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CHAPTER SIX 
The breakdown of Achaian -solidarity and the end of 
the balance of power in archaic Magna Graecia. 
The closing years of the sixth century witnessed tremendous 
changes within the polis-system of Magna Graecia. Originating 
in the band of Greek settlement labelled 'mainstream' Magna 
Graecia in previous chapters, these changes would result in a 
drastic reorganization of the balance of political and military 
power within the Italiote polis-system. The tenets of the 
balance of power in existence prior to the upheavals of the late 
sixth century had their roots 1n the previous century. As 
discussed in chapters 1 and 4, the Achaian poleis of southern 
Italy, spearheaded by Sybaris, began to dominate large tracts 
of the peninsula from very early on in their colonial lives, and 
1n some cases built up territories on the shores of the Ionian 
Sea that soon dwarfed the chorai of their metropoleis. By the 
end of the seventh century the Achaians had initiated a process 
which would see them gain control over much of the 
Tyrrhenian coastline of Magna Graecia as well, entering a 
sphere which had previously been the preserve of the Italiotes 
of Euboian extraction. Moreover, it is also clear that these 
Achaian states were operating as a de facto pan-Achaian 
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league, 1n the process sharing many elements of their 
respective monetary systems and on at least one occasion 
launching a joint military campaign. 
Led by Sybaris, itself the largest and most powerful polis m 
Magna Graecia at that time, the Achaians influenced and in 
some cases dictated the events of the Italiote polis-system 
stretching from Taras in the north-east to Lokroi Epizephyrioi 
in the south. Whether it was through the 1ncuse technique of 
their mints or their imperialistic expansion, the Achaians made 
their presence felt. Thus the crux of the balance of power 
during this period was Achaian domination, with Sybaris as the 
self-interested yet most competent standard bearer. 
Individual Achaian poleis did experience setbacks, but few if 
any of these were decisive in nature, and none altered the fact 
that acting in cohesion, the Achaians were virtually invincible, 
as the destruction of Siris, the second city of Magna Graecia, 
testifies. 
The key weakness in the v1s10n and reality of the 'magna 
Achaia' built in southern Italy, at least from a polis-system 
point of view, was that its maintenance required a willingness 
on the part of the Achaian states to tolerate the pecking order 
established among them, with Sybaris positioned at the top. 
Subsequent Achaian disunity removed one of the greatest 
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assets they possessed within the Italiote polis-system, that is 
joint military action. Although only one instance of pan-
Achaian military intervention is known, via Pompeius Trogus 
and his epitomator Justin (20.2.3-4), the mere threat of such 
action could only have served to intimidate the non-Achaian 
states in the region. The removal of thi$ potential and 
occasionally active power bloc from the Italiote polis-sy stern 
towards the end of the sixth century had enormous 
consequences for the politics of the region. 
Section One: The fall and rise of archaic Kroton. 
Mentioned briefly in earlier chapters, the conflict between 
Sybaris and Kroton towards the end of the sixth century was 
the culmination of a number of factors, all of which probably 
revolved- around a realization within Kroton that the hegemony 
of Sybaris need not be tolerated indefinitely. The two states 
did share a history of co-operation, as demonstrated by the 
Krotoniate participation in the Sybarite invasion of the Siritid 
in the 570' s. Nevertheless, this must be qualified by the 
Sybarite failure to aid Kroton in its conflict with Lokroi towards 
the middle of the same century. As will be discussed in detail 
below, there also existed many potential flashpoints between 
Kroton and Sybaris when it came to the carve-up of the 
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Tyrr henian Ii ttoral. Moreover, another damaging factor in 
relations between the two poleis was the climate of internal 
political upheaval and change in both Kroton and Sybaris 
during the last decades of the sixth century. The rise to 
prominence of policy-makers in the two largest Achaian states 
whose political ideologies had the potential to foster 
antagonistic attitudes towards the regimes around them 
introduced a new, highly flammable element to the Italiote 
polis-system at large. 
1.1 Early expansion and failure. 
As stated 1n chapter 4, Kroton was founded in the same 
generation as Sybaris, and despite the almost deafening topos 
concerning the superiority of Sybaris in nearly every regard 
(land and wealth in particular), it is likely that Kroton was m 
fact a senior player in the mainstream Italiote polis-system. 
However, just as it has been demonstrated that some truth did 
in fact lie behind the Sybarite topos, a case can also be made 
for a relatively slow rate of development at Kroton in terms of 
the assets that facilitated the exercising of disproportionate 
power within the ltaliote polis-system. 
The Delphic oracle associated with the foundation of Kroton 
extant in Diodoros as a secondary answer to a query from the 
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Krotoniate oikistes Myskellos (7.17.1), has been regarded in a 
positive light by many commentators on colonization 
oracles, 1 and therefore serves as a guide when seeking to 
determine the territorial and resource limits of the early 
archaic Krotoniate state. ' In particular, Diodoros' references to 
the AaKivios aKpos and iEpa Kpiµfol) help us to establish the 
approximate northern and southern limits of colonial Kroton' s 
borders, if not effective immediately, then certainly as they 
were perceived to be by the colonists themselves. 2 Such 
boundaries indicate that the c ho r a of Kroton was not 
substantially smaller than the early c ho ra of neighbouring 
Sybaris. Moreover, although it has been demonstrated in 
chapter 4 that the Sybarite chora was in a league of its own 
when it came to productivity, and economic and demographic 
growth, the c ho ra of Kroton also possessed significant 
cultivable resources.3 
Where Kroton and Sybaris truly parted ways was 1n the 
territorial expansion that the latter was to achieve, from the 
seventh century in particular. The aforementioned agricultural 
resources, as well as terrain, both played important roles in 
1 Parke & Wormell, The Delphic Oracle vol. 1, p. 70; Malkin, Religion 
and Colonization in Ancient Greece, pp. 45-6. 
2 Edlund, The Gods and the Place, pp. 106-7. 
3 Graham, "The Colonial Expansion of Greece", p. 112. 
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this process, with Krotoniate expansion, at least initially, 
confined to the coast by the imposing Sila mountain range to 
the west. 4 Moreover, the presence of compact and robust 
indigenous areas adjacent to the Krotoniate chora also placed 
limits on territorial expansion and exploitation of the 
countryside during much of the eighth and seventh 
centuries.5 In contrast, as discussed in chapter 1, the 
Sybarites advanced rapidly up the relatively negotiable Krathis 
and Sybaris valleys and were able to either kill, expel or 
absorb the Oinotrian population therein within the first two 
generations of Greek settlement. 
As discussed in chapter 2, it is most probably during this 
period that the mythological integration of territory in and 
around the Krotoniate c ho ra occurred. Philoktetes 1n 
particular was used to bind the area around Krimissa (Ciro 
Marina/Punta Alice) and Makalla (Murge di Strongoli) to the 
Krotoniate Greek world view. 6 The use of Apollo Alaios at 
Makalla has also be interpreted as a cult symbol designed to 
cater towards indigenous as well as Greek audiences.7 
Considering the effort invested in this process, it is almost 
certain that this northern region in particular survived in an 
4 TWGa, p. 161. 
5 RCA, p. 224. 
6 Ibid., pp. 229-32. 
7 Edlund, The Gods and the Place, pp. 107-8. 
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autonomous form for much of the seventh century as well as 
the eighth, before full integration into the Krotoniate state. 8 
Again, it should be noted that such was the impact of Sybaris 
on the indigenous communities in its immediate vicinity, that it 
was already beginning to look towards the Tyrrhenian Sea by 
the end of the seventh century. 
It should therefore come as no surpnse then that the bulk of 
Krotoniate expansion in the archaic period was firstly confined 
to the shores of the Ionian Sea, and secondly, that the 
expans10n that did occur was largely associated with the sixth 
century. The foundation of Kaulonia in the seventh century 
presents the only major exception to this model, although, as 
argued by Giangiulio, Kaulonia should be regarded as 
conforming to a wider "modello acheo di organizzazione", of 
which Metapontion was also an example. 9 Despite the 
obvious but probably informal obligation to bend to the will of 
the states which had effectively sponsored their establishment 
in Magna Graecia (Kroton and Sybaris), both Kaulonia and 
Metapontion respectively developed into fully-fledged poleis, 
as attested by numerous independent actions throughout their 
existence, as well as the emergence of autonomous mints 
approximately contemporaneous with the em1ss1on of c01ns 
8 RCA, p. 227; Manfredi & Braccesi, I Greci d'Occidente, p. 144. 
9 RCA, p. 223. 
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from Sybaris and Kroton. 
Moreover, as in the case of Metapontion' s relationship to Siris, 
the foundation of Kaulonia may also have been at least partly 
based on a reaction to the foundation of neighbouring Lokroi, 
also founded in the seventh century. As argued in chapter 5, 
there is no evidence to suggest that Kroton and Lokroi came to 
blows as early as the seventh century, but this does not mean 
that the Achaians did not wish to place territorial limits on the 
nascent Lokrian state, particularly in regard to Lokroi' s 
northern borders. 1 O That Lokroi turned to the Tyrrhenian as 
its preferred sub-colonial outlet further suggests that their 
expansionist options underwent curtailment during the course 
of the seventh century. 
After Kaulonia, Krotoniate sub-colonies were established at 
Skylletion (Strabo 6.1.10) and Terina ([Skymnos] 306-7; Steph. 
Byz. s.v. TE'piva; Pliny NH 3.72; Solinus 2.10; Phlegron, FGrH 
257 F31), during the sixth century. At this time it is also 
probable that Kroton managed to achieve full control over 
Krimissa and Makalla.11 References in Hekataios and 
Stephanos also identify a handful of minor sites that probably 
1° Ciaceri, Storia della Magna Grecia vol. 1, p. 172; RCA, p. 224 & n. 35; 
TWGb, p. 181. 
11 RCA, pp. 224, 233 & n. 35. 
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lay within the Krotoniate chora, givmg a further indication as 
to the direction and extent of Krotoniate expansion in the 
archaic period, namely Brystakia, Siberine and Kyterion.12 All 
of these sites were within twenty kilometres of Kroton, and no 
more than ten kilometres from the Ionian Sea. 
However, the colonization of Terina suggests that the 
Krotoniates had finally begun to penetrate the Sila dominated 
interior in the course of the sixth century, - over, a century after 
the foundation of Kroton itself. Intimations of this shift can be 
detected in the presence of Korinthian and Ionic ceramics at 
Cotronei, a site on the Neaithos (Neto) River. This river was the 
most probable route by which transisthmian contact was 
conducted in this region of southern Italy .13 By comparison, 
in the same period· the Sybarites had already exported their 
influence and control across to the Tyrrhenian, and placed the 
stamp of the Sybarite bull over much of the Oinotrian and 
Chonian interior. 
Therefore, despite the unfavourable comparisons with Sybaris 
and its rate of imperialist acquisistion, the Krotoniate polis had 
clearly entered a period of territorial expansion by the early 
sixth century. The degree to which this expansion translated to 
12 TWGa, p. 156. 
13 Edlund, The Gods and the Place, p. 109. 
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power and influence within the Italiote polis-system is 
apparent in the conflicts of the first half of the sixth century. 
As partially discussed in chapters 4 and 5, Kroton was a 
member of the anti-Siris alliance of the 570's which brought 
about the destruction of the only major. non-Achaian polis in 
the region. The benefits from this expedition, apart from the 
usual short term gains through plunder, in all probability 
favoured the more local Achaian states, that is Sybaris and 
Metapontion, rather than Kroton, situated some 150 kilometres 
to the south. As demonstrated previously, clearly there was a 
pan-Achaian element to this conflict and Kroton' s participation 
cannot be interpreted as an instance of strong Krotoniate 
influence or pressure within the Italiote polis-system. Indeed, 
it is possible that Kroton came under pressure from Sybaris, by 
this time well on the way to establishing itself as the regional 
hegemon, to join the attack on Siris. The sack of Siris therefore 
does not help to paint Kroton as a power in its own right. 
Suspicions concerning the limitations of the Krotoniate state 
within the Italiote polis-system are confirmed approximately 
twenty years later at the Battle of the Sagra River. During a 
period of expansion, quite possibly engendered by confidence 
gained at the sack of Siris, Kroton came to blows with the small 
but demonstrably potent Lokrian polis to its south._ As stated 
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earlier, it was probably in the aftermath of Siris that Kroton 
finally asserted itself definitively over the territories to its 
north, centred around Krimissa and Makalla. Moreover, with 
the north secure the Krotoniate push to the Tyrrhenian also 
probably began in earnest, resulting 1n the foundation of 
Terina. As demonstrated in chapter 5, rather than alleged 
Lokrian actions during the Sirite War, it was a , Tyrrhenian 
expedition that in all likelihood generated a conflict with the 
Lokrians, whose own territorial interests had been 
concentrated on the western shores of the peninsula since the 
mid seventh century. 
It would appear that Kroton sought to solve this conflict with 
an invasion of the Lokrian core, as opposed to its Tyrrhenian 
periphery, around the middle of the sixth century. The 
subsequent defeat of the Krotoniate army was, according to 
Strabo and Pompeius Trogus, so severe that Kroton fell into 
serious decline, both militarily and culturally (Strabo 6.1.10; 
Justin 20.4.1). As observed by Dunbabin, a conspicuous 
absence of Krotoniate senior Olympic victors between 548 and 
532 .may also indicate that defeat at Sagra instigated a period 
of malaise at Kroton.1 4 At any rate, a forty year period of 
consistent Krotoniate representation on the senior victors' list 
14 TWGa, p. 360;- F.L. Vatai, Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World: 
From Early Times to the Hellenistic Age (Beckenham, 1984), p. 43. 
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at Olympia certainly came to an end at this time. 
The use of the Olympic games to extrapolate Krotoniate decline 
within the Italiote polis-system is of course never going be 
conclusive in isolation, but there are other indicators that at the 
Sagra Kroton had sustained a body blow to its imperialist 
ambitions even before they had really begun to bear fruit. The 
emergence of an independent Kauloniate mint by c. 530 at the 
latest suggests that Kaulonia may not have been under strong 
Krotoniate influence at this time, despite the likelihood that 
relations between the two states had been close since the 
seventh century .1 5 However, given the autonomy of the 
Metapontine mint from symbols of Sybarite power, as well as 
the continued independence of Kauloniate issues after the 
Krotoniate accession to the Italiote hegemony m 510, it is also 
possible that the emergence of a Kauloniate mint by c. 530 may 
have been coincidental. 
The best indication that Kroton experienced difficulties after its 
defeat at the Sagra manifests itself in the balance of power in 
subsequent relations with Lokroi Epizephyrioi. Flushed with its 
joint victory over Siris, Kroton could well have expected to 
succeed in a bid to assert the kind of imperial dominance over 
15 TWGa, p. 360; De Sensi Sestito, La Calabria in eta arcaica e classica, 
p. 36. 
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its neighbours that Sybaris had so successfully achieved 
further north. However as stated earlier, the essence of that 
victory was its alliance format. Neither Sybaris nor 
Metapontion came to Kroton's aid in c. 550 when the latter 
marched south against Lokroi, and Kroton appears to have paid 
dearly for its misapprehensive behaviour. Moreover, while 
Lokroi did not have the strength to press its victory in the 
devastating manner so recently demonstrated in the Siritid, 
Kroton found itself locked into a cycle of ongoing conflict with 
Lokroi in which the latter invariably proved itself to be a 
tenacious foe, and which effectively stymied Kroton' s efforts to 
play the hegemon in its own neighbourhood for much of the 
remainder of the. sixth century. A comparison with Sparta in 
the post-Leuktra period is illustrative of the problems Kroton 
faced after the Sagra episode. Just as the Spartan capacity to 
project its power beyond the Peloponnesos declined abruptly 
after the rise of a tough and independent, although not 
necessarily powerful, neighbour (Messenia), so too did Kroton 
have its hopes of regional power dashed, at least in the short-
term. 
As demonstrated in chapter 5, after the defeat of Kroton at 
Sagra the Lokrians appear to have adopted a more aggressive 
stance in relation to their Tyrrhenian territories. A second 
Krotoniate defeat is recorded as having occurred around 525 
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(SEG 11.1211), this time with specific reference to Lokroi's 
Tyrrhenian sub-po leis, Hipponion and Medma. Moreover, 
Kroton' s fortunes in their conflict with Lokroi, particularly on 
the Tyrrhenian front, took a further dive when in the 4 7 0' s the 
Lokrians seized the then Krotoniate-controlled sub-polis of('" 
Temesa, also on the Tyrrhenian Sea (Strabo 6 .1.5) .1 6 
Although strictly falling outs.ide the parameters of our period, 
the attack on Temesa reveals much concerning the nature of 
the Kroton-Lokroi conflict, namely that the Tyrrhenian 
continued to be the chief sticking point between the two states 
for years to come. 
Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 5, it is possible that in the 
wake of the Sagra disaster Lokroi may have been able or 
tempted to put pressure on Kroton' s sphere of influence to the 
south of the Lakinian promontory. Despite the 
inconclusiveness of the numismatic evidence cited above, 
Kaulonia, the southernmost of Kroton' s allies, may well have 
felt the need to initiate a rapproachement with Lokroi, in the 
short term at least. Indeed, such a development may even 
have extended to the Krotoniate dependency, Skyll~tion, north 
of Kaulonia. Certainly, the actions of Dionysios I of Syracuse in 
389, in which Kaulonia and Skylletion were razed and their 
chorai ceded to Lokroi (Diod. 14.106.3; Strabo 6.1.10), suggest 
1 6 De Sensi Sestito, La Calabria in eta arcaica e classica, p. 62. 
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that Lokroi did harbour designs on this area, and although they 
do not appear to have been realized in such a drastic form until 
the fourth century, it is possible that they possessed an 
historical basis, stemming from the Krotoniate-Lokrian conflicts 
of the sixth and fifth centuries. As indicated by the loss of 
Temesa, even after its victory over Sybaris in 510, Kroton 
clearly remained vulnerable to Lokrian assaults from the south, 
assaults to which it had exposed itself through its previous 
losses to Lokroi, primarily at Sagra. 
Thus for Kroton the Battle of the Sagra should also be 
understood as a watershed in its relations with the other 
poleis in the region. In terms of population, agriculture and 
military might, by the end of the seventh century it was 
becoming evident that the core of the Italiote polis-system 
was at Sybaris, along with its fertile plains, traversable valleys 
and subjugated or accommodated indigenous population 
centres. Kroton possessed lesser versions of all the above and 
by the sixth century was attempting to devel.op its assets in a 
manner similar to that of Sybaris. However, before Krotoniate 
imperialiasm could progress beyond anything more than an 
embryonic state, Kroton suffered a major defeat at the hands of 
a smaller neighbour. 
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Moreover, through its defeat at the Sagra Kroton was forced to 
concentrate much of its energy on the relatively peripheral 
Tyrrhenian region. As a neighbour of Sybaris, it is highly likely 
that Kroton had at least a rough understanding of the basis of 
Sybarite power, if only in terms of agricultural resources. 
While the Tyrrhenian littoral around Hipponion in particular 
did in fact contain some arable land, Kroton' s need to fight a 
lengthy conflict in such an area only highlights the extent to 
which Kroton found itself in many ways removed from the 
centre of the Italiote polis-system, and effectively stripped of 
most of the advantages of belonging to the powerful Achaian 
bloc. Consequently, Kroton found itself dragged into the ranks 
of the medium-sized states of the Italiote po l is-system, a 
gr.oup from which Kroton was evidently trying to distance itself 
by attempting to establish a southern 'magna Achaia' based 
approximately upon the Sybarite hegemony to the north. Thus 
Kroton fell even as it began its premature rise. 
1.2 Kroton and the 'Pythagorean revival'. 
Due to an abundance of confused and often hagiographical 
commentary on Pythagoras of Samos and his political and social 
impact upon Kroton and Magna Graecia in general, the issue of 
Krotoniate revival within the Italiote po l is-system in the 
generation after the Sagra defeat is a controversial one to say 
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the least. Moreover, as the vast majority of this material was 
in all probability written after the Krotoniate conquest of the 
Sybaritid in 510, the theme of 'revival' would have been 
difficult to refute in hindsight. Afterall, following the nadir of 
Sagra, how could any commentator have possibly believed that 
Kroton had not undergone a fundamental martial and moral 
recovery in order to have defeated the mighty Sybarite 
hegemon? The arrival of Pythagoras of Samas at Kroton 
around 531 (Justin 20.4.17), has therefore been interpreted by 
many scholars as the turning point in Krotoniate fortunes. 1 7 
Certainly the ability of Kroton to defeat in battle the greatest 
land power in Magna Graecia at that time does suggest that 
Kroton must have experienced a revival of some description, at 
least in respect to its armed forces. A number of the ancient 
sources relating to Pythagoras claim that this triumph was a 
direct result of a moral re-invigoration of the state instigated 
by the Samian philosopher and his followers, the Pythagoreans. 
Justin asserts that the Krotoniates adopted a hedonistic way of 
1 7 The date varies between c. 531 and c. 529. See K. Von Fritz, 
Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy: An Analysis of the Sources 
(New York, 1977 [rep.]), pp. 91-2; TWGa, p. 360; GHW, p. 115; Attianese, 
Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, p. 51; Giangiulio, "Aspetti di storia della 
Magna Grecia", p. 26; De Sensi Sestito, La Calabria in etii arcaica e 
classica, p. 37; de Juliis, Magna Grecia, p. 178; Vatai, ·Intellectuals in 
Politics in the Greek World, p. 37. 
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life after their defeat at Sagra, perhaps accounting for the 
decline in their Olympic prowess (20.4.1). Justin, and also 
Timaios and Diodoros then go on to claim that it was only 
through the intervention of Pythagoras that this hedonism was 
broken and the martial vigour of Kroton restored (Justin 
20.4.2-13; Tim. ap. Iamb., VP 37-57; Diod. 10.3). 
Certainly, in a climate of disillusionment, it 1s not difficult to 
accept the hypothesis that many Krotoniates found Pythagoras' 
quasi-religious and often puritanical approaches to the state's 
woes attractive. 1 B In this sense Pythagoras could well have 
constituted a positive force in the polis, effectively raising the 
morale of the demoralized military elite of Kroton upon whom 
the weight of the disaster at the Sagra had in all probability 
fallen most heavily .1 9 However, despite the likelihood of low 
morale at Kroton, it does not necessarily follow that Pythagoras 
was the only 'prophet' present at that time, nor that his brarid 
of spiritual revival was the most influential. In particular, 
scholars have long suspected that a sixth century nexus 
between Orphism and Pythagoreanism evolved within Magna 
Graecia. 20 Indeed it is possible that the fifth century gold leaf 
18 Vatai, Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World, pp. 44-8. 
19 Ibid., pp. 44-5. 
20 R. Parker, "Early Orphism", The Greek World, A. Powell (ed.) 
(London, 1995), p. 501; Vatai, Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek 
World, p. 47. 
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funerary inscriptions from Kyme and Hipponion reflect an 
earlier fixation among Italiotes influenced by Pythagoras' 
teachings concerned, with salvation and the afterlife. 2 1 
At any rate whether Pythagoras was only one of a number of 
revivalist preachers at Kroton at the time is superseded by -the 
fact that the sources claim that it was Pythagoras, and his 
foHowers, who entered the political arena. Thus it is the extent 
to which Pythagoras and his followers were able to convert 
their 'spiritual prestige' into influence over, and a revival of, 
Kroton' s position within the polis-system of Magna Graecia 
that concerns this inquiry most. In other words, it is the 
degree to which. Pythagoras transformed his sect into a political 
force so as to influence the foreign policies of Kroton that needs 
to be assessed. 
In addition to the sympathizers who allegedly numbered in the 
thousands, Iamblichos states that Pythagoras built up a core 
group of some six hundred members (VP 29-30). The 
existence of a core group is also mentioned by Justin (20.4.14), 
Diogenes Laertios (8.3), and Apollonios of Tyana (ap. Iamb. 
254 ), although the figure cited by these sources is three 
hundred. Moreover, a substantial number of these core 
21 Parker, "Early Orphism", pp. 485, 496-7; M. Marcovich, "The Gold 
Leaf from Hipponion", ZP E 23 (1976), pp. 221-4. 
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followers appear to have been recruited from amongst the 
aristocratic elite of Kroton (Iamb., VP 88, 254), enough in fact 
to constitute what was probably a relatively disciplined and 
potentially influential, but not necessarily pervasive, bloc 
within the aristocrat-dominated chilion, the seniormost 
Krotoniate constitutional body (VP 257, 260).22 In any case, 
given the Pythagoreans' support for the ancestral constitution 
of Kroton (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 255), it is extremely unlikely 
that the movement sought to exercise power outside the 
established machinery of government.23 
One of the more prominent members of this core group was 
Kylon, a wealthy aristocrat who later fell out with the 
Pythagoreans, but who was also powerful enough to secure the 
exarchate based on the conquered Sybarite territories after 
510 in his own right (VP 74, 249, 258). Milon, the five-time 
senior Olympic wrestling champion, and later a commander of 
the Krotoniate army, was also reputed to have been a member 
(VP 249, 267; Strabo 6.1.12; Diod. 12.9.5-6), as was 
Demokedes, the doctor whose skills had ensured favour 
amongst several aristocratic and royal courts of the eastern 
Mediterranean (VP 257, 261; Hdt. 3.125, 131, 134-7). Many 
22 Vatai, Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World, pp. 49-50. 
23 E.L. Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory (New 
York, 1979 [rep.]), p. 18. 
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others for whom aristocratic ong1ns are suggested by their 
membership of the chilion, are also named and are depicted as 
vocal advocates for the Pythagorean cause within the 
Krotoniate body politic.24 It is therefore evident that the 
Pythagoreans constituted a group within Kroton who possessed 
the potential to exercise at least some influence over the 
course which Kroton would chart in its relations with the other 
poleis of Magna Graecia. 
Pythagorean activity within the realm of Krotoniate foreign 
policy is first hinted at around 517, when Demokedes, an 
expatriate doctor, sought asylum in his former homeland after 
escaping from his Persian masters. Recorded by Herodotos, the 
affair can be construed as a Pythagorean foray into a matter 
with international connotations, via one of their number, Milon, 
who effectively rescued Demokedes from a return to slavery in 
the East by agreeing to engage his daughter to him (3 .13 6-7). 
By opposing the will of Demokedes' Persian owners, the 
Pythagoreans were potentially involving the rest of the polis 
in a dispute with Sousa. While this incident does not have· an 
impact upon the Italiote polis-system as such, it does indicate 
24 These include the otherwise unkno"".n Alkimachos, Deinarchos and 
Meton, all described as speakers in the chilion by Iamblichos (VP 257). 
See also Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 
56. 
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that after some fourteen years of residence in Kroton the 
Pythagoreans were capable of exercising some influence over 
the direction which Kroton took when conducting relations with 
other states.2 5 
However, the most crucial indicator of the efficacy of the 
Pythagorean faction within Krotoniate politics is the stance 
allegedly adopted by this faction during negotiations between 
Sybaris and Kroton over the extradition of Sybarite exiles then 
resident 1n Kroton. 2 6 These negotiations occurred in or 
around 510, the same year as the military conflict between 
Kroton and Sybaris, and according to Diodoros, their breakdown 
was the primary cause of this conflict (12.9.3). Indeed, there is 
little reason to doubt that Kroton' s harbouring of Sybarite 
exiles was in fact one of the reasons for the outbreak of war 
between the two pole is. It is after all evident from other 
literary sources, as well as numismatic evidence, that this 
conflict did occur at this time; and furthermore, that the issue 
of exiles was on more than one occas10n a factor in the 
outbreak of conflict between Greek states.2 7 Moreover, both 
Diodoros and Iamblichos claim that Pythagoras was personally 
25 For a full discussion of the Demokedes affair, see appendix. 
26 Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 13. 
2 7 The presence of exiles and their subsequent agitation against him 
within neighbouring pole is regularly played a role in determining the 
direction of Dionysios I's aggression (Diod. 14.87.1-4; 103.4-5). 
296 
involved m the debate, and that he was hostile to the Sybarite 
demands (Diod. 12.9.4; Iamb., VP 133, 177-8). While it is 
Diodoros alone who specifically states that Pythagoras carried 
the debate, lamblichos, m citing Apollonios (ap. Iamb., VP 
260), demonstrates that he knew Kroton went to war with 
Sybaris not long after the departure of the Sybarite embassy, 
and by extension that Pythagoras played a key role in this 
development. If these accounts are accurate or even only 
approximately so as Minar and others attest, 2 8 then we are 
dealing with an incidence of Pythagorean intervention 1n 
Krotoniate politics which had a direct impact upon the polis-
system of Magna Graecia, namely war between its two senior 
Achaian members. 
Given the vulnerability of many of the sources to the charge of 
Pythagorean sympathies, it is not inconceivable that this 
episode is simply an example of magnifying the achievements 
of Pythagoras at Kroton. However, as von Fritz has noted, of 
the Pythagorean corpus that has survived, only Diodoros and 
Iamblichos make mention of Pythagoras' role in the debate. 
Furthermore, given the likelihood that Timaios is the source for 
28 Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, pp. 13-
15. 
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both, the veracity of their claim need not be dismissed out of 
hand. 2 9 Aristoxenos. and Dikaiarchos, the authors of the two 
earliest surviving, although fragmentary, Bioi of Pythagoras, are 
largely concerned with the calamities visited upon Pythagoras 
and his followers by the ungrateful poleis of Magna Graecia 
after the Krotoniate victory over Sybaris, as well as the 
various intellectual and philosophical tenets of the Pythagorean 
order. 30 Part of this may derive from the fact that 
Aristoxenos is said to have actually interviewed some of the 
last surviving Pythagoreans, some of whom would surely have 
been embittered by their exile (Diog. Laert. 8.46). Dikaiarchos, 
a near contemporary of Aristoxenos, may well have consulted 
similar sources. 
The case of Timaios as a source is arguably somewhat different. 
While not claiming to possess firsthand information, as in the 
case of Aristoxenos, Timaios can be said to have attempted to 
approach Pythagorean issues from a historical perspective, thus 
seeking to -integrate the Pythagoreans into a wider history of 
southern Italy, rather than producing biographical or 
hagiographical accounts of the lives of Pythagoras and his 
followers. Moreover, as observed by Pearson, Timaios refers to 
29 Von Fritz, Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy, p. 47; GHW, pp. 
113, 115-17. 
SO Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, pp. 51-2. 
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Pythagoras In a particularly respectful light on only one 
occasion (FGrH 566 F132), emphasizing further the probability 
that Timaios was not, at least as far as he was concerned, 
according special treatment to Pythagoras, nor seeking t<? 
magnify his alleged deeds. 31 The intervention of Pythagoras 
during the contentious debate over the fate of the Sybarite 
exiles, as probably derived from Timaios by Diodoros and 
Iamblichos, therefore deserves a reasonably tolerant hearing 
when its veracity is being assessed. 
As stated earlier, if Pythagoras did In fact intervene 
successfully In opposition to the demands of the Sybarite 
embassy, as has been demonstrated to be feasible, then neither 
should the influence of the Pythagorean movement within 
Kroton, nor the ability of the Pythagoreans to help reinvigorate 
Krotoniate morale be underestimated. Moreover, it can also be 
demonstrated that this influence extended to matters of fo!eign 
policy and therefore constituted the ability to affect the polis-
system of Magna Graecia. 
Sybarite embassy was 
Diodoros states clearly that the 
delivering an ultimatum to the 
Krotoniates, and that failure to surrender the exiles in question 
would result in war (12.9.4). Pythagoras would surely have 
31 Von Fritz, Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy, p. 66; Minar, 
Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 52; G HW, pp. 41-
2, 125. 
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been aware of this threat when he proferred his advice, and 
thus effectively aligned himself with, or perhaps even helped 
to constitute, the 'war party' within Krotoniate political circles. 
Thus even if the Pythagorean role in the Demokedes' affair of c. 
517 is rejected, it is apparent that Pythagoras and. his followers 
found themselves in the midst of a war in 510, a war which 
their leader in all likelihood supported. It should therefore 
come as no surprise that Milon, previously famous for his 
Olympic wrestling victories and a known member of the 
Pythagorean order (Strabo 6.1.12; Iamb., VP 249, 267; Diod. 
12.9.6; Hdt. 3.137), is said by Diodoros to have led the 
Krotoniate army into battle against Sybaris, again with Timaios 
as his likely, authority.32 
Moreover, the stasis that broke out in Kroton after the victory 
over Sybaris in many ways ressembles a dispute within the 
war party which had originally advocated a belligerent 
response to Sybarite demands. The main protagonists in this 
stasis, at least initially, were the Pythagoreans on the one 
hand, and a group of militant aristocrats centred around the 
former Pythagorean Kylon on the other (Aristox. F18 [Wehrli]). 
That Kylon was indeed a member of the original war party is 
strongly suggested by his pre-eminence in the subsequent 
carve-up of the spoils of war (Iamb., VP 74). Moreover, that 
32 GHW, pp. 112-13. 
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the Pythagoreans were also similarly connected to the war 
effort is demonstrated by their very definite ideas about the 
administration of the newly conquered territories (Ap.Ty. ap. 
Iamb., VP 255). Thus the Pythagoreans can be seen to have 
provided policy advice, moral guidance, military leadership and 
administrative strictures In relation to the war with Sybaris 
and its aftermath. It Is therefore evident that the 
Pythagoreans were involved in the conflict with Sybaris at 
most, if not all stages of its development, including its 
inception, conduct and aftermath. 
Having established the strong possibility that Pythagoras and 
his movement did play a significant role in the Sybarite War, 
the one event that establishes Kroton as a reinvigorated force 
in the Italiote polis-system more than any other, the key 
question now posed is this: did Pythagoreanism, as claimed by 
many of the sources, therefore precipitate the dramatic revival 
in Krotoniate fortunes? Exactly what Pythagoras brought to 
Krotoniate political power is a matter of debate. Clearly the 
post-Sagra period was a potentially demoralizing one for 
Kroton, exacerbated by the tenacity of Lokroi to the south. 
Indeed, as argued previously, Kroton' s position in the Italiote 
polis-system had probably suffered to a substantial degree. 
However, it must also be emphasized that Kroton did not 
disappear from the map of Magna Graecia, as had been the fate 
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of Siris, and was able to affect a significant recovery within a 
generation of the Sagra defeat. In other words, Kroton had not 
received a mortal wound from Lokroi and, as one might argue, 
within the context of the often wildly unpredictable 
fluctuations of fortune endemic to polis-systems all over 
Hellas, Kroton could be expected to rise again, with or without 
the aid of Pythagoras and his disciples. 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that one group of 
aristocrats, the 'Kylonians', were probably in favour of war 
with Sybaris regardless of Pythagorean intervention. However, 
it can be said that the Pythagoreans helped to engineer an 
environment imbued with confidence and bellicosity within 
Kroton at a time when matters of war and peace were being 
debated. Given that war was the result, and that Kroton' s 
victory signalled its defintive return to the centre stage of the 
Italiote polis-system, the Pythagoreans should therefore be 
able to claim a significant, but by no means the dominant, place 
in the revival of the Krotoniate state at the end of the sixth 
century. 
302 
Section Two: Ideological polarization and territorial 
competition: inter-Achaian conflict in the late sixth 
century. 
The outbreak of war between Sybaris and Kroton in 510 can be 
said to have represented the culmination of several years of 
tense relations. On the one hand, the Pythagoreans' 
aforementioned opposition to Sybaris, which was 1n many ways 
ideologically-based, helped to poison the diplomatic climate 
between Kroton and Sybaris. However, it is also important to 
understand that there existed a number of crucial non-
ideological points of conflict between Kroton and Sybaris, 
including pre-existing disputes over territory, . commerce, 
regional hegemony, and spheres of influence. 
2.1 Pythagoreanism, anti-aristocratic revolution, and 
the clash of Sybaris and Kroton. 
An examination of the debate prompted by the demands of the 
Sybarite embassy adds a second dimension to the Pythagorean 
contribution to the political life of Kroton. As has been 
demonstrated, the Pythagoreans' opposition to Sybaris in 510 
helped to set Kroton on a course of political and military 
revival within the Italiote polis-system. Moreover, the 
reasons given by the sources for this belligerent stance also 
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serve to highlight the fact that any significant Pythagorean 
influence at Kroton at this time was conducive to conflict 
between Kroton and Sybaris. According to Iamblichos, and in 
contrast to Diodoros' more generalist position, Pythagoras had a 
personal motive for his opposition to the Sybarites. Upon the 
arrival of the Sybarite embassy in Kroton, Pythagoras is said to 
have adopted a hostile position on account of the murder of 
Pythagorean students at Sybaris (VP 133, 177).3 3 That 
Pythagoreans were indeed present in Sybaris during the sixth 
century is confirmed by Iamblichos at various points in his 0 n 
the Pythagorean Life (33, 36, 267). 
Indeed the nature of the Sybarite regime at this time reveals 
much not only about why Pythagorean students may have 
been murdered in Sybaris, but also about the Pythagoreans' 
own political prejudices and the impact of these prejudices 
upon Krotoniate-Sybarite relations. At some point prior to the 
Sybarite ultimatum of 510 a coup had occurred in Sybaris, 
bringing to power a certain Telys. Described by Diodoros as a 
O-rwaywy6s (12.9.2), by Herodotos as a Bacn}..Elfs (5.44), and by both 
Herodotos and Herakleides of Pontos as a Tvpavvos (Hdt. 5.44; 
3 3 At VP 133 Iamblichos mentions only that one of Pythagoras' 
friends had been murdered by a Sybarite, whereas at 177 it is evident 
that Pythagoras lost several of his followers to Sybarite violence and 
that one of the ambassadors also happened to be involved in one or all of 
these killings. 
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Herakleides F49 [Wehrli]), it would appear that Telys headed a 
populist regime, 34 and like Peisistratos, quite possibly without 
any formal title. Diodoros' characterization of the opponents of 
Telys, such as those who sought refuge at Kroton in 510, as 
deriving from the wealthiest classes gives further credence to 
the view that Telys was a demagogic tyrant (12.9.2).3 5 
As argued earlier in the section, the Pythagorean movement at 
Kroton possessed a decidedly aristocratic hue, and their 
championing of the ancient politeia of Kroton after 510 can 
only underscore their prejudice towards aristocratic 
government (Iamb., VP 255). Thus the emergence of Telys' 
regime cannot have boded particularly well for any 
Pythagoreans then resident in Sybaris, and it is to this period 
that the murders of Pythagoras' Sybarite students probably 
belong. That Telys chose to eradicate the Pythagorean presence 
in Sybaris, along with five hundred local aristocrats should 
therefore not be seen as surpnsmg. Moreover, the subsequent 
hostility on the part of the Pythagoreans of Kroton towards 
Sybarite demands, as well as their enthusiastic participation in 
3 4 T W Ga, pp. 83, 362; Vatai, Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek 
World, p. 43; de Juliis, Magna Grecia, p. 179. 
35 However, that Telys himself was an aristocrat cannot be ruled out, 
particularly given his relationship with the Krotoniate aristocrat, 
Philippos (Hdt. 5.47). 
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the ensmng war can be located within an established pattern of 
deteriorating relations between the Pythagorean movement 
and the nascent anti-aristocratic regime at Sybaris. 
Indeed, given that some estimates of the duration of the 
tyranny of Telys are as high as ten years, 3 6 and that the anti-
aristocratic pogroms launched by this regime presumably 
began early in its life, it is possible that the mutual antipathy 
between the Pythagoreans and the partisans of Telys was well 
established by 510. That Telys had been in power for at least 
two years prior to the outbreak of war between Sybaris and 
Kroton is suggested by Telys' relationship with Philippos of 
Kroton, who was to be the tyrant's son-in-law (Hdt. 5.47). 
Enough time had lapsed between the rise of Telys and the war 
itself for Philippos to negotiate a marriage, experience a 
sentence of exile which included a sojourn at the Kinyps with 
Dorieus, and to return to Magna Graecia in time to aid Kroton 
against Sybaris in 510. Dorieus' own stay at the Kinyps River 
(Hdt. 5.42), is usually dated to between c. 514 and c. 512, thus 
indicating that if Herodotos' account of the life of Philippos is 
correct, then Telys had been ruling Sybaris for up to four years 
before the final showdown with Kroton.3 7 Moreover, given 
the intense commitment to mutual defence amongst the 
36 De Juliis dates Telys' seizure of power to c. 520: Magna Grecia, p. 179. 
37 TWGa, p. 349. 
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Pythagoreans, these four years probably served to increase the 
bitterness on the part of the Pythagorean movement, and 
harden their resolve to punish those responsible for the 
murder of their Sybarite comrades at the next opportunity.3 8 
Furthermore, the contrast between the principles of the 
Pythagorean movement and the relatively luxurious conditions 
at Sybaris afforded by the prosperity of the Sybarite c ho ra 
could not have been greater. The alleged adoption by the 
Pythagoreans of tenets such as property held in common 
(Iamb., VP 72; DL 8.10), strict veneration of the gods (VP 45), 
and ascetic self-regulation (VP 41-2), must have helped to 
engender a low opinion of their neighbours to thC? north. 3 9 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that a Kroton influenced by the 
Pythagoreans would not have indulged in the denigration of 
their Sybarite foes when war broke out, based upon their own 
moral and ideologocal superiority.4 0 In effect, we are dealing 
with the foundations of a bell um iustum ideology, latent and 
non-specific, but relatively easy to adapt to the requirements 
of the war at hand. 
38 Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 23; 
Vatai, Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World, pp. 50-2. 
39 Vatai, Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World, pp. 52-3. 
40 Pugliese-Canatelli, "An Outline of the Political History of the Greeks 
in the West", p. 156. 
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Thus in many ways it can be said that the Pythagoreans were 
part of a shift towards ideological extremism within the Italiote 
palis-system, and in particular, within its two largest 
members, Kroton _and Sybaris. The emergence of an influential 
and politically conservative movement at Kroton at about the 
same time as the establishment of a demagogic tyranny in 
Sybaris provided for an environment that was highly 
combustible. The catalyst for the actual outbreak of war was a 
dispute which involved the fate of aristocratic Sybarite 
refugees, over which the two protagonists predictably held 
diametrically opposed views. For Telys, the continuing survival 
of such a potentially dangerous diaspora was inconceivable. 
However for the Pythagoreans, the Sybarites were an outcast 
people whose legendary decadence and violent rejection of 
their own ancien regime and all those associated with it, 
including local Pythagoreans, demanded that they be opposed 
at every turn, both in the name of morality and vengeance. In 
sum, fundamental changes in the stila di vita in both Kroton 
and Sybaris during the last decades of the sixth century helped 
to construct the conditions for conflict in the region. 4 1 
41 De Juliis, Magna Grecia, p. 179. 
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2.2 Regional rivalry and the end of 'easy' expansion in 
central Magna Graecia. 
Whilst noticeable changes in the domestic arenas of both 
Sybaris and Kroton were taking place at this time, it is crucial 
to appreciate the territorial developments also underway in the 
region. The first half of the sixth century witnessed rapid 
expansion among the Achaian states of central Magna Graecia. 
Sybaris continued to expand onto the Tyrrhenian half of the 
peninsula, with the foundations at Laos and Skidros probably 
occurnng at this time. Moreover, the Siritid was also 
conquered by a Sybarite-led coalition. Kroton too advanced its 
borders in the north, and also to the west, at Terina; and 
Metapontion also began to penetrate the interior of the 
peninsula to its west, around the aforementioned Cozzo 
Presepe. However, it is apparent that by the middle of the 
century opportunities for relatively easy territorial expansion 
were beginning to dry up. The pervasive extent of the Sybarite 
_domination over the Oinotrian and Chonian settlements of the 
interior had removed a key group of potentially 'soft targets' 
from the equation. Furthermore, Kroton' s experience with 
Lokroi in particular indicates that without coordinated Achaian 
action it would prove more difficult to subordinate the non-
Achaian states in the region. 
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As argued m chapter 5, the defeat of Kroton at the Sagra 
around 550 also had the effect of raising the prestige and 
power of Lokroi to the point that for Kroton any expansion to 
its south or west would now involve a serious commitment of 
forces without any guarantee of success. With the region to its 
north already under firm Sybarite control, the second half of 
the sixth century was not looking particularly bright for 
Krotoniate imperialism. In essence, for Kroton to expand its 
territory and role in the Italiote polis-system, the status quo 
had to be disturbed in a radical and decisive manner.4 2 
While an important Pythagorean role has been identified in the 
events immediately leading up to the outbreak of war between 
Kroton and Sybaris, it needs to be emphasized that Kroton did 
not go to war with its hegemonal neighbour solely to execute 
the will of Pythagoras and his school. Despite the tenacity of 
the Lokrians to the south, the empire of Sybaris was afterall 
the most obvious impediment to Krotoniate expansion in the 
long-term. Sybaris controlled the bulk of the agricultural 
resources in the region, as well as a substantial share of the 
trans-isthmian routes. Indeed, the Krotoniate Tyrrhenian 
foundation at Terina was in the immediate vicinity of the 
Sybarite sub-colony, Temesa. The proximity of these outposts 
42 Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 12. 
310 
could well have been a point of contention between the two 
states, 43 particularly given the likelihood that Kroton was 
seeking to as.sert itself in this area, as indicated by the 
protracted Tyrrhenian confrontation with Lokroi from c. 550 
onwards. Krotoniate expansion to its north and, after c. 550, to 
its south was clearly not feasible at this time and it is possible 
that the Tyrrhenian coastline constituted Kroton' s last 
opportunity to advance its frontier. Ill-feeling between Kroton 
and Sybaris, generated by events on the Tyrrhenian littoral, 
was therefore a distinct possibility. 
Regardless of the specific Pythagorean objections to the 
methods and extremes of Telys, it is also difficult to picture 
Kroton as being at ease with the emergence of a volatile 
demagogic regime in Sybaris.44 Indeed, as demonstrated in 
section 1.2, there are strong indications that a war party 
separate from the Pythagoreans and under the leadership of 
the future exarch Kylon, existed at Kroton in 510. What is 
more, the new Sybarite regime had quickly demonstrated itself 
to be aggressive both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. 
Moreover, due to the size and importance of the Sybarite polis, 
stasis within Sybaris clearly had the ability to destabilize the 
polis-system within which it operated, as indicated by the 
4 3 RCA, p. 238 & n. 35; Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, p. 176. 
44 Pallotino, A History of Earliest Italy, p. 57. 
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presence of Sybarite exiles In Kroton, the subsequent 
ultimatum from Sybaris, and the eventual battle at the Traeis. 
Indeed, an undated event recorded by Phylarchos depicts a 
violent scene in which thirty Krotoniate ambassadors were 
allegedly put to death by the Sybarites (ap. Athen 521d). 
While the occasion may have been exaggerated by Phylarchos 
or his source, this type of behaviour does accord well with the 
style of Sybarite foreign policy under "Telys, namely threats 
and ultimatums to neighbouring states. Such developments did 
not require the presence of the Pythagorean movement to alert 
Kroton to the dangers posed to it by a Sybaris led by Telys, or 
to provoke militants within its own citizenry to urge a robust 
response. 
Given its eventual outcome, the debate within Kroton in 510 
over the fate of the Sybarite exiles proved to be a crucial one 
for this polis.4 5 Kroton had little to be satisfied with in its 
recent history and, as demonstrated by its expansionist 
activities around Terina, Krimissa and Lokroi earlier in the 
century, Kroton had clearly hoped for a more prominent 
position Ill the Sybarite-dominated Italiote polis-system. 
However, despite these grievances it IS unlikely that Kroton 
45 Diodoros implies that both an ekkles ia and a council (ovyK}.,l{Tos), 
perhaps the chilion of Iamblichos' account (VP 259-60), were 
summoned to deliberate on this issue (12.9A). 
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went out of its way to provoke a Sybarite invasion 1n 510. 
Sybaris was the regional hegemon and had been so for most of 
the century, and while the sources' estimations of the size of 
the Sybarite army are prone to exaggeration, as argued in 
chapter 4, their understanding that Sybaris outnumbered 
Kroton' s forces significantly is unlikely to have been misplaced. 
Thus the sources' depiction of the events immediately prior to 
the Battle of the Traeis as involving an aggressive Sybarite 
ultimatum, rather than an overt act of war by Kroton, are most 
probably accurate. 
As discussed above, Kroton did in fact possess militants of its 
own, including the Pythagoreans, but opinion was divided 1n 
510 as to whether the Sybarite demands should be met. 
Indeed, Diodoros specifies that it was the demos which sought 
to avoid conflict, underscoring the earlier suggestion that it was 
the aristocracy-orientated Pythagoreans and other elites who 
agitated most vocally for war (12.9.4). It was afterall 
aristocrats like Kylon who would benefit most from the war, 
with victory vastly increasing the amount of land available for 
aristocratic economic exploitation. Moreover, given the 
revolutionary nature of the Sybarite government under Telys, 
it is quite possible that the aristocratic regime of Kroton would 
have come under pressure to adopt a more populist 
constitution, more in line with that of Sybaris itself, if 
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concessions over the harbouring of exiles were made. The 
Krotoniate aristocracy thus had much to fear from Sybaris 
under Telys and many incentives to resist its demands. 
The resultant war can therefore be represented as a decision 
by the majority of the Krotoniate aristocracy to resist the 
wishes of the regional hegemon in the interests of self-
preservation and also, by extension, to contest the hegemony 
itself. Indeed, it can be argued that Kroton had little choice but 
to take this course if it wished to avoid being bound to the 
whims of its northern neighbour in future. In essence, it suited 
many within Kroton' s decision-making elite to bring about a 
violent resolution to the problems being experienced within the 
Krotoniate-Sybarite relationship. Moreover, these problems 
can be said to have been inherent features of Krotoniate-
Sybarite relations, in that the regional ambitions of Kroton did 
not accord well with the existence of an all-pervasive Sybarite 
empue. Sybaris clearly did not view Kroton as an equal 
partner even before the revolution of Telys, as suggested by its 
absence on the Sagra battlefield as far back as c. 550. In 
contrast, it is evident that Kroton saw itself as a regional power 
in the making, with territorial ambitions on both sides of the 
peninsula. The conditions for conflict between the two states 
were therefore apparent long before the introduction of 
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Pythagoreanism and demagogic revolutionary change to the 
ltaliote po l is-system. The ideological distance between the 
regimes of both states by 510 certainly increased the likelihood 
of an 'incident' at that time, but the conflict that followed was 
also fundamentally about power within the central ltaliote 
polis-system as a whole. 
Section Three: Balance of power recast: the collapse of 
Sybaris and the Krotoniate new order. 
Achaian solidarity, confined as it was to occasional mutual 
assistance in war and such general principles as numismatic 
cooperation and the preference for further Achaian 
colonization, was nonetheless the most important feature of the 
central Italiote polis-system in the archaic period. For a 
century and more, Achaian states exercised hegemony over the 
largest and most populous region of Magna Graecia, 
manipulated the inflow of new migrants to the area, and 
brooked no foreign intervention in the affairs of southern Italy 
under their control. However, this balance of power was 
shattered irrecoverably by two key developments: the 
destruction of the Sybarite empire and the nse of a new order 
under the hegemony of its destroyer, Kroton. 
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3.1 The fall of the Sybarite empire. 
The ultimatum issued to Kroton in 510 concerning the 
extradition of Sybarite exiles led directly to the outbreak of 
war between the two states. Given the fundamentally different 
imperialist fortunes of the two states, the Sybarites may be 
forgiven for feeling confident in issuing such threats. However, 
the Sybarites suffered a massive defeat at the hands of Kroton 
and were forced to endure the destruction of their astu and 
the dissolution of much of their empire. As discussed in 
chapter 4, it is apparent that Sybaris possessed the soundest 
possible foundations for its imperialism, yet still managed to 
lose the struggle with its Krotoniate challenger in 510. This 
section will attempt to reconcile the seemingly incredible 
distance between Sybarite strength and its rapid collapse, as 
well as provide an analysis of the last years of the Sybarite 
empue. 
As reported by Diodoros, any defiance on the part of the 
Krotoniates concerning the extradition ultimatum would 
automatically result in a declaration of war by Sybaris (12.9.4). 
However, according to Iamblichos the major battle of this war 
took place by the Traeis River (VP 260), situated within the 
southern rim of Sybarite territory. Thus, despite the claims of 
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Diodoros that it was the Sybarite army which advanced against 
Kroton (12.9.5), it would appear that the Krotoniates launched a 
pre-emptive strike against their foe. 46 Similarly, concerning 
the war Herodotos remarks only that the Sybarites were 
preparing to march against Kroton when the battle took place 
(µ€11.l-.. uv cnpaTEvrn8ai), again suggesting that Kroton struck the 
first blow. 
That Kroton may have decided to take such a step makes much 
sense given the context of the conflict. The Krotoniates afterall 
knew that war would result from their negative answer and 
thus knew before Sybaris that a military clash was imminent. 
In essence, Kroton was able to assert control over the timing of 
the battle, and by extension, the place. Moreover a surprise 
attack across the frontier not only provided an opportunity for 
the Krotoniates to compensate for their numerical inferiority 
(Strabo 6.1.13), but also ensured that the ensuing battle would 
inflict damage on the Sybarite c ho ra rather than their own. 
Thus the likelihood that the Sybarite army which the 
Krotoniates had to face at the Traeis was a force mustered m an 
environment of haste and even pamc 1s considerable. 
46 Ciaceri, Storia della Magna Grecia vol. 2, p. 257. In contrast, de 
Juliis believes that the Traeis (mod. Triolo) formed the border between 
Sybaris and Kroton: Magna Grecia, p. 180. However, Thoukydides 
implies that the Hylias River marked the frontier between Kroton and 
the mid fifth century successor to Sybaris, Thourioi (7 .35). 
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Also operating in the Krotoniates' favour was the possibility 
that they received some form of military assistance from 
outside the Italiote po l is-system. Herodotos records two 
contradictory traditions in relation to foreign support for 
Kroton, one of which outlines the contribution of a Spartan 
expeditionary force, under the Agiad pnnc~ Dorieus, and relies 
upon a Sybarite recollection of the events (5.45). Herodotos 
also states that this verston of events acknowledges the 
assistance of Philippos, a Krotoniate exile who commanded a 
small independent force of his own (5.47). The second version, 
this time derived from a Krotoniate source, rejects the 
participation of these outsiders and quite possibly stems from 
·an unwillingness on the part of the Krotoniates to associate 
themselves and their victory with suspect company. Philippos 
had after all been tarred previously by his association with 
Telys, the tyrant of Sybaris (5.47); and Dorieus was the leader 
of a colonization attempt in western Sicily tainted by disastrous 
failure and a blase attitude towards the Delphic Oracle and its 
colonial role (5.42-3, 45). However, Dorieus was present in the 
western Mediterranean at approximately the same time as the 
fall of Sybaris and his participation in this war certainly aids 
the reconstruction of a seemingly implausible victory on the 
part of Kroton. 4 7 
47 TWGa, p. 363. 
318 
Another crucial factor 1n the previously unthinkable defeat of 
Sybaris at the Traeis was the very real possibility that the 
Sybarite regime under Telys was an inherently unstable one. 
The fact that Tely s was still in the process of expelling 
members of the aristocracy in 510 certainly suggests that 
political instability was a consistent feature of the then 
Sybarite government. Moreover, given the presence of the five 
hundred exiled Sybarite aristocrats at Kroton, it would appear 
that Telys and his followers were faced with a diaspora which 
was not only large but also hostile to them. The ultimatum for 
the handing over of these exiles suggests that Telys did indeed 
feel that some or perhaps all of the five hundred exiles in 
question continued to pose a threat to him and, by extension, 
that his regime had not sufficiently consolidated its hold over 
the polis. 
Furthermore, it is also possible that Telys was expenencmg 
domestic difficulties and believed that an act of strength 
abroad would alleviate his problems at home. Such an act did 
not necessrily require a war, but merely the diplomatic 
humiliation of a weaker neighbour such as Kroton. Whatever 
the truth of the matter, it is evident that Telys and his 
followers were not able to rule Sybaris without taking into 
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account the continuing survival of the cause espoused by their 
domestic opponents. Indeed Herakleides reports that the 
loyalty commanded by Telys was ultimately not sufficient to 
save either his tyranny or the lives of his followers (F49 
[Wehrli])). The massacre of the partisans of Telys ·at the hands 
of their fellow Sybarites, as described by Herakleides, probably 
took place in the desperate period after the defeat at the Traeis 
but prior to the final siege of Sybaris by the Krotoniate army. 
Such a rebellion suggests that even by 510 Telys had still not 
managed either to exile or kill all his domestic opponents. 
Reinforcing the view that the Telys-led regime at Sybaris faced 
considerable internal as well as externally-based opposition is 
the slight suggestion that there were defections on the 
battlefield from the Sybarite army. According to Aristotle, 
Julius Africanus and Aelian, the Sybarite cavalry was rendered 
useless during the battle at the Traeis. Africanus states that a 
Sybarite flute-player defected to Kroton before the battle and 
revealed the tune which would effectively disable the Sybarite 
cavalry whose horses were accustomed to musical 
performances (Kestoi 293). Whilst neither Aristotle nor 
Aelian mention a disaffected flute-player, both record that the 
same tune caused the entire Sybarite cavalry either to desert 
to the Krotoniate army (Arist., Syb.Pol. F583 [Rose]) or throw 
the Sybarite ranks into confusion (Aelian, De Nat. Anim. 
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16.23). Moreover, the accounts of Africanus and Aristotle refer 
to a betrayal of one form or another, effective during the 
decisive battle between Kroton and Sybaris. Crucially, the verb 
chosen by Aristotle to describe the actions of the Sybarite 
cavalry (avToµoA.E'w) was commonly used to describe desertions 
from one army to another or from the battlefield entirely (c.f. 
Hdt. 8.82; Thouk. 3. 77; Xen., Anabasis 1.7.13). 
Despite the fanciful spin placed upon the event, given the 
apparent continued agitation against the regime of Telys it is 
possible that some elements of the Sybarite cavalry did in fact 
defect to the Krotoniate army either immediately before or 
during the battle at the Traeis.48 That such an event might 
transpire should not be ruled out, particularly as it was 
-probably the Sybarite aristocracy who made up the bulk of the 
state's cavalry. This group was afterall one of the main 
collective victims of the Telys-led revolution earlier in the 
decade and would thus have viewed a defeat for Telys as 
advantageous to themselves. Further underscoring this 
hypothesis that aristocratic discontent inside the Sybarite camp 
helped to undermine the war effort of Telys, Herodotos records 
a specific act of desertion. Kallias, a member of the aristocratic 
lamid clan which derived from Elis on the Greek mainland, 
abandoned the Sybarite cause prior to the battle and actively 
4B Rutter, "Sybaris - Legend and Reality", p. 169. 
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aided the Krotoniates against the forces of Sybaris (5 .44-5). 
It is therefore apparent that the considerable strengths of the 
Sybarite polis and its empire, as built up over the course of 
the sixth century, had been significantly undermined by the 
time of the final confronatation with Kroton. Moreover, it is 
possible that Kroton received assistance from non-Italiote 
sources 1n its campaign to resist Sybaris, as well as probably 
having the good fortune of being able to choose both the time 
and place of the decisive battle. Dissatisfaction with the 
domestic balance of power, particularly on the part of the 
Sybarite demos and its demagogic leader Telys, had sparked a 
cycle of revolution and attempted counter-revolution which 
weakened the ability of Sybaris to operate as an effective 
hegemon within the central Italiote po lis-system. This 
internal dissension in turn helped to provoke a confrontation 
with a neighbouring state and, in the wake of an overwhelming 
defeat, ultimately created a power vacuum in the polis-system 
hitherto either under Sybarite domination or influence. The 
regional balance of power, previously based on the 
preponderance of Sybaris, was thus overturned not only by a 
military defeat but also by the failure of the Sybarites to 
resolve stasis. Consequently, the balance of power in the 
central Italiote polis-system was recast to the disadvantage of 
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Sybaris. 
3.2 The Krotoniate 'new order'. 
Strabo states that in a campaign lasting seventy days, the 
Krotoniates toppled Sybaris from its hegemony and laid waste 
to the Sybarite astu itself, going so far as to divert the course 
of a nearby river over the top of the ruined city (6.1.13). It is 
not clear whether this time frame includes both the Battle of 
the Traeis and the siege of the astu that must have followed or 
merely the , latter. In any case Sybaris was destroyed in a 
matter of months by a foe previously considered weak enough 
to threaten over the issue of exiles. Diodoros also emphasizes 
the destruction that followed the military defeat (12.10.1), and 
Herodotos provides a name for the river allegedly diverted, the 
Krathis (5.45). In this way Kroton ensured that the old balance 
of power was dead and that a new order in its own likeness 
could be built. 
As the destroyer of Sybaris, Kroton was well placed to 
influence the shape of the new balance of power in the central 
Italiote polis-system. In particular, like Sybaris in the wake 
of the conquest of Siris earlier in the century, Kroton appears to 
have acquired the lion's share of the spoils. Included within 
these spoils was the Sybaritid, the plain upon which Sybaris 
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had built its agricultural wealth. A passage in Iamblichos' 0 n 
the Pythagorean Life indicates that Kroton appointed an 
administrator for the newly conquered Sybaris called an 
ex a r c h (VP 7 4). It is possible that this term reflects the 
milieu of Iamblichos more than that of the sixth century since 
the word rarely occurs in relation to the archaic or classical 
Greek world. However, given its leadership connotations, it is 
probable that Iamblichos understood the position to entail 
Krotoniate rule over the Sybaritid.49 Moreover, it would 
appear that Kylon, whilst in his capacity as the first known 
exarch of Sybaris (6 L:v~apnwv E'~apxos), was able to continue his 
political activities in Kroton itself, including attending the 
debates over the long-term fate of new territories (VP 249, 
258). The position of Kylon can thus be seen as a form of 
governorship, but given Kylon' s continuing factional 
commitments 1n Kroton this position evidently did not 
necessarily entail full-time residency in the exarchate itself. 
Moreover, such a scenario suggests that the Sybaritid was more 
often than not administered from a centrist perspective rather 
than a local one. 5 O 
Much is also revealed concerning the Krotoniate carve-up of 
the Sybaritid through numismatic evidence. Around 500 a 
49 Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 70. 
so TWGa, p. 366. 
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small series of staters appears, featuring the tripod of Kroton 
and the 9 PO legend on the obverse, and the bull of Sybaris and 
the 2: Y legend on the reverse. This development suggests that a 
settlement on the site of the old Sybaris was allowed to 
continue. Moreover, in view of the overt Krotoniate symbolism 
on its coinage, it is also highly probable that this new Sybaris, 
from now on referred to as Sybaris II, occupied an inferior 
position 1n relation to Kroton. 5 1 Indeed, these coins 
strengthen the case put forward by literary evidence that the 
Sybaritid came under the direct rule of Kroton after 510, via 
the office of the exarch. 
Moreover, it 1s possible that the community of Sybaris II was 
composed of some or perhaps all of the contentious five 
hundred Sybarite aristocrats who had fled the regime of Telys 
and had sought shelter in Kroton just before the outbreak of 
war between the two states.52 This group was afterall 
ideologically close to the Krotoniate regime in 510, at least in 
terms of their opposition to the populist tyranny of Telys, and 
since Kroton had effectively gone to war over these exiles it 
would not have been a particularly controversial move to 
51 lb id., pp. 365-6; AC G C, p. 172; G.K. Jenkins, Ancient Greek Coins 
(London, 1972), p. 23; Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, p. 50; 
IGASMG IV, p. 71; Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and 
Theory, p. 36. 
52 Lombardo, "Da sibari a thurii", p. 278. 
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sponsor their re-establishment in a subordinate successor state. 
Such a state would have been directly dependent on their 
Krotoniate 'saviours', and the existence of a Krotoniate governor 
as well as the issuing of coins with clear references to Kroton 
supports this hypothesis. 
Numismatic evidence is also useful in determining the status of 
the numerous towns and villages, including the so-called 
Oinotrian poleis of Hekataios and Stephanos, which had 
formed part of the Sybarite empire up until the destruction of 
Sybaris in 510. Discussed briefly in chapter 4, the years 
immediately following the fall of Sybaris witnessed significant 
changes in the numismatic chronicle of central Magna Graecia. 
Coins issued in Pandosia and Laos around 500, two sites 
identified in chapter 4 as existing within the imperial system of 
Sybaris until 510, feature the Krotoniate tripod.53 Coins dated 
to between c. 500 and c. 490 featuring the tripod of Kroton on 
the obverse and a joint legend (<?PO and TE) may also refer to 
the extension of Krotoniate control over the formerly Sybarite 
Temesa. 54 
53 A CG C, pp. 172-4; Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, pp. 55-8; 
IGASMG IV, p. 35. 
54 Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, p. 61; Jeffrey & Johnston, 
The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece, p. 254; IGASMG IV, p. 78. 
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It is therefore highly probable that Kroton did in fact reap 
substantial territorial benefits from its conquest of Sybaris, 
both in the Sybaritid proper and m the wider territories 
previously under Sybarite rule. Indeed, these acquisitions 
were one of the key features of the Krotoniate new order in the 
central Italiote polis-system. Kroton in effect became the new 
regional superpower in that the widespread nature of its new 
territorial assets ensured access to greater resources and an 
ability to influence events far beyond its now redundant 
former borders. Kroton now possessed the firm foothold on the 
Tyrrhenian it had been seeking since the middle of the century 
as well as secure trans-isthmian routes, and such resources as 
the copper mines of Temesa (Strabo 6.1.5), and the agricultural 
wealth of the Sybaritid plain. 
Furthermore, the setbacks Kroton had experienced against 
Lokroi around 550 and 525 must have begun to pale into 
insignificance compared to the stunning gains secured by the 
defeat of Sybaris. Indeed, although there is no evidence to 
suggest Krotoniate domination of Lokroi after 510, it is unlikely 
that Kroton would have any need to tolerate any limitations 
that Lokroi may or may not have imposed in the wake of its 
earlier victories. Kaulonia too probably came come under some 
form of pressure to gravitate towards the foreign policy 
intrests of Kroton, although this may have merely taken the 
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form of 'self-regulation' rather than external military or 
political pressure. Certainly there is no numismatic evidence to 
suggest that Kaulonia entered the Krotoniate orbit 1n the same 
manner as Sybaris II, Pandosia, Laos and Temesa so obviously 
did. 55 Similarly, Kaulonia' s role as an independent arbitrator 
during one of Kroton' s many outbreaks of stasis after the 
conquest of Sybaris does not lend itself to the view that 
Kaulonia came under any form of direct Krotoniate control 
(Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 261). 
However, as suggested by the distribution of the new 'tripod' 
corns m the region, it is also clear that the Krotoniate new order 
did not entail the superimposition of Krotoniate rule over the 
full extent of the defunct Sybarite empire. 5 6 There is no 
known Krotoniate rule or influence at Poseidonia, Aminaia or 
Lagaria and it is not inconceivable that Metapontion, long the 
loyal but independent and rich ally of Sybaris extended its 
control role over the territories north of the Krathis River after 
510. 57 Certainly, the area that witnessed the most intensive 
5 5 The first known numismatic indication that Kaulonia and Kroton 
were operating on a particularly close level comes between c. 480 and c. 
460, over a generation after the fall of Sybaris and the rise of the 
Krotoniate new order. See Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, p.86. 
56 TWG a, p. 367. Cf. Minar, Early Pythagoreanism in Practice and 
Theory, pp. 36-7. 
57 De la Geniere, "L'identification de Lagaria et ses problemes", p. 57. 
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Krotoniate influence was that south of the Krathis, at sites such 
as Pandosia and Laos, suggesting in turn that the Krotoniate 
new order was 1n fact subject to specific geographic 
limitiations. 
Nonetheless, the triumph of Kroton at the Traeis in 510 did 
result in its elevation to the hegemony of the central Italiote 
polis-system. The thorough nature of the destruction of 
Sybaris ensured that in the short-term Kroton did not face the 
prospect of a revitalized local rival for the hegemony. Indeed, 
the leadership role Kroton assumed within the context of the 
Italiote summachiai of the fifth and fourth centuries in all 
probability stemmed from the emergence of Kroton as a 
military power at the end of the sixth century (Diod. 14.100.3, 
103.4-5; Livy 23.30.6). For nearly a century the preserve of 
Sybaris, power and influence in central Magna Graecia became 
the natural policy goal of the newly rampant Krotoniate state. 
Furthermore, accompanying this development was the 
realization that Achaian solidarity, or rather lip service to it, no 
longer formed the basis of the balance of power in the Italiote 
polis-system. It was now effectively up to the conqueror of 
Sybaris to build and defend its 'new order' on its own. 
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CONCLUSION: Balance of power recast: losses and gains. 
The confrontation between Sybaris and Kroton at the end of the 
sixth century represents a watershed in the history of the 
ltaliote polis-system. As the century old hegemon of the 
region, Sybaris faced a seemingly unlikely challenger whose 
own rise to prominence had been regularly punctuated by 
failure against other weaker poleis. However, Kroton was 
aided in its bid to unseat Sybaris by the blossoming of at least 
one belligerent philosophical and political club within its walls, 
the Pythagoreans. Other crucial components of Kroton' s victory 
were such strategic advantages as surprise, the instability of 
the opposing regime, and the probability that some sections of 
the Sybarite army were lukewarm in their support for Telys. 
As a result of Kroton' s victory in 510 the balance of power 
within the central ltaliote polis-system was altered 
irrecoverably. The incumbent hegemon, Sybaris, was cut down 
and although its surviving population enjoyed a degree of 
success in the proceeding century, it was never able to recover 
its previous strength. In contrast Kroton, as the instrument of 
this collapse was, in theory at any rate, well placed to benefit 
from the subsequent power vacuum in the polis-system of the 
region. Indeed, Kroton proceeded to build its own vision of 
central Magna Graecia, in part by grafting much of which 
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imperial Sybaris had held and developed on to its own chora. 
At a glance the Krotoniate eclipse of Sybaris may appear 
merely as a case of one Achaian state replacing another as the 
regional hegemon. However, 1n reality the dynamics of a 
century of Achaian domination of Magna Graecia were put at 
risk. Achaian polis had now fought Achaian polis for the first 
time, altering the previous norm which had seen the Achaian 
states expand aggressively in nearly every direction on the 
peninsula except against each other. Indeed, in the past these 
states had operated in tandem against non-Achaian foes and 
cooperated m elements of monetary policy. In essence, for 
much of the sixth century pan-Achaianism had been an 
important, but informal, component of the power which the 
Achaian states wielded in Magna Graecia. 
The collapse of this pan-Achaianism marched alongside the 
emergence of inter-Achaian competition, and stemmed from 
dissatisfaction with Sybarite preponderance and the shrinkage 
in easily attainable resources, and was fuelled by ideological 
differences between the two leading Achaian states. In sum, 
for Kroton to expand any further in the sixth century, Sybaris 
had to be resisted, challenged and ultimately removed from its 
monopoly on power. As large as Magna Graecia was in terms of 
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geography, it was also the home to a disproportionately high 
number of large states, and by the end of the sixth century the 
pressure and potential for a clash within the Italiote po lis-
system, in which only one state would survive, was at its most 
intense. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The successors to the post-Sybarite po lis-system and 
the diffusion of power in Magna Graecia. 
The collapse of the Sybarite hegemony in the last decade of the 
sixth century had serious and long-reaching consequences for 
the Italiote polis-system. The repercussions of this collapse 
were felt not only in the central band of Greek settlement in 
southern Italy where Sybaris was situated, but also along the 
southern rim, including the Straits of Messina, and as far away 
as Greek Sicily. In essence, the archaic Italiote polis-system of 
the archaic period experienced shock, stemming largely from 
the withdrawal of the one force which had provided for a 
degree of relative stability over the past century. As the 
regional hegemon, Sybaris represented and effectively 
monopolized overwhelming force for the greater part of the 
sixth century. Thus the absence of Sy baris not only altered the 
balance of power, it also precipitated a political vacuum. 
As discussed m chapter 6, the polis which had brought about 
the downfall of Sybaris stood first in line to profit from this 
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vacuum, and to a considerable , degree Kroton did in fact 
prosper. However, as will be demonstrated below, Kroton was 
not able to fill the void completely. Consequently, this gave 
rise to opportunities for other poleis to take advantage of the 
regional upheaval and stake their own claims to a share of the 
power once concentrated in the hands of Sybaris. Moreover, 
the multiplication of the number of poleis with the ability to 
exercise some power witnessed the growth of non-Achaian 
influence In Magna Graecia. In turn, as will be seen, the 
potential for conflict also increased, as each nascent regional 
power attempted to assert itself and resist the claims of its 
neighbours. Indeed, as the shift towards frequent outbreaks of 
inter-po l is violence rose, so too did the propensity towards 
rapid escalation and extension beyond the borders of Magna 
Graecia. 
Moreover, it IS apparenf that during the last years of the sixth 
century and the first decades of the fifth, power within the 
Italiote polis-system was experiencing senous 
pressure. The balance of power that evolved 
centrifugal 
after the 
breakdown of the previously dominant Sybarite system was 
subject to the competing interests of a number of 
approximately evenly matched poleis. Three separate major 
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centres of power can be identified as having emerged in this 
period, not all of which were located within Magna Graecia 
itself. Constituting two of these new centres, both Kroton and 
Rhegion were Italiote states with long histories by the time of 
the fall of Sybaris. However, the emergence of Sikeliote 
Syracuse as an important player within the Italiote polis-
system was an entirely new development and symbolizes well 
the extent to which power m Magna Graecia had become open 
to competition 
Section One: Kroton: the legacy of Sybaris and the 
inadequate heir. 
The war 1n which Kroton had toppled Sybaris saw the 
Krotoniates reach a hitherto unprecedented peak in the history 
of their po l is. As demonstrated in chapter 6, the spoils of this 
campaign were spectacular, with Kroton effectively doubling 
the size of the territory under its control. From 510 the 
Krotoniate tripod began to cast its shadow over the Tyrrhenian 
littoral as well as much of Oinotria. However, it is also evident 
that the tripod was not planted across the length and breadth 
of the old pastures of the Sybarite bull. As has also been 
demonstrated in chapter 6, the northern half of the Sybarite 
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empire effectively remained outside the new Krotoniate 
frontiers. As will be seen, this state of affairs reflects a wider 
failure on the part of Kroton to reconstruct itself as the new 
and definitive regional hegemon. 
One possible problem for Kroton in its administration of the old 
Sybarite empire was demography. As stated in chapter 4, 
Sybaris was undoubtably the larger of the two poleis both m 
terms of territory and population, and its demographic policies 
were, according to Diodoros, unique amongst the Italiote poleis 
(12.9.2). Thus for the Krotoniates to physically 'hold down' the 
entirety of the Sybarite empire may have been beyond its 
resources, at least until they had successfully digested the core 
components. However, the key deficiency in the Krotoniate 
ability to absorb the full extent of the Sybarite empire and the 
dominant role that empire had enabled it to play, lay in the 
Pythagorean-related staseis that wracked Kroton in the wake 
of its victory on the Traeis. 
Given the telescoped and multilayered nature of the sources 
concerned, it is difficult to reconstruct a clear chronology of the 
anti-Pythagorean violence which wracked Kroton from the late 
sixth century to the middle of the fifth. However, the broad 
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outlines of the earliest of these staseis are as follows: 
Aristoxenos (F49 [Wehrli]), and in part supported by Aristotle 
(F191 [Rose]), Justin (20.4.17-18) and Porphyrios (VP 54-5), 
relates that Pythagoras was forced by Kylon and his politco-
military faction to abandon Kroton around 509 and emigrate to 
Metapontion, where he is reputed to have died in the 490' s 
(Dikaiarchos F3 Sb [Wehrli]) .1 Aristoxenos also remarks that 
this was not the end of the stasis, and Iamblichos cites the 
Timaios-dependent Apollonios when describing an escalation of 
the conflict conflict, in which the Pythagoreans as a whole 
suffered exile (VP 255-61). 2 This turbulent year 1n 
Krotoniate politics has been methodically summarized by Minar 
under the heading of the 'Kylonian troubles' - a reference to 
the leading anti-Pythagorean agitator of the day. 3 
1 Von Fritz proposes c. 490 as the date for Pythagoras' death, whereas 
Minar prefers c. 494. For a general chronological reconstruction of 
Pythagoras' career, see von Fritz, Pythagorean Politics in Southern 
Italy, p. 49; and Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and 
Theory, pp. 73, 133-5. 
2 Dikaiarchos (F34 [Wehrli]) and Nikomachos (ap. Iamb., VP 252) 
also cite a tradition which relates that Pythagoras was not even present 
when the stasis took place. This has been credibly discounted by 
Minar: Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, pp. 66-7. 
3 Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practive ,and Theory, pp. 50-
70. 
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It is therefore evident that Kroton experienced at least two 
bouts of internal ' conflict centred around the issue of 
Pythagorean power at Kroton. It has been demonstrated that 
the Pythagoreans had exercised significant political influence 
within Kroton up until this time, including a prominent role 
during the debate over war and peace with Sybaris in 510. It 
is also apparent that the stance adopted by the Pythagoreans in 
this debate would have brought them into temporary accord 
with their future arch-enemies, the Kylonian faction, as it was 
this latter group which benefited most from the war with 
Sybaris and thus was the most likely supporter of its 
prosecution. The conflict between the Kylonians and the 
Pythagoreans can therefore in many ways be represented as a 
dispute within the Krotoniate war party over the spoils, with 
both factions possessing decidedly different views on 
distribution and, in all probability, the future of Kroton in its 
new role as 'hegemon-elect' . 
Moreover, the triumph of one view in effect required the 
extirpation of the proponents of the other. As mentioned 
earlier, Kylon appears first to have targetted the leader of the 
faction most dangerous to his interests, and succeeded in 
expelling Pythagoras. Kylon' s interests at this point probably 
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included little more than the control of the 'exarchate' of 
Sybaris. Land was after all at stake and Kylon and his 
associates could not afford to let those aristocrats who had 
thrown Ill their lot with the Pythag ore,ans dominate the 
distribution process, a goal which, according to Apollonios (ap. 
Iamb., VP 255), the Pythagorearis appear to have temporarily 
achieved. 4 However, clearly the expulsion of Pythagoras was 
not enough to silence the Pythagorean movement as a whole 
and the size of the anti-Pythagorean faction within the polis 
appears to have expanded rapidly, uniting both To 'ITAf\8os and 
the ljyEµovEs ... Tf\s oiw:(>opas, the latter group compnsmg Kylon and 
his associates (ap. Iamb., VP 255). Full scale civil war broke 
out by the end of 509 pitching the Kylonian-demos alliance 
against the Pythagorean core, which at this time appears to 
have included a group known as the €qn)~oi (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., 
VP 258-61). Although Kylon and the demagogue Ninon were 
prominent in the lead-up to this second phase of the stasis, 
Apollonios states that the conflict was finally settled in a battle 
(µaxlJ), between the aristocratic Theages and Demokedes the 
Pythagorean. 5 
4 Berger, Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy, 
p. 20; Lombardo, "Da sibari a thurii", p, 28L 
5 However, both Theages and Demokedes can be seen to have been 
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Thus it is evident that the civil strife which gripped Kroton 
around 509 in all likelihood involved most sections of society 
and included at least one pitched battle. The leaders of the 
original opposing factions were all derived from the arsitocracy 
an~ the presence of Ninon, descibed specifically as h Twv 
61wonKwv (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 258), clearly indicates that the 
Pythagoreans ·had inspired popular resentment against them. 
Moreover, it 1s also evident that some of the Pythagoreans, 
along with their ephebic allies, were able to seize control of at 
least one town or fortress within the Krotoniate chora, at the 
otherwise unknown Plateai (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 261). 
The picture of Kroton painted by the sources in the aftermath 
of the stunning victory at the Traeis is therefore one of a state 
in the midst of a violent and pervasive crisis. Conflict not only 
infected the astu, but also extended to the chora, in effect 
resulting 1n the temporary partition of the polis. _ Although 
only ever described as a tiny minority of the total population of 
Kroton (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 260), the Pythagoreans had 
contemporaries of Kylon and Ninon, m that the former pair 
represented the anti-Pythagorean faction in the probouleutic chilion, 
whereas the latter pair spearheaded the contest in the ekklesia (Ap.Ty. 
ap. Iamb., VP 257). For the proposal that Demokedes was in fact the 
son-in-law of Milon of Kroton, see appendix. 
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clearly penetrated the upper echeleons of Krotoniate 
government to a degree sufficient enough to require a violent 
extraction. Furthermore, it is evident that the aristocracy, the 
main decision-making class of Kroton, was hopelessly split by 
the stasis, thus seriously reducing the state's ability to deal 
effectively with the new conditions of the post-Sybaris Italiote 
polis-system. Thus, despite Kroton's overwhelming victory 
against Sybaris in 510, the ability of the Krotoniates to stamp 
their authority over the polis-system of central Magna Graecia 
must have been hampered significantly by their own internal 
problems. 
Although Minar and others argue for a rapid Pythagorean 
recovery in the wake of the Kylonian troubles and the 
subsequent dawn of nearly fifty years of Pythagorean-inspired 
stability at Kroton, there are too many indications to the 
contrary In the sources to adopt such a position 
unreservedly. 6 Apollonios, for instance, is unequivocal in his 
statement that the aforementioned Theages defeated the 
Pythagoreans in battle (ap. Iamb., VP 261). Moreover, 
modern scholars are generally agreed that Pythagoras died In 
6 See Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory, pp. 
71-5; Bicknell, "The Tyranny of Kleinias at Kroton", Klearchos 69-72 
(1976), pp. 10-11. 
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exile at some point In the late 490' s. 7 Such an event does 
not include much scope for a Pythagorean revanche at Kroton 
before this time, as a return to power for Pythago!as' school 
would surely have entailed a recall of the master. Ultimately 
Minar can only offer "it is still impossible to say how the 
Pythagoreans regained their power", In defense of his 
hypothesis, and it is therefore probable that the Pythagoreans 
were still out of power during the 490' s. 8 
There is no doubt that the Pythagoreans were able to stage a 
comeback at Kroton, and certainly this must have occurred 
many years before the renewed expulsions of 454/3, as related 
by Aristoxenos (F18 [Wehrli]). Indeed the occasion of their 
return may have been the pan-Italiote arbitration process 
described by Apollonios and conducted by Taras, Kaulonia and 
Metapontion (ap. Iamb., VP 262). In relation to the date of 
this process, although I am In agreement with Minar that 
Iamblichos has probably left a chronological gap between 
passages 261 and 262 in his On the Pythagorean Life, his 
assertion that the aforementioned arbitration belongs to the 
7 Von Fritz, Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy, p. 49; Minar, 
Early Pythaorean Politics in Practice and Theory, pp. 73, 134-5. 
8 Minar, Early Pythaorean Politics in Practice and Theory, p. 71. 
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440' s is more difficult to accept. 9 Rather, this later period in 
all probability provides the context for the intervention and 
arbitration from the Achaian motherland as outlined by 
Apollonios (ap. Iamb., VP 263) and Polybios (2.39.1-5).1 O 
Although there is no way of providing a precise date for the 
pan-Italiote arbitration, given that there are two known major 
outbreaks of anti-Pythagorean violence, one 1n 509 and the 
other in 454/3, and that the latter is eventually accounted for 
by pan-Achaian arbitration, 1 1 it is therefore possible that the 
pan-Italiote venture is linked to the stasis sparked in 509. 
Moreover, as demonstrated earlier, this arbitration 1s unlikely 
to have taken place before the death of the exiled Pythagoras, 
thus suggesting a range between c. 490 and 454/3. 
Indeed, as will be discussed further in section 3 .3, just as the 
Sybarite revanche of 453/2 brought about a change 1n the 
Krotoniate regime (Diod. 11.90.3),1 2 so too may the 
Syracusan-backed refoundation of Sybaris in 476 have created 
a crisis grave enough to facilitate arbitration leading to national 
9 Ibid., pp. 59-60, 81-2. 
1 O Bicknell, "The Tyranny of Kleinias at Kroton", pp. 14-16. 
11 As for note 10. 
1 2 Bicknell, "The Tyranny of Kleinias at Kroton", p. 16. 
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unity, or at least a definitive political settlement in Kroton. As 
argued by Bicknell, such a deal probably enabled the return of 
moderate Pythagoreans and the permanent ostracization of 
extremists such as those who had followed the late 
Demo k e des . 1 3 At any rate, Apollonios' emphasis on a 
thorough 'clean-out' of all those dissatisfied with the 
government certainly lends itself to the view that Kroton 
desperately required unity of purpose at this time (ap. Iamb., 
VP 262). Moreover, given what is known about Kroton' s 
history between c. 490 and 454/3, it is only the events of 476 
which provide us with a crisis desperate enough to warrant the 
pan-Italiote arbitration described by Apollonios. 
Thus I propose that although Kylon and his allies, including 
Ninon and Theages, were able to expel the Pythagoreans in 
509, agitation from outside the Krotoniate astu, at sites such as 
Plateai, continued for many years. Furthermore, it is possible 
that this state of affairs lasted until as late as 4 7 6, when the 
Pythagoreans were finally re-integrated into the Krotoniate 
mainstream. Moreover, as stated earlier, it should also be 
emphasized that these agitators represented a significant 
proportion of the Krotoniate elite who, like other exiled 
13 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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aristocratic groups such as the Peisistratidai and the 
Alkmaionidai, could exert considerable pressure on the 
government of the day .1 4 A slow and incomplete takeover of 
the territories of the former Sybarite empire by Kroton should 
therefore not be seen as surprising. 
Further highlighting the handicap placed upon Kroton by its 
turmoil at home is the nature of the aforementioned pan-
Italiote arbitration it received, tentatively dated to 4 76. As 
stated earlier, three poleis, Taras, Metapontion and Kaulonia, 
were selected to settle the stasis and were empowered to exile 
the individuals found guilty (Ap.Ty. ap. Iamb., VP 262). 
Although many examples of Greek poleis calling for external 
arbitration are available for the archaic and classical periods, 
most of these involve disputes over frontiers or possession of 
exclaves. 1 5 It is far less common to find instances of 
1 4 For the activities and potency of the Peisistratidai in exile, see Hdt. 
1.60-2, 5.96, 6.107; [Arist.], Ath.Pol. 14-15. For the Alkmaionidai, see Hdt. 
5.62-3; [Arist.], Ath.Pol. 1, 19. 
15 Korinth and Kerkyra between Gela and Syracuse, c. 492 (Hdt. 7.154); 
Athens between Samas and Miletos, 441 (Thouk. 1.115.2; Plut., Per. 25.1); 
Sparta between Elis and Lepreion, 421 (Thouk. 5.31.1-4); an hypothetical 
arbitrator between Sparta and Argos, 420; Thouk. 5.41.2); the King's 
Peace between Sparta and its various foes, 387 (Diod. 14.10.1-4). 
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arbitration or intervention involving stasis unless the relevant 
institutions of the afflicted state in question had become so 
weakened or djvided as to be effectively useless.16 
Moreover, the significance of the fact that other states had 
been brought in to arbitrate 1n the dispute should not be 
underestimated. It 1s not unheard of for the opposing sides m 
a civil disorder to call upon the services of an individual, or 
even a god, to arbitrate, as in the case of Demonax of Mantineia 
at Kyrene around the middle of the sixth century (Hdt. 4.161; 
Diod. 8.30.2), and the Delphic Oracle at Thourioi in 434 (Diod. 
12.35.1-4). However, for other poleis, i.e. the theoretical 
fellow competitors 1n any given po l is -system, to be 
empowered with what was in effect the deciding of the final 
make-up of the government of the polis concerned was 
considerably different, and can only emphasize the severity of 
the problems which the Kroton of the post-Sybarite era was 
facing. The case of Kerkyra in the last quarter of the fifth 
century 1s again illustrative. Between 427 and 425 the 
Kerkyraians were unable to deploy their forces competently 
16 As in the case of Kerkyra in 427, when the Athenian strategos 
Nikostratos attempted to reconcile its warring parties (Thouk. 3. 75.1). 
Thoukydides' views on the dysfunctional nature of the Kerkyraian 
polis at this time are well known (3.82-4). 
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(Thouk. 3. 76-8), due to the strife within their own ranks 
(Thouk. 3.77.1: o~ BE: rroA.A.0 8opv~!¥ wl. rrE<Po~1)µEvoi Ta T' E:v Ti.\ rroA.n ... ), 
and were thus prone to the predations of other pole is. In 
other words, Kerkyra had ceased to function within its polis-
system in an effective manner, at least until its internal 
problems were resolved. 
In 509 in particular but also down to c. 476, Kroton must have 
experienced similar difficulties. As the historic second city of 
the Achaian-dominated world of central Magna Graecia and as 
the conquerer of the Sybarite hegemon, Kroton was in many 
way well placed to move to the forefront of the Italiote polis-
system. As has been demonstrated, to a degree Kroton did in 
fact improve its territorial position as well as its position within 
the polis-system as a whole, emerging as a power to be 
reckoned with 1n late archaic Magna Graecia. However, while 
nothing could take away the victory over Sybaris, debilitating 
stasis could certainly take away or retard the ability of Kroton 
to capitalize on its gains efficiently and effectively. That Kroton 
required the assistance of other poleis to solve its domestic 
problems is thus a strong indication that the Krotoniate state 
was experiencing serious problems in the aftermath of its 
victory at the Traeis. Moreover, its failure to surmount all of 
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the internal problems it faced in the wake of its great victory 
also spawned opportunities for other poleis to make a claim to 
the legacy of Sybaris. 
Section Two: Rhegion: the 'principality' of the Straits. 
One of the earliest indicators of centrifugal pressure within the 
Italiote polis-system after the fall of the pervasive Sybarite 
hegemony comes from the southernmost point of Magna 
Graecia, the Straits of Messina. As discussed briefly in chapters 
3 and 5, Rhegion had begun to assert itself as an independent 
polis during the second half of the sixth century, involving 
itself in at least one land war between its Italiote neighbours to 
the north, at the Sagra (c. 550), as well as the largely maritime 
clash between the Greeks and the Etruro-Punic axis in the 
western Mediterranean (c. 535). However, from c. 510 the 
policies of Rhegion began to take a far more ambitious 
direction. Moreover, the timing of this shift corresponded with 
the collapse of the hegemony of Sybaris and the subsequent 
instability of the first successor state, Kroton. In essence the 
exercising of power in the central Italiote po l is - system 
' 
experienced a period of uncertainty, contributing to the rise of 
formerly peripheral players such as Rhegion. In turn the 
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fortunes of Rhegion in this period were epitomized by the 
ambitions and confidence of its first tyrant, Anaxilaos son of 
Kretines. 
The tyranny of Anaxilaos lasted frmri 494 until his death In 
476 (Diod. 11.48.2), and established an imperialist dynasty so 
resilient that it survived an interregnum of some nine years 
under the stewardship of a certain Mikythos (Diod. 11.48.2, 
66.1-3), who is generally referred to as household retainer of · 
Anaxilaos (Hdt. 7.170; Paus. 5.26.4). The coup which installed 
Anaxilaos in 494 IS said by Aristotle to have toppled an 
oligarchic regime (Pol. 1316a38), and the occasion was 
probably linked to a popular uprising against the original 
Chalkidian aristocracy by the Messenian element within 
Rhegine society, 1 7 of which Anaxilaos was a member (Thouk. 
6.4.6; Paus. 4.23.6). However, it is likely that events external to 
the ethnic make-up of Rhegion also played a crucial role in the 
establishment of the Anaxilad dynasty .1 B 
1 7 Strabo states that it was the Messenians who comprised the ruling 
elite (6.1.6), but this is most probably an anachronism resulting from 
the superimposition of the Anaxilad dynasty over the rest of the archaic 
period. See Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, pp. 77-8, 80, 336; Berger, 
Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy, p. 29. 
18 Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, p. 336. 
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In particular, it has been speculated that the aggressive 
expansion of Gela under its tyrant, Hippokrates (498-491), 
against the Chalkidian poleis of eastern Sicily precipitated the 
coup in Rhegion.1 9 Certainly Hippokrates did launch a 
number of successful offensives against the Chalkidians 
between c. 497 and c. 494, in which he extended his domain to 
the Straits of Messina by capturing Zankle and installing a sub-
tyrant, Skythes (Hdt. 6.23, 7.154). This Geloan advance to 
within twenty kilometres of Rhegion must have caused alarm 
within the last remaining independent Straits polis, and 
perhaps even a crisis large enough to have instigated a change 
of government. Moreover, it is possible that the fall of Zankle 
and at least three other Chalkidian poleis 1n eastern Sicily 
(Hdt. 7.154: Leontinoi, Kallipolis and Naxos) served to 
undermine the military credibility and prestige of the 
Chalkidian ruling class in Rhegion. 2 O 
However, the coup d'etat of 494 in reality may have merely 
been the coup de grace for the Rhegine oligarchy. The brief 
reflection of the peculiarly Italiote incuse technique by the 
coins of Zankle around 510 suggests that Italiote Rhegion may 
19 Caccamo Caltabiano, La Monetazione di Messana, p. 3. 
20 TWGa, p. 387. 
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have occupied Sikeliote Zankle for a short time.21 Moreover, 
the existence of a late sixth century Olympic dedication 
(IGASMG Ill no. 34), in which Zankle records a victory against 
an unknown foe suggests a similar version of events. The foe 
in question cannot have been Gela, as assumed by Vallet,22 as 
there is no record of Hippokrates' tyrannical predecessor and 
brother, Kleandros (505-498), ever having expanded the 
borders of Gela in the direction of Zankle. Indeed, the 
continuing independence of the Chalkidian poleis of eastern 
Sicily up until the invasion of Hippokrates in the early 490' s 
virtually rules out the possibility of an attack on Zankle from 
the south, as Hippokrates' own attack demonstrates that a 
systematic reduction of all of these poleis was necessary to 
enter and occupy the region effectively.23 
While an Etruscan seabourne raid cannot be ruled out, the most 
likely invader of Zankle from the north or east would have 
been Rhegion, whose own ambitions in the direction of Zankle 
after 510 have already been hinted at by the appearance of a 
Zanklaian incuse series. Moreover, a second Olympic dedication 
21 ACGC, p. 207; TWGa, pp. 386-7. 
22 Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, pp. 334-5, n. 3. 
23 TWGa, pp. 382-3. 
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recording a Zanklaian victory over Rhegion between c. 500 and 
c. 490 lends further support to the view that Rhegion was 
seeking to capture Zankle after 510 (SEG 11.1205).24 Thus 
prior to the Geloan occupation of Zankle around 494 it is 
evident that Rhegion was attempting to conquer the polis for 
itself and had failed to do so on at least two occasions, as 
indicated by the aforementioned Olympic dedications. The 
Geloan triumph may well have dealt the final humiliating blow 
to the Chalkidian oligarchic regime in Rhegion, underscoring a 
decade of failure as well as creating the conditions for a 
Messenian-based tyranny whose raison d'etre would have 
been to achieve atonement through military victory. 
Indeed, from the earliest days of his tyranny it is clear that 
Anaxilaos was intent on addressing the failures of the previous 
regime by expanding Rhegine power in the region. In 493 the 
unstable Italiote polis-system of Magna Graecia was further 
complicated by the arrival of a fleet of Samian and Milesian 
refugees fresh from the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt (Hdt. 6.23). 
Herodotos states explicitly that Anaxilaos was already in 
conflict with the Zanklaians at this time (ToTE Ewv oicic):>opos Tofo"~ 
ZayKA.atoioi), reinforcing the view that Anaxilaos had inherited 
an earlier dispute from his oligarchic predecessors. 
24 See also IGASMG III no. 35. 
352 
From Herodotos we also learn that these refugees, of whom the 
Samians were the most numerous and dominant, had been 
invited by the Zanklaians to found a new po l is at Kale Akte, 
some eighty kilometres west of Zankle on the coast of northern 
Sicily (6.22). Given the political situation at Zankle at that time, 
such an invitation must have required approval from Zankle' s 
tyrant Skythes, and possibly even Hippokrat~s himself,25 and 
its occurence foreshadows the centrally planned colonization 
activities of the later Deinomenid, Emmenid and Dionysian 
tyrannies. 2 6 
One purpose of colonies such as these was to consolidate the 
tyrant's gnp over his territories by reinforcing the loyalist 
presence in the given area. A colony at Kale Akte at this time 
would have served to reinforce the western borders of the 
Zanklaian cha ra, a frontier zone through which Zankle itself 
was vulnerable to attack, as demonstrated by the Carthaginian 
invasion of Himera in 480 (Hdt. 7.165-6; Diod. 11.20), an 
25 TWG a, pp. 391-2; Burn, Persia and the Greeks: the Defence of the 
West, c. 546-478 B.C. (London, 1962), p. 298. 
26 Kamarina, by Hippokrates (Thouk. 6.5.3); Aitna (Katane), by Hieron 
I (Diod. 11.49.1-2); Leontinoi, by Hieron I (Diod. 11.49.2); Himera, by 
Theron (Diod. 11.49 .3); Katane, by Dionysios I (Diod. 14.15. 3); Messene, by 
Dionysios I (Diod.14.78.4-5); Tyndaris, by Dionysios I (Diod. 14.78.5-6). 
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Athenian assault 1n 426 (Thouk. 3.90.2-4), and a Rhegine 
incursion in 394 (Diod. 14.87.1).27 Thus there were strong 
indications that the Straits region, and in particular Zankle, had 
been a recent flashpoint for conflict between ltaliote and 
Sikeliote poleis, and was expected to be so again. 
To press the claims of his polis to Zankle, Anaxilaos entered 
into negotiat~ons with the Samians himself once the refugee 
fleet had reached Lokroi (Hdt. 6.23). Consequently, Anaxilaos 
was able to persuade the Samians to seize control of Zankle for 
themselves whilst Skythes and the Zanklaian army were absent 
from the city. From the Rhegine perspective, this achieved a 
result second only to outright conquest by their own forces: the 
removal of a dangerous Geloan-backed regime from their 
border, and the installment of an allied population. 
However, this event also produced the first real· crisis of the 
Anaxilad regime in Rhegion in that the Samians rapidly 
betrayed the Rhegines by bringing about a rapproachment with 
Hippokrates (Hdt. 6.23). A brief series of distinctly Samian 
coins issued from the Zanklaian mint then follows, 
demonstrating the entrenchment of an independent and 
2 7 Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 298. 
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possibly even pro-Geloan regime 1n Zankle.2 8 The failures of 
the deposed Rhegine oligarchy had well and truly become the 
property of the new tyrant, Anaxilaos. 
Thoukydides remarks that Anaxilaos was not long thwarted by 
the Samians and that direct Rhegine, as opposed to the 
previously unsuccessful proxy, control over Zankle was soon 
established (6.4.6). The death of Hippokrates in 491 and the 
ensuing collapse of his Pantarid dynasty at Gela were almost 
certainly key factors in this conquest (Hdt. 7 .15 5). 2 9 The end 
of the Samian coinage at Zankle has been dated to 488, after 
which a Rhegine influenced series begins, thus implying that 
the Anaxilad tyranny not only survived the setback of 493 but 
was also able to achieve the occupation of Zankle after as much 
as twenty years of collective failure on the part of Rhegion' s 
leadership. 3 0. 
The significance of this achievement cannot be overstated. 
28 ACGC, p. 213; Jenkins, Ancient Greek Coins, p. 73. 
29 For the date of Hippokrates' death, see TWGa, p. 403. 
3 O For the date of the end of Samian coinage at Zankle, see Vallet, 
Zancle et Rhegion, pp. 340-1; ACGC, p. 213; Stazio & Siciliano, "La 
Magna Grecia e il mare", p. 303; Caccamo Caltabiano, La Monetazione di 
Messana, p. 3. 
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Rhegion's :forcible unification of the Straits poleis brought 
together the best harbour (Zankle) and the best-placed sentinel 
in the region (Rhegion), enabling the Rhegine tyranny to 
establish, as Vallet puts it, "le royaume de Detroit", or in the 
words of Burn, a "principality" (see map 6).31 In terms of 
square kilometres, the new principality still did not rival the 
giant land-based Achaian dominions to the north. However, 
the strength derived from its strategic position and maritime 
capabilities was formidable. Traffic to and from the Greek 
Mainland now required a minimum level of good will or 
tolerance from the tyrant of Rhegion. The marked slowing 
down in the use of the Straits during the 480' s by ships from 
the Mainland, as derived from the decline in Attic ceramic 
imports in the region can, to a degree, be linked to the growmg 
confidence and assertiveness of the Anaxilad regime in 
Rhegion.32 
Moreover, Rhegion' s conquest of Zankle also marks a 
generational change in the balance of power on the Straits of 
Messina. During the first two centuries of Greek control over 
31 Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, p. 355; Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 
299 (map). 
32 Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, p. 380. 
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the Straits of Messina it would appear that Zankle was the 
senior partner in the Straits-based polis-system.33 Zankle 
had after all been the driving force behind the foundations at 
Rhegion, My lai, Metauros and Himera. Furthermore, given that 
this process of colonization did not expire until c. 648, Himera 
being the last known Zanklaian foundation, it is probable that 
Zankle's pre-eminent posistion within the Straits polis-system 
survived into the middle of the seventh century at least. 
Indeed, the earliest incident that can be construed as being 
indicative of independent action on Rhegion' s behalf is the 
alliance with Lokroi around 550. In turn, this alliance indicates 
that Rhegion was looking towards Magna Graecia rather than 
Sicily to meet its needs. Although Lokroi shared a land border 
with Rhegion it had little to do with the essentially maritime 
structure of the Straits polis-system, and the alliance should 
therefore be seen in terms of Rh~gion pursuing Rhegine 
interests. Thus by the middle of the sixth century Rhegion was 
beginning to gravitate away from its original colonial 
parameters and functions, a shift which culminated 1n the 
decision to seize the Straits for itself and substitute the old 
pan-Chalkidian regime with a system specifically tailored to 
33 Sabbione, "La colonizzazione greca", p. 223. 
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Italiote interests. 
The governance of the newly captured Sikeliote territory was, 
like that of Rhegion itself, strongly linked to the Anaxilad 
family. Of the three known sons of Anaxilaos one, a certain 
Leophron, 34 was clearly of age during the 470' s and appears 
to have been given one of the poleis within the principality to 
rule on his own. However, this does not alter the fact that it is 
only Anaxilaos who is accorded by the ancient sources the de 
facto title o 'P1wfov Kal ZayKf..T)s n.Jppavos (Diod. 11.48.2), thus 
implying that the principality was essentially still a centralized 
state. Nevertheless, the ancient sources often cite Rhegion as 
being the specific charge of Leophron, and Zankle of Anaxilaos 
(Justin 21.3.2; schol. on Pindar, Pyth. 2.32-3, 34; Diod. 
11.66.1), but the ambiguity of the Pindaric scholiast (see esp. 
Pyth. 2.38), has led Burn to suggest that it was Anaxilaos who 
in fact reigned in Rhegion, and Leophron in Zankle.35 
However, given the recent nature_ of the Rhegine conquest of 
34 Also called Kleophron by the Pindaric scholiast: schol. Pyth. 2.32-3, 
34, 38. 
35 Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 477 & n. 7. See also Vallet, Zancle et 
Rhegion, p. 369 and L. Woodbury, "The Gratitude of the Locrian Maiden: 
Pindar, Pythian 2.18-20", TAPhA 108 (1978), pp. 287-8. 
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Zankle, and the political competition generated by the 
proliferation of aggressive tyrannies in Sicily at that time, it is 
not unfeasible to suggest that Anaxilaos may have opted to 
base himself in Zankle in order to provide the experienced 
hand that was no doubt required there. Rhegion on the other· 
hand was relatively shielded from the designs of the Sikeliote 
tyrants by Zankle itself, as well· being protected by the 
instability prevalent 1n the Italiote polis-system to the north, 
thus making Rhegion a safer prospect for the novice Leophron. 
Moreover, such 'apprenticeships' were not uncommon within 
the tyrannical houses of Greek Sicily. 3 6 At any rate, it is 
apparent that the new dual-polis state that emerged in 488 
was dominated by Anaxilaos and his family. 
The impact of Rhegine rule at Zankle has strong imperialistic 
36 Hieron I was sub-tyrant of Gela (485-478) after his brother Gelon 
had transferred his seat of power from Gela to Syracuse and before 
Hieron himself succeeded to the Syracusan 'throne' in 478 (Hdt. 7.156). 
A third Deinomenid, Thrasyboulos, possibly served in the same capacity 
(488-467) until he too succeeded at Syracuse, in 467 (Diod. 11.66.4-67.5). 
It also appears that Hieron was grooming his own son, Deinomenes II, as 
a future ruler of Syracuse when he installed him as sub-tyrant of Aitna 
(476-c. 461): Pind., Pyth. 1.58-60; Diod. 11.76.3. Thrasydaios also served 
an apprenticeship as sub-tyrant of Himera (c. 477-472) while his father, 
Theron, reigned in Akragas: Diod. 11.48.6, 53.l. 
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undertones reminiscent of the policies of the Achaian Italiote 
states to the north and, in particular, of the attempts by Kroton 
to depict itself as the legitimate successor state to the 
hegemony of Sybaris. Shortly after the Rhegine conquest of 
Zankle the mints of both poleis began to issue identical coins. 
The obverse type featured a lion and was perhaps influenced 
by the leonine type of the recently defunct Samian/Zanklaian 
tetradrachm, although the Apolline connotations also suggest 
the influence of the strong Rhegine association with the Delphic 
Oracle (Diod. 8.23.2).3 7 It has also been suggested that the 
calf-head type on the reverse symbolizes 'Italia_', a geographical 
area in antiquity referring approximately to the southern half 
of modern Calabria, of which Rhegion probably considered 
itself the main city (Arist., Pol. 1329b8-12). 3 8 Moreover, 
over time the association between Rhegion and Zankle on the 
one hand, and the Anaxilad regime on the other, became more 
intense and overt. In 480 Anaxilaos achieved a victory in the 
Olympic mule race, which precipitated a new series of coins 
from both mints of the principality, featuring a 
37 Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, p. 343; A CGC, p. 214. 
38 Through interpreting the word 'calf' (italos) as a pun on Italia. See 
Jenkins, Ancient Greek Coins, p. 73; Caven, Dionysius I: War-Lord of 
Sicily, p. 146. 
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mule-car big a as the obverse type (Arist. F568, 578 [Rose]).3 9 
Thus the coinage of the Anaxilad period clearly demonstrates 
both where the centre of power was in the principality 
(Rhegion/Italia), and upon which family this power was 
bestowed (the Anaxiladai). Italiote maxims and cultural 
imperatives, as opposed to Sikeliote ones, were therefore in 
many ways the order of the day. As has been detailed 
previously, both Sybaris and Kroton were also early adherents 
to this ideology of power as expressed through numismatic 
symbolism. The coinage of such Sybarite conquests as Siris, as 
well as that of its villaggi periferici were all marked by the 
Sybarite bull type. In seeking to assert itself as the new 
hegemon after 510, Kroton also took control of the numerous 
mints that lay within its newly extended borders and ensured 
that the tripod would replace the bull wherever possible. 
Unlike under the fifth century Athenian empire,40 and to a 
lesser extent under the royal mint system of the later Argeadai 
and the Diadochoi, 41 there was obviously some prestige to be 
39 TWGa, p. 431; A CGC, p. 214; Caccamo Caltabiano, La Monetazione di 
Messana, p 32. 
40 M &L no. 45. 
41 A.B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire: The reign of Alexander the 
Great (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 232, 244; 0. M!i1rkholm, Early Hellenistic 
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had in the ltaliote polis-system from allowing the survival of 
dependants' mints, even in the instance of the conquest, and m 
some cases annihilation, of the poleis in question, such as at 
Siris (by Sybaris), Sybaris (by Kroton) and Zankle (by Rhegion). 
Therefore, although it is possible that the personalized aspect 
of Anaxilaos' biga coins were influenced by the quadriga 
series commemorating the Olympic victories of the Deinomenid 
tyrants of Syracuse, 4 2 it is evident that in many ways 
Anaxilaos was seeking to establish Rhegion as an imperialist 
state in the mould of the Achaian giants to the north. Such a 
policy naturally required the adoption of an ideology of power, 
replete with hegemonal numismatic symbolism. 
There is also evidence to suggest that Anaxilaos may have 
emulated some of the ethnic policies of the Achaian 
superstates. Thoukydides states that after the Rhegine 
Coinage: From the accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-
188 B.C.), P. Grierson & U. Westermark (ed.s) (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 45-
54; H.S. Lund, Lysimachus: A study in early Hellenistc kingship 
(London & New York, 1992), pp. 131-4; A. Stewart, Faces of Power: 
Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics (Berkeley, Los Angeles & 
London, 1993), p. 158. 
42 A CGC, p. 210. For the Olympic chariot victories of the Deinomenidai, 
see Paus. 6.9 (Gelon, 488); and Pindar, OZ. 1 (Hieron I, 476). 
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conquest of Zankle Anaxilaos recolonized the polis and 
renamed it Messene (6.4.6), after his own ancestral homeland 
(d:no Tf\s E:avTov To apxafov TiaTp£8os). Numismatic evidence also 
points towards a name change for Zankle, with the legend 
MEL: L: EN ION appearing after 488 on all coins issued from this 
mint. 4 3 Moreover, as indicated by Thoukydides' reports of 
recolonization, there is good reason to believe that this change 
was not merely nominal. In a somewhat garbled and 
anachronistic account of the events surrounding the Rhegine 
capture of Zankle, Pausanias reveals two salient points. Firstly, 
it is alleged that Anaxilaos, as Skythes had previously done 
with the Samians, invited a band of Messenians from the 
Peloponessos to Magna Graecia, where he promptly enrolled 
them as soldiers in his bid to conquer Zankle; and secondly, 
after the capture of Zankle, the Messenians were allowed to 
settle in Zankle ( 4. 23. 6-10). 
While Pausanias confuses the chronologies of this event with 
that of the Second Messenian War, and transposes the actions 
of the victorious Messenians over the top of the Herodotean 
account of the Samian seizure of Zankle (c.f. Hdt. 6.23), the 
Messenian recolonization process is likely to have occurred. 
43 ACGC, p 214. 
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Strabo also asserts that these colonists were m fact Messenians 
(6.2.3), and Thoukydides' description of the colonists as being 
~vµµdKTwv dv8pwTiwv can certainly be interpreted as at least 
including Messenians in its midst (6.4.6). Certainly, it has been 
accepted as plausible that there was some form of revolt or 
disturbance in Messenia in either 491 or 490, thus making 
available an em i gr e population of Messenians for use 1n 
488. 44 Moreover, the eventual retention of the name 
'Messene' even after the expulsion of the Anaxilad dynasty in 
461 strongly suggests that the ethnographic make-up of the 
polis had been altered permanently during the years of 
Anaxilad rule.4 5 
The implications of such a policy are considerable. Between 
485 and 4 76 the Deinomenid tyrants of Syracuse would also 
earn for themselves a reputation for flexibility in relation to 
the demographic resources which they regarded as at their 
disposal. However, their ethnic policies rarley relied upon the 
44 Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, pp. 344-6; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 
pp. 153-4. 
45 A CGC, p. 216, Caccamo Caltabiano, La Monetazione di Messana, pp. 
4-5. 
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formula that deploying one's own ethnic group in sensitive 
recolonization ventures was the best guarantee of l~yalty .4 6 
Both Gelon and Hieron I attracted and exploited a wide variety 
of non-Syracusan and non-Sikeliote peoples on account of their 
military and patronage power.47 Anaxilaos on the other hand 
turned to his Messenian roots for inspiration and support when 
the issue of Zankle' s long-term future arose. Such a preference 
is reminiscent of the 'call to the fatherland' made by Sybaris 
and Kroton when colonization of Metapontion and Kaulonia was 
mooted. More importantly, as discussed in chapter 4, upon the 
Sybarite conquest of Siris, the Siritid underwent a process of 
'Achaianization', effectively transforming the ethnic character 
of the region into a state more palatable to the new Achaian 
overlords. A degree of ethnic engineering also probably took 
place in the aftermath of Kroton' s acquisition of the Sybaritid, 
46 For instance.: Gelon's insertion of Geloans, Kamarinaians, and the 
aristocrats of Megara Hyblaia and Euboia into the population of 
Syracuse in 485 (Hdt. 7.156); Hieron's importation of Peloponnesians and 
Syracusans into Aitna/Katane in 476 (Diod. 11.49.1); Hieron's 
introduction of Naxians and Katanaians into Leontinoi in 476 (Diod. 
11.49.2). 
4 7 There are many examples of Deinomenid patronage of individual 
foreigners: Hagesias of Stymphalos (Pind., 0 l. 6); Astylos of Krnton 
(Paus. 6.13.1); Simonides of Keos (Tim. ap. schol. Pind. OZ. 2.29; Ath. 
14.656d; Ael., VH 9.1); Bakchylides of Keos (Ael., VH 4.15). 
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at least in terms of the ruling class, as suggested by the 
position of Kylon. As the Rhegine example at Zankle 
demonstrates, evidently conquest followed by recolonization 
had become an imperialist norm. 
The emergence of a regime m Rhegion intent on redistributing 
populations as it saw fit thus not only predates the more 
famous recolonization projects of the Sikeliote Deinomenidai, 
but also m many ways conforms to a pattern of imperialism 
endemic to the central region of the Italiote polis-system. 
Clearly in archaic Magna Graecia, and later in Greek Sicily, 
population was regularly regarded as an asset condusive to 
control, or even as a weapon against regional rivals. In effect, 
population could be used both to build or strengthen a state's 
authority over its new territories or spheres of influence, as 
well as to 'fund' warfare. Therefore, while classical and 
hellenistic Rhegion became increasingly tied to the events and 
political processes of Greek Sicily, the emergence of an 
imperialist Rhegine state in the late archaic period boasted a 
strongly Italiote pedigree. 
That the principality of the Straits was a senous contender 
with Kroton for a share in the power left in the wake of the 
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Sybarite collapse 1s also evident in its rapid nse to prominence 
in the affairs of southern Magna Graecia, Sicily, and the lower 
' 
Tyrrhenian Sea 1n general. Moreover, standing aside 
momentarily from raw politico-military power, in terms of 
broader international name recognition, it was probably 
Rhegion, with its tyrant victorious on the field of Olympia and a 
stranglehold over the main east-west trade route, that stood 
out among the Italiote states. Sybaris was in all likelihood the 
last Italiote po lis to enjoy such widespread recognition, as 
suggested by the record of Smindyrides' voyage to Sikyon (Hdt. 
6.127; Thphr. ap. Ath. 12.511c), Alkisthenes' to Sparta (Arist. 
ap. Ath. 12.541a), and the impact of the fall of Sybaris at 
distant Miletos (Hdt. 6.21). In this sense it 1s not difficult to 
imagine that Kroton, embroiled as it was 1n civil war and 
struggling to come to terms with the magnitude of its territorial 
'inheritance', played second fiddle to Rhegion. 
As has been seen, just as the Samians represented a setback for 
Rhegine interests, the emigration of the Messenians to Italy m 
or just prior to 488 appears to have tipped the balance of 
power on the Straits -in Rhegion' s favour. If Pausanias is to be 
believed, the Messenians provided Anaxilaos with the fresh 
soldiers with which he was finally able to invest Zankle 
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successfully (4.23.8). In contrast, Thoukydides makes no 
mention of this joint assault, and speaks only of the post-
conquest period (6.4.6). However, despite the problems 
already identified with this episode as related by Pausanias, 
the proposition that the Messenians provided the infantry 
component to reinforce a Rhegine naval siege of Zankle should 
not be dismissed out of hand. 
As a maritime polis, Rhegion can be expected to have been 
well endowed with naval assets but, as discussed in chapter 3, 
its small and mountainous c ho ra m all probability did not 
support a particularly large hoplite army. Indeed, the earliest 
available figures for the Rhegine armed forces support this 
estimation. The largest land army which Rhegion is known to 
have fielded appeared in 399 and did not exceed 6,000 
infantry and 600 cavalry (Diod. 14.40.3), whereas the Rhegine 
war fleet numbered a more than respectable eighty ships in 
389 (Diod. 14.103.2, 106.3).48 · Although most poleis in the 
48 Although Diodoros states that Dionysios I confiscated the entire 
Rhegion fleet, at that time numbering 70 ships, in 389, Rhegion had 
already lost ten ships to Dionysios' admiral, Thearides, off Lipara earlier 
that year, thus bringing the total to eighty ships. The figure of eighty 
is less clear but nevertheless implied at Diod. 14.8.2 as well. 
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region were dwarfed by the naval power of Deinomenid 
Syracuse (Hdt. 7.158), the Rhegine fleet was in all probability 
the second largest in Greek Italy, and thus also the largest in 
Magna Graecia at that time. Clearly what Rhegion did lack was 
infantry, and the failure of its forces to seize Zankle at the end 
of the sixth century, and again in 394 when it relied upon a 
land assault only (Diod. 14.87 .1-3), underlines this weakness. 
Therefore Pausanias' account of the fall of Zankle, in which a 
combined land and sea operation secures victory for Anaxilaos 
and his new Messenian allies, should be viewed as a plausible, 
if not preferable, version of events. Moreover, taken in 
conjunction with the use of the Messenians as colonists in the 
new 'Messene', the role of the Messenians in Rhegion' s 
expansionist plans thus becomes instrumental, 
both deployment 1n offensive as well as 
operations. 
encompassing 
consolidation 
Rhegion continued to demonstrate its new power by seeking to 
reoccupy those territories which had traditionally belonged to 
Zankle, but had since asserted their independence. -Two 
Olympic dedications dated to the 480' s outline victories over 
Mylai, at the hands of the M EGG { v i o i (SE G 24.313-14). As 
argued m chapter 3, this former colony of Chalkidian Zankle in 
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all probability formed part of the extended c ho ra of the 
metropolis, as indicated by the numerous attempts by 
Zankle/Messene over the centuries to bring the colony to heel 
or secure its recovery (Diod. 14.87.3, 19.65.3-5).4 9 In this 
sense the Rhegines and their Messenian allies resembled the 
later Mamertine conquerers of Sikeliote Messene. Having 
seized Messene in the 280' s, it is evident that by the time of 
their defeat at the Longanos River in the 260' s the Mamertines 
had expanded their territory to include all of the old Zanklaian 
patrimony, including Mylai (Polyb. 1.9.7; Diod. 22.13.1). 
Moreover, given that Rhegion was the ruler of Messene from 
488, it is probable that Rhegion was also the directing force 
behind the Messenian assault on Mylai. The appearance of 
MEaaE'vioi on the Olympic dedication thus aptly symbolizes the 
Rhegine ability to deploy both the resources of its new 
subordinate polis, and its people, the· Messenians. 
Further evidence of this strength is apparent 1n another 
Olympic dedication, this time recording a Rhegine victory 
against the Geloans in the late sixth or early fifth century (SE G 
24.303: [T6]i 'PEyivoi fEA.rniov). In trying to establish a more 
49 Moreover, Thouk. 3 90.2 not only implies that Mylai was under 
Messenian control in 426, but also, given that a strong Messenian 
garrison was present, that revolt may have been a possibility. 
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precise date for this event, the vanous political manoeuvrings 
endemic to late archaic Sicily and Magna Graecia provide 
indispensable aid. Given that there is no indication of Geloan 
activity as far north as the Straits until the expedition of 
Hippokrates, the battle possesses an upper range of c. 497-c. 
494. so Moreover, as discussed earlier, the circumstances of 
Anaxilaos' own rise to power in 494 leaves precious little scope 
for a successful military operation on the part of the Rhegine 
oligarchy prior to this date. Furthermore, a clash between a 
land power such as Gela and a maritime state like Rhegion not 
only necessitates some form of Rhegine intervention in Sicily, 
but also the Rhegine occupation of a base within Sicily so as to 
facilitate the fielding of a land army. An attack of this nature 
sits far easier with the known imperialist ambitions of 
Anaxilad Rhegion, as well as the known Anaxilad occupation of 
two such potential bases, Zankle and Mylai. Therefore there is 
little doubt the Rhegine victory over the Geloans occurred 
during the reign of Anaxilaos. 
A possible lower range for this victory is made available by 
referring to the transfer of Geloan power to Syracuse in 485 
5 ° For a definitive chronology of Hippokrates' career, see TWGa, pp. 
378-406. 
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(Hdt. 7.156). Any conflict between Rhegion and Gela after 485 
would almost certainly have dragged in the senior Deinomenid 
partner, Syracuse, then under the control of Gelon. Given that 
Syracuse was the premiere military power m Sicily by c. 481 at 
the very latest (Hdt. 7 .158), 5 1 it is extremely unlikely that 
Rhegion would have risked a military encounter with Gela at 
this time. Indeed, as will be discussed further below, the 
threat of war from Gelon in 480 was possibly enough to force 
Anaxilaos to abandon his alliance with Carthage. However, m 
the years prior to Gelon' s occupation of Syracuse he was m 
many ways at his most vulnerable. Gelon in all likelihood had 
inherited a Sikel war from his predecessor, Hippokrates, was 
forced to put down a revolt within Gela itself, had to dispose of 
the new Pantarid regime, and possibly even fought a war 
against the Carthaginians (Hdt. 7. 155, 158). A defeat for an 
overstretched Gelon at the hands of the Rhegines at this point, 
whose own conquest of Zankle he would have been hard 
pressed to ignore, is thus conceivable. Therefore the most 
likely date for the Olympic inscription lies between 488 and 
51 Based on Burn' s calculations and the speech of the pan-Hellenic 
envoys at Syracuse in which Xerxes is said to have not yet crossed the 
Hellespont. See Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 321. 
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485, when Anaxilaos had good reason to be fighting m Sicily by 
way of his occupation of Zankle/Messene, and Deinomenid 
power had yet to peak but was still probably interested in 
asserting itself over the former Pantarid domain, including the 
Straits region. 
This Rhegine victory over what was presumably a Geloan 
expeditionary force helps to underscore the confidence and 
success of the nascent principality, particularly in regard to 
Sicily and the lower Tyrrhenian Sea region. Moreover, it also 
serves to define what Anaxilaos' vision for his principality may 
have been. As discussed earlier, the coinage issued by the two 
known mints of the domain (Rhegion and Messene), indicates 
that Anaxilaos most probably viewed his principality as 
ltaliote, as opposed to Sikeliote, in nature. Furthermore, his 
determined opposition to the Sikeliote land powers between 
494 and 480, whether Geloan or Syracusan-based, suggests a 
strong desire to sever much of north-eastern Sicily from the 
rest of the island and bind it to his Rhegine stronghold in 
Magna Graecia. While the conquest of Zankle was a first step 
towards realizing this design, the capture of Mylai soon after 
488 indicated the direction in which Anaxilaos was looking to 
secure his gains, the lower Tyrrhenian Sea. 
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Accordingly, the Rhegine commitment to the wider Straits zone 
increased markedly. It is probably around this time that 
Anaxilaos established a vav aTaBµo v at Skyllaion, on the Italiote 
side of the Straits (Strabo 6.1.5). Situated so as to exploit the 
narrowest point of the Straits, between Cape Pelorias and Cape 
Kainys, Strabo goes on to explain that Anaxilaos was then able 
to block traffic at will. As stated previously, this feat in itself 
was probably achieved somewhat earlier by the Rhegine 
occupation of Zankle, but what the foundation of Skyllaion did 
accomplish was the ability to close even the entrance to the 
Straits from the north. The main effect of this, according to 
Strabo, was that Anaxilaos was able to curb Etruscan piracy 1n 
the region, thus enhancing his status as lord of the Straits and 
as a major player in both the polis-systems of Magna Graecia 
and Sicily. 
Although the establishment and consolidation of Rhegine rule 
over the entire Straits zone no doubt formed the nucleus of 
Anaxilad imperialism, Rhegion also appears to have identified 
some room for expansion in Magna Graecia itself. A series of 
Olympic dedications outline multiple victories on the part of 
Rhegion and Messene against Lokroi early in the fifth century 
(SEG 24.304-5, 311-12). Rhegion had been an ally of Lokroi's 
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during the 550' s when Kroton went to war against the latter. 
However, given the disarray in central Magna Graecia following 
the fall of Sybaris, Kroton and its Achaian brethren no longer 
posed the threat they once had. In essence, Rhegion could now 
afford to reduce or even remove the formerly useful Lokrian 
buffer state to its north. The benefits of such expansion 
included access to fertile Lokrian territory on the Ionian Sea 
. -; littoral and around Matauros, the Lokrian outpost closest to 
Rhegion itself.52 
Two of the inscriptions mention the Rhegines only (24.304-5), 
whilst the remainder record solely the actions of the 
Messenians (24.311-12). Given the imprecise nature of the 
dating for the former pair, it is possible that these victories 
were scored by Anaxilaos' oligarchic predecessors. However, as 
stated previously, Anaxilaos came to power against a backdrop 
of military failure on the part of this oligarchy, and it is 
therefore more likely that the dedications in question celebrate 
victories achieved under Anaxilaos' aegis. The key to 
differentiating between the two groups of dedications is 1n the 
phases of Anaxilaos' reign to which they belong. The 
Messenian dedications clearly represent the successful 
52 De Sensi Sestito, La Calabria in eta arcaica e classica, p. 56. 
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deployment of forces from the junior polis in the principality 
of the Straits against the foes of the senior, thus locating the 
dedications 1n the post-488 period. The Rhegion-centric 
dedications can therefore be seen as either celebrating the 
achievements of Rhegine soldiers in the same attack, or the 
results of an earlier invasion of Lokroi, during the period pre-
dating the Rhegine occupation of Zankle/Messene (494-488). 
Whatever the case may be concermng the precise chronology of 
these inscriptions, it is evident that Rhegion also wished to see 
itself as a land power as well as a maritime one. Such a view 
was directly linked to the Rhegine perception that many of the 
'rules' regarding the ltaliote polis-system prevalent before the 
fall of Sybaris were now simply redundant. Rhegion clearly did 
not feel threatened by the proximity of Kroton any more if it 
was seeking to carve up part, or all of, the Lokrian c ho ra, the 
buffer zone between the Achaian and Euboian worlds since at 
least c. 550. Previously a node for maritime commerce, 
Anaxilad Rhegion was at the forefront of those states seeking to 
exploit the opportunities created by the end of the Sybarite 
hegemony. 
However, where Rhegion was most vulnerable was along its 
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newly extended southern frontier, in Sicily. Anaxilaos' trump 
card in his efforts to fend off the Deinomenid threat from the 
south and consolidate his realm was an alliance with Carthage, 
which Herodotos states was initiated by Anaxilaos (7.165). Not 
only was this one of the rare examples of an alliance between 
Italiotes and a foreign power in the archaic period, it was also 
the first known major military agreement between Greeks and 
non-Greeks. 53 Moreover, it also indicates the lengths to which 
Rhegion was prepared to go to secure its position. An alliance 
with an African-based power 1n an environment of 
ambivalence and outright hostility between Greeks and non-
Greeks in the West was a significant and thoroughly pragmatic 
step to take, particularly as Rhegion already had a record of 
pro-Phokaian sympathies, a group who had proven themselves 
to be both anti-Etruscan and anti-Carthaginian (Hdt. 1.166, 
6.17). 
53 Other instances of major Helleno-barbarian military alliances occur 
in 431, between Athens and the Odrysian kingdom (Thouk. 2.29, 95); in 
387, the so-called King's Peace between Sparta and Persia (Diod. 14.110); 
and in 383, between the Italiote League and Carthage (Diod. 15.15.2). 
However, minor alliances such as that between Hippokrates and the 
Sikels of Ergetion around 491 were probably quite common in the West 
(Polyain. 5.6). 
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Furthermore, the evolution of this alliance also demonstrates 
bo'th Anaxilaos' efforts to involve himself in the affairs of 
Sicily's lower Tyrrhenian littoral and this region's importance 
to the security of his nascent principality. Anaxilaos' victories 
against Zankle, Mylai and the Geloans did not go unnoticed m 
the only other significant Greek polis m the northern half of 
Sicily, Himera. 5 4 As suggested by the escape of Skythes from 
his imprisonment at Inyx soon after 493 and his subsequent 
flight to - Himera (Hdt. 6.23-4), this po l is lay outside the 
Pantarid sphere of influence, and probably outside that of their 
Deinomenid successors too. Herodotos also records the 
existence of a tyranny at Himera during the 480' s and it is 
therefore possible that it was this which provided the mainstay 
of the anti-Geloan and anti-Syracusan stance around 493 
(7 .165). Reaffirming this stance, after having been driven into 
exile by Syracuse's Emmenid allies at Akragas, the Himeraian 
tyrant, Terillos, sought the protection of the two largest powers 
in northern Sicily, Carthage and the principality of the Straits 
(Hdt. 7.165). 
Furthermore, Herodotos' account implies a reasonably long-
standing relationship between Anaxilaos and Terillos, which 
54 Caccamo Caltabiano, La Monetazione di Messana, p. 3. 
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fits well with the current hypothesis that Rhegion was also 
seeking both to protect itself from the Dorian empires to the 
south, and to expand its influence in northern Sicily. Indeed, 
Anaxilaos' marriage to Terillos' daughter, Kydippe, must have 
occurred by 486 -at the latest, given that the offspring of this 
marnage came of age in 467 (Diod. 11.66). Moreover, given the 
preparation time cited for the eventual Carthaginian expedition 
under Hamilkar in support of Terillos in 480, Terillos cannot 
have been expelled by Akragas any earlier than 483 (Diod. 
11. 1). 5 5 Therefore it appears very probable that Anaxilaos 
came into contact with Terillos soon after the creation of his 
Straits principality 1n 488, and that their mutual dislike of the 
Deinomenid-Emmenid axis led not only to a marriage alliance, 
but also to a flexible position on the Carthaginians, whose 
nearest base, at Soloeis, was only twenty kilometres from 
Himera itself. 
Thus at the very end of the archaic period, and in order to 
protect the gains reaped from its imperialist policies, Italiote 
Rhegion found itself on the brink of a large scale Sicilian war. 
In essence, in little over a decade Rhegion had become one the 
highest profile Italiote pole is, spreading its power and 
55 Woodbury, "The Gratitude of the Locrian Maiden: Pindar", p. 290. 
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influence into Sicily and as far as north Africa. However, as the 
power and ambitions of Rhegion increased,_ so too did the costs. 
The war in question was one in which Rhegion fought as a 
member of a mixed coalition, against Greeks whose eventual 
victory was depicted as a triumph over barbarism (Hdt. 7.166; 
Simonides ap. Schol. Pind., Pyth. 1.152; Diod. 11.22.5-23.3; 
Plut., Moralia 175A). Moreover, as will be discussed further in 
section 3, Rhegion' s choice of allies in 483 also had the effect of 
laying the foundations for a ·new ~ra in Magna Graecia in which 
aggressive foreign intervention and interference featured 
prominently. 
Section Three: Syracuse: foreign intervention, p a x 
Sy r a c us an a and their impact upon the Italiote po l is -
system. 
As stated in the prev10us section, the expansion of Rhegine 
power into northern Sicily brought it into contact with the local 
hegemonal Dorian states, Gela and Syracuse. However, while 
Anaxilaos was eventually able to avoid a Pantarid-Geloan 
diktat over the balance of power m the Straits of Messina, the 
Deinomenid-Syracusan tyrants proved far more difficult to 
ignore, and it is the policies of this latter dynasty which 
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heralded a new era both in Italiote-Sikeliote relations, and in 
the politics of the Italiote po l is-system. Due to the 
chronological overlapping of the traditional closing date for the 
archaic period by the various dynasties, policies and poleis 
under consideration, this section will necessarily extend 
beyond 480 in its enquiries. In particular it will be argued that 
it was not until the 470's that the dust stirred up by the fall of 
Sybaris finally settled, thus allowing for the establishment of a 
new, and more to the point, relatively stable balance of power 
in the polis-system of Magna Graecia. 
3.1 Syracuse 
humbling of 
and southern 
the principality 
clientship of Lokroi. 
Magna Graecia: 
of the Straits and 
the 
the 
As mentioned earlier, the expulsion of the Himeraian tyrant, 
Terillos, by Akragas precipitated a large-scale mobilization of 
support by the opposing sides (see map 6). Terillos called upon 
his son-in-law, Anaxilaos, who m turn recruited the support of 
Carthage. Akragas, under its tyrant Theron, was linked 1n a 
marriage alliance with the Deinomenidai, who at that time 
ruled in both Gela and Syracuse. 5 6 Wbilst this was ostensibly 
56 Gelon had married Theron's daughter, Damareta, and Theron the 
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a dispute over the ownership of Himera, it is probable that 
nearly all of the island's major players saw an opportunity for 
a final reckoning. In particular, Anaxilaos must have realized 
that his attempts to slice off and attach north-eastern Sicily to 
his Italiote realm could not go unchallenged by the Dorian 
poleis to the south indefinitely. Moreover, the Deinomenidai 
themselves had long been advocates of an anti-Carthaginian 
war (Hdt. 7.158). 
However, despite Anaxilaos' manoeuvrings between 488 and 
480, there is no record of Rhegion ever having participated in 
the Battle of Himera, the culmination of the crisis sparked by 
Terillos' expulsion. The course of the battle, supposedly fought 
on the same day as the clash at Salamis (Hdt. 7.166; Diod. 
11.24.1 ), is more the preserve of a Sikeliote-centric study, and 
thus will not be discussed here in detail. Suffice to say that 
while both Herodotos and Diodoros agree on the size of the 
Carthaginian host, neither include a Rhegine/Messenian 
contingent, and this despite a detailed Herodotean account of 
the forces present (Hdt. 7.165; Diod. 11.20.2). Given that 
Anaxilaos is supposed to have given his own children to 
daughter of Gelon' s brother, Polyzelos (Schol. Pind., 0 l. 2 inscr.). For 
the date of these weddings, see TWGa, p. 414. 
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Hamilkar as hostages (Hdt. 7.165), the total absence of Rhegine 
military support is difficult to digest. As a solution, Dunbabin 
has proposed that Gelon's bother-in-law, Chromios of Gela, led 
the Deinomenid fleet, numbering around 200 ships (Hdt. 
7.158), against the Carthaginians, but either by design or 
accident, ended up missing the battle at Himera and 
neutralizing Anaxilaos' navy on the Straits.5 7 
Based upon vague references to a Greek naval victory (Schol. 
Pind., Pyth. 1.146a; Paus. 6.19.7), and the absence of Chromios, 
a proven and trusted soldier, from Himera, as well as his 
participation in a number of unnamed sea battles (Pind., N em. 
9.40-3), Dunbabin' s hypothesis goes far towards explaining 
both why Hamilkar was able to sail to Sicily unopposed 
(Diod.11.20.2), and why Gelon chose to march overland to 
Himera (Diod. 11.21.1). Moreover, it should come as no 
surprise that Anaxilaos did not provide a contingent at Himera. 
Even when augmented by its Messenian allies, Rhegion was not 
a land power and its most valuable contribution to Hamilkar' s 
war effort was undoubtedly its fleet and its ability to block the 
Straits of Messina. 
57 Ibid., pp. 425-6. 
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Whether or not the fleet of Chromios ever came to blows with 
that of Anaxilaos is impossible to determine. That the Anaxilad 
dynasty continued to reign independently on the Straits for 
another nineteen years, suggests that Anaxilaos probably kept 
a substantial portion, if not all, of his fleet out of harm's way. 
However, as it is clear that Gelon was in the position to be 
magnanimous to all his foes after his decisive victory at Himera 
(Diod. 11.26), we must assume that Chromios was at least able 
to "neutralize", as Dunbabin puts it, the threat posed by 
Anaxilaos. Indeed, Hieron' s reminder in 467 to the sons of 
Anaxilaos of the benefaction (EvEpyEafo) given to their father by 
Gelon strongly suggests that Rhegion was a member of the 
group which sought leniency from Syracuse after the events at 
Himera (Diod. 11.66.1). 
Moreover, it is also evident that Rhegion' s independence was 
not completely unqualified. Although the overt 
Italiote/Rhegine numismatic symbolism continued unabated, in 
the wake of Gelon' s victory at Himera the comage issued by the 
principality underwent a subtle change. Having previously 
been issued on the Chalkidian standard, the coinage of Rhegion 
and Messene now adopted the Attic standard then prevalent at 
Syracuse. 58 As was the case with Sybaris and its relationship 
58 Ibid., p. 431; Vallet, Zancle et Rhegion, p. 366; ACGC, p. 214. 
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with other Italiote pole is using the Achaian standard and 
incuse technique in the sixth century, formal obeisance, in this 
case to Syracuse, was probably not implied by this 
standardization. Rather, we are in all likelihood witnessing 
recognition by Rhegion that Syracuse was now the strongest 
po l is in the region, in both military and economic terms. 
Moreover 1n many ways, to adopt the standard in use at 
Syracuse was also in effect to acknowledge that Gelon was the 
master in northern and eastern Sicily, and if he wanted to force 
the Straits of Messina in future, he would do so. Indeed, as will 
be seen, Syracusan ships, whether merchant or naval, do not 
appear to have had any difficulty securing passage through the 
Straits for much of the remainder of the fifth century. 5 9 
The changes in the coinage of the principality should also be 
seen as a symbol for the long-term costs, associated with 
Anaxilaos' ill-fated alignment with Himera and Carthage. 
Although Anaxilaos' reign over Zankle/Messene and a 
substantial portion of north-eastern Sicily down to 480 had, to 
an extent, been dependent on the recruitment of allies such as 
5 9 Syracusan fleets are known to have sailed through the Straits en 
route to the Bay of Naples (M &L no. 29; Diod. 11.51.1-2), and Corsica 
(Diod. 11.88.4-5), during the first half of the fifth century. 
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Terillos and Hamilkar, it is evident that Rhegion had remained 
a conduit of Italiote power and ambitions. Thus, up until this 
time north-eastern Sicily was a zone subject to Rhegine 
machinations, incursions and imperialism. However, the defeat 
of Rhegion' s key allies in 480 at the hands of a thoroughly pan-
Sikeliote and panhellenic alliance pr~cipitated an inversion of 
the regional balance of power, in which Rhegion effectively 
became a gateway through which Sikeliotes might intervene in 
the affairs of Magna Graecia. 
The first indication that Sikeliote power was being asserted in a 
territorial sense within the Italiote polis-system occurs during 
the last years of Gelon's reign at Syracuse. Douris of Samos 
states that Gelon built a garden, and thus presumably 
possessed an estate, at Hipponion, called the Horn of Amaltheia 
(FHG 2.479). ~t is certainly possible to view this statement as 
anachronistic, particularly given that the earliest substantial 
reference to a Syracusan presence at Hipponion occurs in the 
age of Agathokles, coincidentally the subject of Douris' 
biography (Strabo 6.1.5). However, there is also good reason to 
believe that the Deinomenidai did in fact possess estates tn 
southern Magna Graecia in the time of Gelon. 
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As stated earlier, Gelon' s victory at Himera established 
Syracuse both as the foremost polis of Sicily as well as the 
centre of an east Sicilian empire whose influence and fame 
extended far beyond the western Greek world, to Olympia and 
Delphoi. 60 Given its proximity to the Straits and eastern 
Sicily, Lokroi, the colonial master of Hipponion, 61 also must 
have recognized that Syracuse was a new regional power to be 
reckoned with. However, it is apparent that the relationship 
between Lokroi and Syracuse may have been a great deal 
closer. In 477, the year after the death of Gelon, the Scholiast 
on Pindar states that a Rhegine invasion of Lokrian territory 
was either threatened or occurred (Schol. Pind., Pyth. 1.99a, 
2.36c, 2.38). The Scholiast goes on the assert that Hieron, 
Gelon' s brother and successor to the Syracusan tyranny, in turn 
dispatched his trusted lieutenant, Ghromios, to put an end to 
the attack. That this act was in Lokroi' s favour is reinforced by 
the praise of the Lokrian maiden given in Pindar' s Pythian Ode 
(Pyth. 2.18-20). 
60 M&L no. 28; Theopompos, FGrH 115 Fl93; Schol. Pind., Pyth. 1.152; 
Diod. 11.26.7; Paus. 6.19.7. 
61 There is no evidence to suggest that Hipponion broke free of its 
metropolis until the 420's (Thouk. 5.5.3). See chapter 5. 
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That Syracuse should take an interest in the security of Lokroi 
at all belies a longer term post-Himera strategy on the behalf 
of the Deinomenidai. It is clear that Rhegion was to a 
considerable degree 'forgiven' by Gelon for its pro-Carthaginian 
stance in 480, and the marriage of Anaxilaos' daughter to 
Hieron strongly suggests that Rhegion became a de facto 
member of the ruling alliance in Sicily (Schol. Pind., Pyth. 
1.112). However, such developments do not imply that the 
Deinomenidai trusted Rhegion, or that Anaxilaos entered into 
rapproachment with Gelon for. any reason other than necessity 
following the defeat of all his allies. Thus for Gelon to contract 
an alliance with Lokroi during the last phase of his reign ( 480-
4 78), makes sense in terms of constructing and implementing a 
policy which would bring about the effective containment of 
Rhegion. Indeed this policy was to form the blueprint for the 
Italiote projects of later Syracusan tyrants, including Dionysios 
I (Diod. 14.44.6, 106.3, 107.2). 
Moreover, in support of this policy being the brainchild of 
Gel on rather than Hieron is the timing of Anaxilaos' attack on 
Lokroi. This offensive can be interpreted as a calculated lunge 
by Anaxilaos to exploit the death of the original architect of his 
confinement, Gelon, before the relatively untried Hieron could 
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consolidate his position. 6 2 Therefore it is possible that 
Hieron' s intervention in favour of Lokroi and against Rhegion in 
477 was a policy inherited from Gelon, who had exploited an 
opportunity to establish a long term counterweight to Rhegine 
influence and power-building in northern Sicily. By extension, 
that Gelon possessed estates in Lokrian controlled Hipponion as 
a token of Lokrian gratitude for this 'new alliance cannot be 
ruled out. Thus in this sense Syracuse became directly 
involved in the affairs of Italiote po leis, through its desire to 
hinder Rhegion expansion and power. However, as will be 
seen, once Syracuse had acquired a taste for intervention in 
Magna Graecia, it would prove difficult for the Italiote poleis 
to resist the increasingly frequent incursions of the Sikeliote 
interloper effectively. 
That Rhegion was involved in an attack on Lokroi in the first 
instance is also indicative of the new dynamics of power in the 
, region. Prior to the defeat of its allies at Himera, Rhegion had 
concentrated much of its imperialist energies in northern Sicily. 
However, in the wake of this defeat, the Syracusan-
Akragantine axis reigned surpreme in Sicily, thus curtailing 
any future expansionism in this area on Rhegion' s part. 
62 For evidence that Hieron's grip on power in Syracuse was insecure 
during the early years of his reign, see Diod. 11.48.3, 67.3-4. 
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Anaxilaos was able to retain Messene, but Himera, and along 
with it any serious hope of power in northern Sicily, was gone -
having become well and truly entrenched within the sphere of 
Akragas, its Emmenid tyrants, and its Syracusan ally. In 
essence, for Anaxilaos to turn to Magna Graecia for his 
territorial conquests was in effect an admission that Sicily was 
now closed to him by Syracuse. 
Thus, the presence of the relatively small Lokrian polis on 
Rhegion' s northern border provided an opportunity for the 
imperialism of the Anaxilad regime to express itself once again. 
Anaxilaos had after all come to power on an expansionist 
platform and although his regime had been able to survive the 
disaster at Himera relatively intact, a military victory over 
Lokroi would no doubt have been to his benefit. The rise of 
Syracuse can therefore be seen to have had a significant effect 
on the way in which the southernmost Italiote pole is 
interacted with one another. Although it has already been 
demonstrated that Rhegion harboured designs against Lokroi 
long before Himera, it can be said that frustration for Anaxilaos 
in Sicily after 480 must have been a decisive factor in the 
rekindling of the desire to pursue this particular course of 
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imperialism. Moreover, the renewed Rhegine attacks north 
into Magna Graecia re-emphasized just how far the stocks of 
the Achaian poleis had fallen following on the collapse of the 
Sybarite empire. 
The Scholiast on Pindar states that both Anaxilaos and his 
eldest son, Leophron, were involved in the invasion of Lokroi 
(Pyth. 2.38), whilst Justin records the leadership of Leophr~m 
only (21.3 .2). Whatever the case, clearly the next generation of 
the Anaxilad dynasty was equally intent upon pursuing 
imperialist policies at the expense of its neighbours, and if this 
meant attacks on Italiotes rather than Sikeliotes, then so be it. 
Moreover, although the Scholiast offers a contradictory account 
of whether the campaign actually proceeded beyond the 
planning stage (Pyth. 2.36c, cf. 1.99a, 2.38), Justin implies that 
the war went ahead and that the Rhegines enjoyed initial 
success. However, as discussed earlier, Lokroi was able to 
summon its Syracusan allies who promptly put and end to 
Rhegion' s designs on its northern neighbour. The significance 
of this blow to the Anaxilad regime's confidence and ambitions 
cannot be underestimated, and was in fact the cause of another, 
more drastic re-orientation of Rhegine foreign policy. 
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Neither Anaxilaos or Leophron long outlived the Rhegine defeat 
over the Lokroi issue, which in turn precipitated the institution 
of a regency under the auspices of the household retainer, 
Mikythos, in 476 (Hdt. 7.170; Diod. 11.48.2, 66.1-2; Paus. 
5. 26 .4). 63 The hallmark of this regency, apart from financial 
rectitude and loyal service (Diod. 11.66.2-3), was a 
fundamental repositioning of Rhegine imperialism. Based on 
the failed attempt by Anaxilaos and Leophron to focus their 
expansionist ambitions on Italiote soil, and ultimately on the 
increasing length of Syracuse's reach, Mikythos turned to the 
Italiote polis-system for support and security. 
The first indication that Mikythos was seeking to give Rhegine 
foreign policy a more pronounced Italiote accent occurs in 473. 
In this year both Herodotos and Diodoros state that a Rhegine 
expeditionary force was dispatched to Taras in order to aid that 
polis in a war against the Iapygians (Hdt. 7.170; Diod. 11.52). 
Diodoros goes on to assert that this was in accordance with an 
63 Dionysios of Halik~rnassos provides the one dissenting voice to this 
tradition, claiming that Leophron succeeded to the tyranny at Rhegion 
at the death of his father, Anaxilaos (20. 7 .1) This may in fact be a 
corruption of the tradition that Leophron ruled at Rhegion when 
Anaxilaos transferred his own seat of power to Messene (Schol. Pind., 
Pyth. 2.32-3, 34, 38; Justin 21.3.2). 
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alliance (11.52.3), which, unless its ongins lie with the 
initiative of Anaxilaos, must have been contracted by Mikythos 
between 476 and 473. The short term consequences of this 
alliance represented a setback for both Rhegine and Tarantine 
arms, the former, if Herodotos is to be believed, losing some 
3,000 soldiers (7.170). 64 Furthermore, Diodoros also claims 
that an Iapygian host proceeded to invade Rhegion and even 
managed to capture the polis (11.52.5). This particular claim 
should also be regarded with suspicion, as there is no other 
record of Rhegion falling to an invading army until that of 
Dionysios I's In 387, an event which struck many In the 
Hellenic world as momentous (Diod. 14.109, 111-12; Lysias 23). 
Moreover, it is also difficult to see how the regency of 
Mikythos, or the tyranny in general for that matter, could have 
survived such a blow, which of course they did, further 
discrediting Diodoros' claim. At any rate, despite the failure of 
the Iapygian campaign, it IS apparent that Rhegion was seeking 
to construct an Italiote alliance within which the Rhegines 
could find a haven from Sikeliote power. 
The second key indicator of Mikythos' re-orientation policy is 
64 Given that Rhegion's total land strength was 6,000 men in 399 (Diod. 
14.40.3), it is difficult to believe that 3,000 soldiers were killed in a single 
engagement outside Taras in 473. 
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found within the Rhegine activities in the Tyrrhenian Sea, 
previously the sub-colonial preserve of Sybaris and Kroton. 
Situated between the Sybarite foundations at Poseidonia, Laos 
and Skidros, in 4 71 Mikythos established a colony at Pyxous 
(Diod. 11.59.4; Strabo 6.1.1). Moreover, it 1s at about this time 
that intensive Rhegine commerce is detectable in the Val di 
Diano, north of Pyxous and east of Poseidonia, and Etruria. 6 5 
The location of this new colonial venture underscores both the 
desire of Rhegion to expand its interests away from the gaze of 
Syracuse, and also to continue to build useful contacts and 
alliances within the Italiote polis-system. 
In particular, the foundation of Pyxous can be seen as a 
mechanism for renewing the previously close relationship with 
the Phokaians of Hyele. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
Phokaians who were forced to evacuate Kyrnos (Corsica) in the 
wake of the Battle of Alalia found temporary refuge in Rhegion 
(Hdt. 1.166). Furthermore, it is from Rhegion that these 
refugees launched their successful bid to colonize Hyele, around 
65 Caccamo Caltabiano, La Monetazione di Messana, p. 13; Vallet, 
Zancle et Rhegion, p. 368; Frederiksen, Campania, p. 102; Gualtieri, 
"The Community at Roccagloriosa: Interpretations and Hypotheses", 
Fourth Century B. C. Magna Graecia: A Case Study, p. 344. 
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535 (Hdt. 1.167). Such events suggest that a healthy rapport 
had existed between the Rhegines and the Phokaians during 
the second half of the sixth century. The close proximity of 
Pyxous to Hyele further suggests that the Rhegines did not 
choose the site for their colony at random and that an attempt 
was therefore being made to re-establish or strengthen 
relations with the Phokaian Italiotes. Moreover, it 1s difficult to 
see how Pyxous could have been founded without the 
permission, tacit or otherwise, of Hyele, particularly as Rhegion 
was hardly in the position to start alienating potential allies. 
Some form of negotiations probably took place between 
Rhegion and Hyele, and in all likelihood within the framework 
of general cooperation. 
As with the attack on Lokroi and the alliance with Taras, such a 
policy highlights the Rhegine desire to recover its prestige and 
autonomy by rebuilding its strength on Italiote soil, as well as 
its innate dissatisfaction with the pax Syracusana set in place 
following the Battle of Himera.66 Furthermore, in general this 
policy also demonstrates the ability of Syracuse to shape the 
politics of the po Us-systems around it. Whilst retaining 
ownership of Messene and thus the principality Anaxilaos had 
66 Giangiulio, "Aspetti di storia della Magna Grecia", p. 42. 
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constructed, nevertheless Rhegion found itself locked in a 
suffocating Syracusan embrace. With the eastern Sicilian 
empue to the south, and the de facto imperial client-state of 
Lokroi to the north, Rhegion was forced to look further abroad 
for support and influence than it had ever done so previously. 
Indeed the alliance contracted by Rhegion with Athens in the 
second· half of the century should be seen as a direct result of 
the rise of Syracuse in the 480's and 470's.6 7 Syracuse had 
proven that it could frustrate and effectively control the 
expansion of Rhegion, whether it be in Sicily or Magna Graecia. 
Thus, in many ways much of the polis-system of southernmost 
Magna Graecia entered the orbit of Syracuse. 
3.2 Syracuse and northern Magna Graecia: the decline 
of Kyme and the retreat of Italiote power from the 
Tyrrhenian Sea zone. 
That Hyele was amenable to renewing its friendship with 
Rhegion at this time is possibly related to political upheaval in 
its own backyard, the Tyrrhenian Sea and its littoral. 68 This 
67 M &L no. 63; D.M. Lewis, "The Treaties with Leontini and Rhegion", 
ZP E 22 (1976), p. 225. 
6 8 An invasion from Poseidonia mentioned but not dated by Strabo 
could be the specific occasion for the Phokaians' willingness. to deal 
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upheaval in turn stemmed from the decisive intervention of 
the Syracusan fleet in the northernmost outpost of Magna 
Graecia, the Bay of Naples. Little is known about the political 
history of Kyme and its sub-colonies during the late archaic 
period, aside from the collapse of Aristodemos' tyranny around 
490 (DH 7.11-12.1). However, it is apparent that the new 
government was dominated by the aristocratic families whom 
Aristodemos had driven out in 504, and who were in turn in an· 
likelihood dependent upon the support of local, non-Greek 
Campanians (DH 7.10-11). 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter 3, between 524 and c. 490 
Aristodemos had helped to elevate Kyme to regional power in 
Campania and, to an extent, in Latium. Thus with the new 
regime still consolidating itself in the aftermath of a bloody 
coup and potentially beholden to local states such as Capua (DH 
7.10.3), due to their _earlier support and sustenance, Kyme was 
probably not in the best position to defend itself adequately. It 
is therefore conceivable that this dependence heralded a new 
period in Kymaian history, in which a far more cautious foreign 
policy was adopted, reflecting an innate fragility and an 
inability to protect its recently acquired regional status. At any 
with the Rhegines at this time (6.1.1). 
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rate, Diodoros states that in 474 ambassadors from Kyme 
approached Hieron and solicited his aid in their struggle against 
the Etruscans (11.51.1). As will be discussed further in the 
following section, the hopes of this embassy were probably 
partially based upon Hieron' s positive response to an earlier 
entreaty, from Sybarite exiles in 476. At any rate, Hieron 
obliged and scored an impressive naval victory at the Battle of 
Kyme later in that year, as celebrated in his Olympic dedication 
(M &L no. 29; Diod. 11.51.2). 
This victory was critical for the vanous Italiote states with 
interests 1n the Tyrrhenian Sea, in that it facilitated the 
extension of the pax Syracusana into northern and western 
Magna Graecia. Moreover, the political isolation from Sicily and 
the rest of the Magna Graecia which Kyme and its satellite 
poleis had enjoyed for centuries came to an abrupt and 
conclusive end. Kyme, a regional hegemon at its. peak in the 
late sixth century under the tyrant Aristodemos, was now 
clearly in decline and sought to integrate itself into the more 
mainstream band of settlement in western Hellas for security 
purposes. Diodoros gives us no details as to the origins or 
make-up of the threat to Kyme, other than the general label 
Tvppl)vo's. However, the maritime nature of the invasion 
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suggests antagonism between Kyme and at least one of the 
Etruscan coastal states. Indeed, the search for a specific 
Etruscan protagonist perhaps need go no further than Agylla-
Caere, a proven sixth century maritime opponent of Hellenic 
influence in the upper Tyrrhenian Sea (Hdt. 1.167). Moreover, 
as discussed in chapter 3, Kymaian-Etruscan relations in the 
last decades of the sixth century were hardly amicable, with at 
least two clashes to speak of. At any rate, pressure from the 
Etruscans to the north had evidently grown too great for Kyme 
to deal with on its own and favourable foreign intervention 
was required. 
The request for Syracusan aid was in many ways symbolic not 
only of the impotency of Kyme in the first quarter of the fifth 
century, but also of the other ltaliote states at this time. It is 
easy to speculate that Sybaris, with its extensive system of 
Tyrrhenian ports, contacts, and trading partners, may have 
been able to exert some influence over the turn of events 
under consideration. However, by 474 none of its successors 
were in the position even to contemplate seriously such a step, 
let alone make an attempt. 
Moreover, it must have hit Rhegion especially hard that Kyme 
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turned to Syracuse rather than itself. ~egion was after all 
most probably the strongest naval state in Magna Graecia 
during the early fifth century, the closest significant ltaliote 
port to the Bay of Naples, and not to mention a fellow 
Chalkidian-Euboian foundation. Indeed, Rhegion may once 
have been the prime candidate for such a mission given its 
willingness to contract alliances with overseas states such as 
Himera and Carthage. However, the Kymaian embassy to 
Syracuse in 474 demonstrates perfectly the extent to which the 
Deinomenid tyrants had been successful in building their 
credentials as the new regional hegemon, in the process 
effectively side lining any of the ltaliote pole is who had 
pretensions to power. 
The failure of the Italiote pole is to cope with their own 
problems in the north-west of Magna Graecia, or at least devise 
a solution which would bar the entry of Sikeliote-based 
imperialism, had long term consequences for the region, and 
foreshadows the Athenian expedition to the Bay of Naples in 
the early 430's (Tim. FGrH 566 F98).69 Syracuse, under the 
tyrant Hieron, signalled its determination to ensure that its 
intervention would not be of a temporary nature by founding a 
69 See Frederiksen, Campania, pp. 104-5. 
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fort (TEfxos), on the island of Pithekoussai (Strabo 5.4.9). 
Presumably established shortly after the victory over the 
Etn1scans at the Battle of Kyme, thfa fort would have served to 
guarantee the future security of the Bay of Naples by 
effectively blocking its northern access point (i.e. from 
Etruria). 70 
Although Strabo goes on to state that se1sm1c activity ensured 
that the fort itself did not last long, perhaps no longer than the 
tyranny itself which was overthrown in 466, it is evident that 
the Syracusans were interested in transforming north-western 
Magna Graecia into a permanent frontier zone for their 
Sikeliote-based empire. The timing of the foundation of 
Neapolis, in the vicinity of the earlier Kymaian settlement at 
Parthenope, hints strongly at Syracusan involvement, and the 
possibility of a more solid entrenchment of Syracusan influence 
on the Bay of Naples. 
7o Ibid., p. 92. 
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Furthermore, the earliest pottery at the cemetry of Neapolis 
can be dated to around 4 70, thus falling within the period m 
which Syracuse established itself as the saviour of 
neighbouring Kyme.71 Moreover, numismatic and cultic links 
between Neapolis, Kyme and Syracuse attests both to the 
possibility of Syracusan involvement, perhaps in the form of 
colonists, in the foundation of the 'New City', as well as the 
deep impact of this Sikeliote po l is upon the Bay of Naples in 
general. 72 Certainly the Deinomenidai had already amply 
demonstrated their taste for both altering existing foundations 
and establishing new poleis altogether in areas under their 
rule or within their sphere of influence (Hdt. 7 .156; Diod. 
11.49). 
While there is no evidence to suggest that poleis on the Bay of 
Naples fell under the direct political control of Syracus'e, the 
Syracusan activity at Pithekoussai and Neapolis detailed above 
indicates that a Syracusan protectorate was probably 
established in the region, at least for the remaining years of the 
Deinomenid tyranny (474-466). Such an arrangement must 
71 Ibid., p. 94 
7 2 Rutter, Campanian Coinages 475-38 B. C., pp. 47-8, 53, 93-5; 
Frederiksen, Campania, p. 94. 
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have entailed a Syracusan commitment to defend the Bay of 
Naples from future Etruscan attacks, as well as an undertaking 
by tbe pole is in this region to follow Syracuse's lead in matters 
of war. In effect, due to its precarious security situation the 
polis-system of north-western Magna Graecia co-opted a new 
member into its ranks. However, this 'new member' was 
neither Italiote in origin, nor subject to the old balance of 
power within this polis-system. Given its subsequent actions, 
it is plain that Syracuse sailed north to lead. Kyme' s plea to 
Syracuse for assistance was tantamount to an admission that its 
own hegemony was no longer viable, and that the costs of 
political independence Ill the region were fast outstripping its 
resources. 
Moreover, despite the collapse of the Deinomenid tyranny in 
466, it 1s evident that Syracusan intervention in north-western 
Magna Graecia and the upper Tyrrhenian Sea in general was 
not dependent upon any one dynasty or political system. 
Although there IS no direct evidence for Syracusan activity in 
these areas in the post-Deinomenid 460' s, it is apparent that 
Syracusan fleets were sailing through the Straits of Messina 
and on into the upper Tyrrhenian Sea by the 450' s at the latest. 
Diodoros states that two Syracusan war fleets were dispatched 
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to the upper Tyrrhenian in 453 in order to combat Etruscan 
piracy in the region (11.88.4-5). This mission highlights the 
new Syracusan role as protector of the Greeks of north-western 
Magna Graecia, as wdl as the continued dependence of the 
latter on foreign support. Moreover, the two Syracusan 
strateg o i involved were particularly interested in Aithaleia 
(Elba), the Etruscan coastline (Tl]v TTapa8aA.ciTnov TvppT)viav), and 
Kyrnos (Corsica). The latter two locations were clearly merely 
ravaged on this occasion, but the use of the verb xnpo w m 
relation to Aithaleia suggests a more permanent form of 
occupation by Syracuse (11.88.5). Furthermore, Diodoros also 
attests the existence of a harbour on Kyrnos called Syrakosion 
(5.13.3), hinting at a Syracusan presence on this island as 
well. 73 An alliance between Syracuse and Lipara in the 420's 
(Thouk. 3.88, 115.1), also probably had its roots in this period 
of Syracusan intervention in the Tyrrhenian Sea following the 
victory at Kyme in 474.7 4 
Thus despite the possibility of a brief pause during the political 
upheaval in Sicily associated with the end of the Deinomenid 
tyranny, Syracuse was now clearly committed to a policy of 
7 3 Frederiksen, Campania, p. 103. 
74 Ibid., p. 93. 
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intervention in a reg10n previously regarded by leaders such as 
Aristodemos of Kyme, as the hinterland of the north-western 
Italiote poleis. Such intervention was the direct result of the 
Syracusan reduction of the Rhegine principality on the Straits 
of Messina and the decline of Kyme. Both Rhegion and Kyme 
had been hegemonal Italiote states at their respective peaks, 
but both also serve as examples of the eclipse of the ltaliote 
maritime poleis by the new political conditions endemic to the 
Tyrrhenian Sea. The battles at Himera and Kyme demonstrate 
aptly that there were now only three players who had the 
capacity to compete effectively in the Tyrrhenian zone: 
Carthage, Etruria and Syracuse. Consequently, Kyme was 
forced to accept Syracusan protection, the first such link 
between the Euboian poleis on the Bay of Naples and other 
Greeks since the Lelantine War of the eighth century. 
3.3 Syracuse and central Magna Graecia: Kroton and 
the reality of Syracusan power. 
The Syracusan intervention in the Italiote polis-system which 
began with pacification of Rhegion did not long remain confined 
to the northern and southern extremities of Magna Graecia. 
Shockwaves were soon felt north of Lokroi and even as far as 
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Kroton, the polis most conveniently placed to reap the benefits 
from the fall of Sybaris. In particular, it was the Syracusan 
sponsorship of Lokroi, initially against Rhegion, that helped to 
create serious anomalies in the mainstream Italiote polis-
system. 
As discussed in chapter 5, animosity between Kroton and 
Lokroi dates back as far as the Battle of the Sagra River which 
occurred around 550, and had been rekindled on at least one 
other occas10n, around 525. Therefore, in theory it should 
come as no surprise that the two poleis were at loggerheads in 
the early fifth century. The period between the fall of Sybaris 
in 510 and the transformation of Lokroi into a de facto 
Syracusan client-state in the early 4 70' s is an ill-documented 
one. However, as flawed as the Krotoniate attempt to adopt the 
Sybarite mantle was, there is little doubt that Kroton held the 
upper hand following its conquest of Sybaris. Compared to 
Lokroi at this time, Kroton was a massive empire, and it 1s 
improbable that the - Lokrians would have contemplated an 
attack on its northern neighbour. 
However, Syracusan intervention in the Italiote polis- system 
appears to have altered this balance of power, only recently set 
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In place by a Kroton anx10us to restore the hegemony 
previously enjoyed by Sybaris, in its own name. In his entry 
on Temesa Straho states that the Lokrians, led by a certain 
Euthymos, captured this polis (6.1.5). This Euthymos, named 
by Strabo as Ev8vµov ... Tov 1TVKT1)V, is known to have competed in 
the Olympics during the 480' s and 470' s, thus providing the 
event with a chronologjcal range. As discussed In chapter 6, 
Temesa had come under the control of Kroton after its partial 
accession to the territorial legacy of Sybaris, and its capture by 
Euthymos therefore represents an outbreak of war between 
Kroton and Lokroi. Given that Syracuse only became interested 
supporting Lokroi after 480 in order to contain Rhegine 
expans10n, it makes sense to place the invasion of Temesa m 
the 470' s rather than the 480' s, i. e. in the latter part of 
Euthymos' career. This was afterall the period in which Lokroi 
enjoyed the backing of a regional super power and could 
therefore expect support in its more ambitious ventures, such 
as attacking the far larger Krotoniate po l is. 
Thus it can be seen that the sponsorship of Lokroi provided 
Syracuse with a dependable ally within the Italiote po lis-
system who could be relied upon to cause trouble for the two 
most prominent successor states to the Sybarite empire, 
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Rhegion and Kroton. Given Syracuse's wider regional 
responsibilities and ambitions after 480, it should come as no 
surprise that this Sikeliote state now took into account the 
threat, potential or otherwise, posed by other poleis with 
regional or -inter-regional aspirations. As stated earlier, 
Rhegion was no doubt the first target, as it was this po lis 
which posed the most danger to the integrity of the Sikeliote 
polis-system. However, once Syracuse had become aware of 
its ability to project its power far beyond Sicily itself, Rhegion 
merely symbolized the gateway through which Syracuse 
passed on its way to establishing a more permanent presence 
in Magna Graecia. Once inside, Lokroi in turn constituted 
Syracuse's base for operations. 
It is therefore probable that the successful Lokrian invasion of 
Krotoniate Temesa must have received some form of sanction 
from Syracuse, if only after the attack had already been 
launched. Providing further support for this hypothesis is the 
wider pattern of Syracusan-Krotoniate relations at this time. 
Diodoros records under the year 4 76 that Hieron received an 
appeal for aid, not unlike that of Kyme two years later, from 
the Sybarites, who were at that time TIO A.io pKovµE'vw v . ' v 'TT 0 
KpoTwviaTwv (11.48.4). In response Hieron planned to send an 
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expeditionary force under his younger brother, Polyzelos 
(11.48.4-5). Although Diodoros goes on to state that Polyzelos 
never actually fulfilled this role (11.48 .6), there 1s no 
suggestion that Hieron abandoned the mission altogether, and 
the eagerness of Kyme to seek out Hieron's aid 1n 474 suggests 
that the tyrant was regarded as a reliable ally 1n overseas 
interventions, and therefore that he did indeed commit some 
forces to the Sybarite cause in 476.75 
The Sybarite appeal in turn illustrates one of the key problems 
faced by Kroton after 510 in its bid to secure the hegemony of 
central Magna Graecia. As recorded by Herodotos, a number of 
Sybarites escaped the carnage at Sybaris in 510, scattering 
themselves amongst their former sub-colonies (6.21). 
Moreover, given the numerous remarks among the ancient 
sources as to the vast population of the Sybarite empire, this 
diaspora must have been substantial. Thus the appeal to 
Syracuse in 476 in all likelihood belies an attempt to re-
establish Sybaris which had run into serious difficulties. The 
use of the verb TioA.iopKEW certainly indicates that the Sybarites 
had gained a foothold in the Sybaritid, then under Krotoniate 
7 5 The Pindaric scholiast intimates that the mission did in fact go 
ahead, and under Polyzelos' command (OZ.2.29b 10-14). 
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control, but rather than being the Sybaris III which some 
scholars have argued for,7 6 the site being besieged may have 
been no more than a Mt. Ithome, as featured in the Third 
Messenian War (Thouk. 1.101.2, 102.1, 103.1). 
As later attempts to refound Sybaris indicate, clearly the 
Sybarite diaspora posed a threat to the stability of the 
Krotoniate successor state.7 7 However, the proximity of the 
Sybarite revanche of 476 to the Lokrian attack on Temesa 
suggests a more serious and widespread attempt to undermine 
Kroton' s position of relative strength within the Italiote polis-
system. The Lokrian conquest of Temesa probably opened a 
window of opportunity for the Sybarites to stage a partial re-
occupation of the Sybaritid. In turn Kroton' s efforts to resist 
the encroachments of the Sybarites increased the likelihood of 
a lengthy period of Lokrian occupation at Temesa. 
Furthermore, given the importance of the agriculturally rich 
Sybaritid to Kroton, Syracusan assistance to the Sybarite exiles 
was tantamount to a threat to the continued viability of the 
76 Lombardo, "Da sibari a thurii", pp. 288-9. 
7 7 At least two more attempts were made by the Sybarites to reclaim 
their patrimony, in 453 (Diod. 11.90.3), and 444 (12.10.3-6), before the 
final settlement at Sybaris-on-the-Traeis (11.22.1). 
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Krotoniate hegemony. The Sybaritid was the power house of 
the old Sybarite empire, as well as the centre piece of Kroton' s 
own imperial ambitions. As stated earlier, Kroton had gone so 
far as to establish an exarchate over this territory and had 
entered into a protracted civil war over the division of the 
spoils available therein. In other words, the Sybaritid formed a 
large component of what set Kroton apart from other poleis in 
the region, and to aid and abet secessionist activity in this 
territory struck at the heart of Krotoniate power. Although a 
fresh bid to establish an independent Sybaris was launched in 
453, thus indicating that the Sybarites and whatever site they 
had managed to fortify in 476 did not' survive long (Diod. 
11.90.3-4), 7 8 the message from Syracuse to Kroton and the 
Italiote polis-system 1n general was clear. Syracuse's 
endeavour to establish a new Sybaris also represented a major 
attempt to alter the dynamics of the Italiote polis-system of 
the day in a comprehensive manner. 
Indeed, so seriously did Kroton view the threat posed by 
Syracuse and its Italiote clients during the 4 70' s, it is possible 
that at this time Kroton underwent pan-ltaliote arbitration in 
7 8 Lombardo speculates that this 'Sybaris III' survived until the death 
of Hieron in 467: "Da sibari a thurii", pp. 288-9. 
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order to forge a united front between its feuding Pythagorean 
and anti-Pythagorean factions. In the wake of such attacks, 
that Kroton finally came to regard the civil strife it had been 
experiencing for over thirty years as both a luxury it could no 
longer afford and as an impediment to its long-term hegemonal 
ambitions should not be seen as surprising. Moreover, as in the 
case of Rhegion and its reacquaintance with the Phokaians of 
Hyele in the post-Himera period, Kroton turned to its historical 
Italiote allies, Kaulonia, Metapontion and Taras, in its time of 
cns1s. 
Although it is not being suggested that Kroton was the victim of 
a carefully planned and executed conspiracy, it is evident that 
on each of the occasions Kroton came under attack in the 4 70' s, 
Syracuse was in some way linked to all of its antagonists. As 
Syracuse's involvement 1n the Italiote polis-system 
intensified, via- its interes'ts in the Straits of Messina, there can 
be no doubt that it would have, gained some comprehension of 
the balance of power in. the region. This would have included 
the realization that Kroton was the state most likely and most 
able to oppose further Syracusan interference in Magna 
Graecia, particularly now that Rhegion had effectively been 
neutralized. 
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Thus Syracuse's willingness to accept the Lokrians and 
Sybarites, historically both hardline foes of Kroton, as clients is 
provided with a viable context. This process need not have 
been systematic, merely opportunistic. Consequently, Kroton 
found itself increasingly victimized by Syracuse and its 
growing band of Italiote allies. Moreover, in effect much of the 
Italiote poleis-system was locked into a cycle of having to 
choose between home-grown and would-be hegemons such as 
Kroton on the one hand, and the rising power of the Syracusan 
outsider on the other. The heady days of Krotoniate triumph 
and undisputed hegemony, already partially tainted by the 
internecine bloodshed of 509 and the rise of Anaxilaos, were 
now well and truly at an end, brought low by the first of many 
successful foreign interventions on Italiote soil. 
CONCLUSION: The end of the archaic period: 
opportunities lost? 
The crossover between the archaic and classical periods in 
Magna Graecia was in many ways a definitive one for the 
Italiote polis-system. After a century of hosting one of the 
largest and most powerful polis-based land empires to have 
ever existed in Hellas, the Italiotes found themselves on the 
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backfoot, embroiled in the uncertainty inspired by centrifugal 
pressure and competition. In essence, Sybarite-enforced 
homogeneity in power politics was replaced by three new 
centres of power, each with their own ambitions and strengths. 
Moreover, it can be said that the inability of the two leading 
Italiote successor states, Kroton and Rhegion, to stamp their 
authority comprehensively over the regions which they clearly 
wished to dominate enabled the entry of Magna Graecia' s first 
successful 'intruder' polis, Sikeliote Syracuse. 
Kroton' s role in the diffusion of ltaliote power was a largely 
unintentional one. As well as constituting a personal struggle 
for survival, Kroton's victory over Sybaris in 510 presented an 
opportunity for imperial success. However, its victory only 
partially capitalized on the opportunities gained, as the 
Krotoniate state had a number of serious limitations of its own 
to overcome. The most immediate obstacle to a smooth 
program 
protracted 
of successful empire-building was a period of 
stasis. The polarization of the Krotoniate body 
politic, in which the Pythagoreans played a major role, would 
have reduced the effectiveness of any attempt by Kroton to 
occupy and preserve_ the frontiers of the old Sybarite empire 1n 
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their entirety. Indeed, the foreig~ intervention amd mediation 
required to settle the civil war helps to underscore the gravity 
of Kroton' s problems. 
Other obstacles of a more general nature also stood in Kroton' s 
way, including a possible 'demographic gap' between Kroton 
and Sybaris which may have caused a difficult transition 
process to Krotoniate rule in those parts of the Sybarite empire 
Kroton did manage to annex or influence. Furthermore, the age 
old predicament of having to deal with other predatory states 
maintaining a sharp lookout for vulnerable pieces of booty in 
the aftermath of a titanic clash between a region's 
superpowers, also played a role in Kroton' s lack of imperialist 
momentum. Moreover, it is also likely that Kroton was forced 
to deal with low-level but distracting ar'med discontent from 
Pythagorean rebels long after the expulsion of this faction from 
the polis. 
As has been argued, the sum of these problems effectively 
meant that by the 470' s Kroton was not particularly well 
placed to deal with the prospect of Sikeliote interference and 
military intervention 1n the Italiote polis-system. Not only 
had the perennially pugnacious Lokroi not been reined in by 
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the 470's, this polis was even able to go on the offensive 
against Kroton, with the backing of its new Syracusan ally. 
Moreover, the very essence of Kroton's claim to hegemony in 
the Italiote polis-system soon came under question as well, 
with an abortive but potentially fatal Sybarite uprising, agam 
with the support of an increasingly confident and ruthless 
Syracuse. 
The rise of a second homegrown imperialist Italiote polis, 
Rhegion, also reiterates the level of power diffusion after the 
fall of Sybaris. This polis was also the first Italiote state to 
construct an outremer empire, extending its frontiers beyond 
the Straits and on to the island of Sicily. Moreover, unlike 
Kroton, Rhegion was, with a few exceptions, very much a 
maritime imperialist, thus capitalizing on an area in which 
Kroton coud not hope, and probably did not expect, to compete. 
However, in many ways due to its expansion into the Sikeliote 
sphere, Rhegion brought upon itself a series of humiliating 
reversals at the hands of the rising Syracuse. Moreover, it is 
precisely because of this Sikeliote rev an c he that Syracuse 
began to involve itself in the wider Italiote polis-system. In 
order to guarantee Rhegine good behaviour, Syracuse adopted 
' Lokroi as its client within the Italiote polis-system. This 
commitment rapidly transformed into a general policy of 
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weakening any Italiote state which potentially posed a threat 
to continuing Syracusan influence in Magna Graecia. Thus, as 
stated above, both Rhegion and Kroton suffered at the hands of 
Syracuse and its Italiote clients. As a result much of the 
Italiote po lis-system became divided along pro and anti-
Syracusan lines, therefore removing any substantial impetus 
for Italiote solutions to Italiote problems. 
Perhaps the most surprising development 1n the post-Sybarite 
period was the return to the mainstream fold of Kyme and the 
polis-system it had dominated on the Bay of Naples in political 
isolation from the rest of the Greek West for centuries. 
Although not in direct competition with Rhegion and Kroton, 
Kyme had also experienced the highs of empire during the 
post-Sybarite era. However, threatened with extinction by the 
Etruscan maritime states during the 470' s, Kyme was finally 
forced to turn to its fellow Greeks for assistance. However, 
crucially it was not an Italiote state which came to Kyme' s 
rescue. The Syracusan triumph at Himera heralded a long 
period of dominance in the lower Tyrrhenian Sea and over its 
major players, including Carthage and Rhegion. Thus Kyme 
sought out Syracusan aid rather than that of its now weakened 
Euboian cousins at Rhegion, further highlighting the ascendancy 
of the Sikeliotes in southern and central Magna Graecia. 
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Thus in this way did three of the Italiote polis-system' s most 
powerful members cope, or rather not cope, with the regional 
balance of power in the wake of the fall of the Sybarite empire. 
Moreover, this was period in which the certainty of Sybarite 
domination was absent and hegemony was available for those 
who had the strength to grasp it. The vast majority of the 
leaders active in this period, including such leading lights as 
Kylon, Anaxilaos, Mikythos, Gelon, Hieron I, and Aristodemos, 
were born during the years of Sybarite power, and all 
recognized that change was the leitmotiv of the era. As a 
result numerous poleis struggled to assert themselves and 
their imperial programs within Magna Graecia. However, it is 
testimony to the skill and uniqueness of Sybaris that no ltaliote 
polis was able to seize and maintain its imperial legacy intact. 
Furthermore, it is an indicator of ltaliote weakness that in little 
over a generation after the destruction of its sixth century 
hegemon, foreign military intervention and exploitation began 
to feature regularly in the polis-system of Magna Graecia. 
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CONCLUSION 
Throughout this study it has been contended that archaic 
Magna Graecia was home to a polis-system which possessed 
great strength and innovation. Indeed, from the very 
beginning vitality and a willingness to seize opportunities 
characterized the Greek colonists' efforts to construct a 'Great 
Greece' in southern Italy. Moreover, it has been demonstrated 
that the pole is which were born of this vitality were 
profoundly effected by the interests and aims of their 
forebears. In particular, the commercial instincts and drive of 
the- Euboians, the thirst for new land on the part of the 
Achaians, and the chronological and numerical superiority of 
both groups, established the basic parameters of the po l is-
system of archaic ·Magna Graecia. As a result, although the 
po lis-system of Magna Graecia could boast a diverse 
membership, it was the Euboian and Achaian apoikiai that 
dominated Magna Graecia for much of the archaic period. 
Furthermore, given the aforementioned nature of the Euboian 
and Achaian motives for colonization, these two groups 
founded pole is which largely evolved within different 
geographical, political, and strategic spheres. Magna Graecia 
thus featured an array of maritime and hinterland-orientated 
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poleis whose interactions with one another rarely took the 
centre stage of the ltaliote polis-system. Rather, for much of 
the archaic period inter-po l is relations were often localized 
affairs, which witnessed the development of such phenomena 
as the 'Campanianization' of ltaliote foreign policy on the Bay of 
Naples, the 'Straits-system' on the Straits of Messina, and 'pan-
Achaian' sentiment in Magna Graecia' s central zone. The 
polis-system of Magna Graecia, during its early years at least, 
can, like Mainland Greece itself, therefore be said to have been 
more an umbrella grouping of poleis than a term implying 
strict geographical cohesion. 
However, the advent of the sixth century paradoxically both 
reinforced and ultimately destroyed the dynamics of this 
system by heralding what was in many ways an epidemic of 
imperialism. Moreover, this process of empire-building also 
added a dangerous new element to the Italiote polis-system, 
in that it introduced the concept of 'total war'. Consequently, 
two of Magna Graecia' s largest and most prosperous po leis, 
Siris and Sybaris, were soon to be exterminated. Achaian 
Sybaris led the way by constructing a complex system of inter-
p o l is relations, sub-colonies, treaties, dependencies, and 
assimilation of indigenous populations, which can only be 
termed one of the greatest land empires ever built by a polis-
based Greek state. Other Achaian ltaliote poleis also attempted 
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to establish imperial identities for themselves with varying 
degrees of success. This inability to emulate Sybaris helped to 
highlight the stratified nature of the Achaian order in Magna 
Graecia, and at length the vague but previously effective 
principle of pan-Achaianism crumbled under an onslaught of 
dissatisfaction and envy. Frustrated in turn by its failure to 
subdue the relatively minor polis of Lokroi, Kroton was thus 
well set on the path to war with Sybaris by the time the 
bellicose Pythagoreans had gained substantive influence at 
Kroton. 
As has been demonstrated, the war between Sybaris and 
Kroton in many ways instigated a chain of events which 
radically and irrevocably altered the Italiote polis-system. 
Consequently, the last decades of the archaic period were in 
effect a transitional environment in which much of the basis of 
the ltaliote polis-system during the classical and hellenistic 
periods was defined. A series of moderately successful little 
ltaliote empues arose over the ruins of the Sybarite realm, 
none of which even approached the scale or time frame of 
Sybaris. Unlike Sparta vis a vis Messenia during the archaic 
and early classical periods, the foremost successor state, Kroton, 
was unable to devise an effective system for the long term 
control of its newly acquired gains. The second Italiote 
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successor state, Rhegion, emerged from this regional upheaval 
with the intent of breaking- free of another of the strictures of 
archaic Magna Graecia, the status quo on the Straits of 
Messina. Under the Anaxilad dynasty, Rhegion achieved 
stunning territorial gains but not before inadvertently 
unleashing the energy, ambition, and hunger of Sikeliote 
Syracuse on Magna Graecia. Within a decade even the 
previously self-contained Campanian quarter of the ltaliote 
po lis-system fell under Syracusan influence. Consequently, 
like Greece in its relations with the Makedonian state, as long 
as Syracuse remained stable and united the po l is-system of 
Magna Graecia remained vulnerable to intervention from a 
' superior foreign power. 
Thus the basic tenets of the archaic Italiote polis-system came 
to an end. Imperial Sy baris, and with it any vestiges of pan-
Achaianism or consolidated Achaian hegemony, was dead; 
power on the Straits of Messina had begun an inexorable shift 
back towards its Sicilian shore; and in ltaliote Campania, Kyme 
was eclipsed by its Syracusan saviour. Given the precarious 
circumstances of the ltaliote poleis in Campania during the 
470' s, it can certainly be argued that Syracusan control over 
the Bay of Naples was better than no Greek control at all. 
However, the aforementioned developments in central-
mainstream and southern Magna Graecia do represent a 
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watershed in the evolution of the Italiote polis-system. 
Archaic Magna Graecia may have been a disparate collection of 
competitive poleis with a high mortality rate, but this was also 
a period in which the Italiote polis-system retained a 
proactive edge in their dealings with the states and peoples 
around them. 
By no means does this imply either belittlement of the classical 
and hellenistic incarnations of the ltaliote polis-system, or the 
elevation of the archaic period to 'golden age' status, but a 
companson between the period under study and those which 
followed is useful for placing the archaic era in perspective. 
The later periods do represent a reactive age for Magna 
Graecia, 1n which defensive leagues, repeated foreign 
intervention and loss of local initiative, and condottieri 
dominate the polis-system of the Italiotes. Thus at the dawn 
of the classical period it is Syracuse that is the major polis of 
the West, not Sybaris, not Kroton, and not Rhegion. By this 
stage the proactive potential of the Italiote polis-system was 
suffering from exhaustion from which it would only ever 
partially recover. Therefore, despite its many failings, the 
polis-system of Magna Graecia during the archaic period was 
in many ways at the peak of its power - fascinating as it was 
volatile, and innovative as it was transitory. 
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APPENDIX 
The homecoming of Demokedes and early Pythagorean 
political influence at Kroton. 
The nostos of the Greek doctor Demokedes to his native 
Kroton, as related by Herodotos (3.134-8), has the potential to 
serve as a chronological anchor for an early Pythagorean 
intervention in Krotoniate politics, as well as having an impact 
upon the rehabilitation of Herodotos' chronology at this point. 
As argued by Griffiths, the story of Demokedes' voyage from 
Persia and his eventual homecoming contains a number of 
elements which should be regarded as suspect. 1 Certainly, 
the emphasis on Demokedes as the only doctor present in the 
whole of the Persian empire with the skills to heal Dareios' 
injured foot (Hdt. 3.129) has all the trappings of a legendary 
' 
triumph of Hellenic skills over barbaric incompetence and 
ignorance. 2 
However, while it may be Herodotos' intention to mythologize 
1 A. Griffiths, "Democedes of Craton: A Greek Doctor at the Court of 
Darius", Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources (Leiden, 1987), pp. 
37-47. 
2 See also Griffiths for his elucidating deconstruction of the incident, 
"Democedes of Craton", pp. 40-2. 
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the deeds of the good doctor, that Demokedes did 1n fact return 
at some point to his native Kroton 1s not disputed by 
Griffiths. 3 Indeed, the appearance of a Demokedes during 
the political upheaval at Kroton after 510, as recorded by 
Iamblichos, (VP 261), would appear to confirm the likelihood 
of such a return, or at the very least his historical existence. 4 
It is this kernel of relative accuracy on Herodotos' behalf that 
this paper seeks to utilize, and in particular the circumstances 
of Demokedes' homecoming, which as will be argued below, 
may in fact serve as a barometer for Pythagorean influence 
and activity in Kroton. This paper will thus seek to establish: 
(i) the context and viability of a voyage such as that of 
Demokedes'; (ii) a secure date for the return of Demokedes, as 
well as Herodotos' credentials in his accounts of Samian and 
_Italiote history; (iii) the veracity of Demokedes' alleged actions 
once he had returned to Kroton; and crucially (iv) the case for 
the occurrence of the earliest known Pythagorean involvement 
in Krotoniate politics, as derived from Demokedes' successful 
negotiations with Milon of Kroton (Hdt. 3 .13 7). 
(i) It is clear from Herodotos at least that Dareios, described as 
a KapTI'J')il.os by his own people (Hdt. 3.89), was a ruler with an 
eye for both imperial and economic opportunities as well as a 
3 Ibid., p. 46. 
4 See also G. Clark (trans.), Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Life, 
(Liverpool, 1989), p. 109, n 2. 
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high degree of curiosity about the world around him. 5 
Moreover, that Dareios was prepared to invest in endeavours 
such as that of Demokedes is further demonstrated by his 
regular utilization of individuals of Hellenic or Hellenized 
extraction to perform specific tasks involving activity on the 
fringes. of the empire or beyond.6 Dareios' exploitation of 
Syloson II, the exiled brother of the late dynast Polykrates and 
pretender to the S amian tyranny, 7 was the first of many 
opportunistic decisions taken by the Great King in order to 
facilitate his expansionist dreams. Between c. 517 (the 
beginning of Persian suzerainty over Samos) and c. 514 (the 
date of Dareios' Skythian Expedition) Dareios achieved the 
subversion of at least twelve Greek poleis in Asia Minor 
through hi's installation and/or patronage of local tyrants. 8 
5 Herodotos' account of Dareios' curiosity concerning other cultures 
at 3.38 has no doubt experienced some macabre exaggeration but gives a 
rough outline at least of the Great King's passion for knowledge of the 
world around him. See also P. Green, The Greco-Persian Wars 
(Berkeley, 1996 [2nd ed.]), pp. 12-15; Burn, Persia and the Greeks, pp. 
98-9 (map), 116£.; J. Hart, Herodotus and Greek History (London, 1982), 
p. 121. 
6 See M.M. Austin, "Greek Tyrants and the Persians, 546-476 B.C.", C Q 
40 (1990), pp. 298-305. 
7 G Shipley, A History of Samas 800-188 BC (Oxford, 1987), pp. 103-6. 
8 Austin, "Greek Tyrants and the Persians", pp. 299-300. 
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Moreover, as argued by Austin, Dareios' recruits were not 
necessarily always political operatives. 9 Mandrokles of 
Samos was deemed useful as an engineer (Hdt. 4.87-8), and 
Skylax of Karyanda, a likely contemporary of Demokedes and a 
fellow reconnaissance leader, was commissioned to mount an 
exploratory expedition to India and beyond (Hdt. 4.44). This 
preference for 'collecting' potentially useful individuals would 
continue even into the last years of his reign, as indicated by 
his reception of exiles such as the Peisistratid Hippias (Hdt. 
5.96; 6.107) and the Eurypontid Demaratos (Hdt. 6.70). 
Thus, although we need not take too seriously the Herodotean 
claim that the whole expedition was in fact merely a boon 
granted by Dareios through Atossa (3.134-5), it would appear 
that Demokedes was selected for the reconnaissance mission 
because of his knowledge of Hellas, and in particular Magna 
Graecia. Again, as argued above, the expedition need not have 
implied any real or immediate desire to conquer territories in 
the western Mediterranean, but rather may well have been a 
display of commercialism or sheer inquisitiveness on Dareios' 
behalf. 1 0 It should be noted that the ships requisitioned for 
9 Ibid., p. 299. 
1 O Although Herodotos claims that both Gelon of Syracuse and the 
Greek envoys who approached him prior Xerxes' invasion of Greece 
believed such expansionsim was a possibility (7.157, 163). Herodotos also 
states that Kambyses wished to invade Carthage (3 .19). 
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the voyage west were from Phoenicia, at once a Persian 
possession and the berthing-place of Phoenician merchant 
vessels whose trading expeditions had in the past often taken 
them into the western reaches of the Mediterranean (Hdt. 2.32, 
4.42, 4.197, 5.46).11 That a voyage such as that of 
Demokedes' took place therefore should not be seen as fanciful. 
(ii) Since the 1920' s scholarly op1n10n has placed this 
homecoming in the late sixth century with a variety of specific 
suggestions having been tendered, 1 2 and Demokedes' famous 
medical skills strongly suggest he was a product of the then 
flourishing medical school at Kroton, thereby also dating his 
career to the second half of the sixth century .13 However, the 
purpose of this section is to suggest that a reading of Herodotos' 
account of the Persian conquest of Samos (3.139) indicates the 
1 1 As Asheri has stated, only the recent conquest of Tyre and its 
surrounding territories in 539 would have brought a definitive end to 
close and regular contact between the Phoenicians and their Wystern 
trading stations and colonies. Arranging passage from Phoenicia to 
Italy around 517 could not have been particularly difficult. See Asheri, 
"Carthaginians and Greeks", pp. 749-50. 
12 Ciaceri, Storia della Magna Grecia vol. 2, p. 51 (c 520); TWGa, p. 370 
(late sixth century); Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, pp. 93-4 
(518); Burn, Persia and the Greeks, pp. 98-99 (map), 137-9 (c. 515); M. 
Grant, The Rise of the Greeks (London, 1987), pp. 230-1 (late sixth 
century); R. Osborne, Greece in the Making 1200-479 BC (London & New 
York, 1996), pp. 279-80, 320-1 (late sixth century). 
13 TWGa, p. 370. 
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likelihood of c. 517 for Demokedes' voyage. At 3.139.1 
Herodotos specifically ties the fall of Samos to the preceding 
Demokedes episode by introducing the chapter with METa SE: 
TavTa. Clearly, in Herodotos' mind at least, one event follows 
the other. Although How and Wells and others rightly draw 
attention to the fantastic nature of the details surrounding the 
Persian acquisition of Samos, a similar charge has not been 
brought against the statement that Samos did in fact fall to 
Persia in the last quarter of the sixth century. 1 4 
The Persian conquest of Samos has been tentatively dated to c. 
517 by Shipley, and is derived from fragments of Diodoros (the 
'Thalassocracy List') extant in Eusebios (Diod. 7 .11) .1 5 This 
date can be calculated by establishing the lowest point of the 
Thalassocracy List as Xerxes' invasion of Greece (480) and 
counting back. Although a problematic source in itself, as will 
be demonstrated further below the date of c. 517 provided by 
the Thalassocracy List fits reasonably well with surrounding 
events and it has been accepted as valid by a number of 
scholars this century .1 6 Indeed, by calculating the 
14 W.W. How & J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus (Oxford, 1912), p. 
298; Austin, "Greek Tyrants and the Persians'', p. 300. 
15 Shipley, A History of Samas, pp. 103-4. 
1 6 J.L Myres "On the 'List of Thalassocracies' in Eusebius", JHS 2 6 
(1906), p. 101; Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 129, n. 5; Shipley, A 
History of Samas 800-188 BC, pp. 103-4; Grant, The Rise of the Greeks, p. 
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approximate duration of Demokedes' career at the court of 
Dareios, Mitchell has proposed the dates of either 518 or 517 
for the fall of Samos, without reference to the alleged vagaries 
of the Thalassocracy List.17 The date of c. 517 for the fall of 
Samos is therefore considered by this paper to be an attractive 
one. 
If Herodotos' chronology (METa oE Taiha) can be accepted as well, 
as indeed it is by Mitchell, then Demokedes' voyage must have 
occurred by c. 517 at the latest, i.e. before Samos fell. 1 8 
Although notorious for the telescoping and compression of 
events, such as the revolt of Babylon (3.150), into chronologies 
rightly deemed unacceptable, Herodotos' accounts of Samian 
and Italiote affairs deserve special consideration. 1 9 As 
Herodotos was in fact both an East Greek (as a citizen of 
Halikarnassos and either a visitor to, or one time resident of 
Samos) and an ltaliote (as a citizen of Thourioi),20 Herodotos' 
knowledge of Samian and Italiote affairs can be said to have 
contained a considerable degree of credibility. 
156. 
17 B.M. Mitchell, "Herodotus and Samos", JHS 95 (1975), p. 86 
18 Ibid., p. 86. 
Herodotos' 
19 J. Gould, Herodotus (London, 1989), pp. 113-14; How & Wells, A 
Commentary on Herodotus, pp. 299-300. 
20 Herodotos is said to have died at Thourioi, some time after 430: Steph. 
Byz. s.v. eovpioi. 
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accounts of Samian landmarks such as the Heraion and its 
prominent dedications (2.148, 182, 3.60, 4.88), the harbour 
mole and Eupalinos' tunnel (3.60) and the cult of Zeus 
Eleutherios (3 .142) attest to such knowledge, as do the 
historian's insights into the late sixth and early fifth century 
politics of Magna Graecia (3.136, 4.44, 6.21, 7.170).2 1 
Herodotean accounts of Samian and ltaliote affairs thus 
demonstrate areas of relative competence. 
The likelihood of a date around 51 7 is further reinforced by 
events early in the reign of Dareios. Having seized the throne 
in 522, Dareios was involved in civil war throughout his central 
provinces until the middle of 521, and probably did not secure 
all of the outlying Achaimenid territories until 520, and 
perhaps even as late as 518.22 Given these restrictions, 
authorization by Dareios of an expedition such as that of 
Demokedes', which reflects a degree of stability at Sousa (Hdt. 
3.134), does not seem likely until 519 or even 518 at the very 
earliest. Moreover, given that Herodotos states that Demokedes 
did not reach Magna Graecia until after an extensive tour of 
Greece (1.136: ES 0 Ta 1TOAAa mhi)s Kal. ovoµaaTa 8El)aaµEVoi aTiiKOVTO Tf\S 
21 Mitchell, "Herodotus and Samos", p. 75; K.H. Waters, Herodotos the 
Historian: his problems, methods and originality (London & Sydney, 
1985), pp. 26, 64, 90; Hart, Herodotus and Greek History, pp. 77, 161-2, 
165. 
22 Burn, Persia and the Greeks, pp. 96-107. 
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'ITard ris ), the original expedition could well have been initiated a 
year or more before the eventual arrival in Italy. Therefore a 
conservative upper limit on the date of Demokedes' return to 
Kroton must be c. 518 (treating c. 519 as the first relatively 
civil conflict-free year of Dareios' reign, minus the projected 
time spent on other reconnaissance by Demokedes and his 
Persian minders). Thus the possibility if not preference for the 
previously proposed c. 517 is again established, this time by 
reference to the known and datable career of the Achaimenid 
Dareios I. 
(iii) Having established the probability that Demokedes 
embarked on a sea Journey which would bring about his return 
to his native polis around 517 it is now necessary to discuss 
the details of what occurred upon his arrival and to assess their 
veracity. Herodotos asserts at 3.137 that Demokedes arranged 
a betrothal to the daughter of the renowned Olympic athlete, 
Milon of Kroton (apµoaTai TlJV M£'1.wvos 8vyaTEpa L:inµoKT]oY)s yvval.rn). 
According to Herodotos (3.136), this marriage was contracted in 
order to facilitate Demokedes' escape from his Persian 
guardians whom he had eluded at Taras prior to fleeing to his 
native Kroton (Ev8avTa o'E EK P'flOTWVl)S Tf)s L:i11µ0Kl)0Eos' ApwTocjn/..io11s Twv 
TapavTivwv 6 ~aaif..Evs TovTo µE:v Ta n11odt.w nap€t.vaE Twv M11oiKEwv vEwv, 
TOVTO OE mhovs TOVS IIEpaas dp~E ws KaTaOKOTTOVS of)8EV EOVTas. EV ~ OE 
OVToi Taiha 1foaaxov, 6 L:il)µOKTJOT}S ES TTJV Kp6Twva amKVEETai). Two main 
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points are raised by Herodotos' assertions at 3.136-7. The first, 
contested by Griffiths, is whether Demokedes' fifteen Persian 
minders, assigned to the Krotoniate by Dareios (Hdt. 3.135), 
would in fact have dared to pursue the fugitive doctor within 
his home town. 2 3 The second main point is whether Milon 
actually had a daughter of marriageable age to give to 
Demokedes. Both of these questions require attention if 
Herodotos' account of the no s to s is to be retained as a 
relatively reliable source. 
Concerning the pursuit of Demokedes conducted by the fifteen 
Persians, it 1s important to note that Demokedes was 
considered to be a slave by the Persians and a opT)'TTETTJS at that 
(Hd t. 3 .13 7). This in fact accords with the earlier history of 
Demokedes, who was seized and enslaved by Oroites, the 
Persian satrap at Sardeis, after his betrayal of Polykrates of 
Samos (Hdt. 3.125). Again, at 3.129, Demokedes is listed as 
part of the XPTJµaTa of Oroites, and his transference to Sousa 
from Sardeis after c. 522 was in reality merely a change of 
masters. That Demokedes rose to favour at the court of Dareios 
apparently did not change the fact that Demokedes was not 
free (Hdt. 3.132). Despite the no doubt exaggerated claims of 
Herodotos that he was extremely influential and esteemed at 
court (3.132), in practice Demokedes was a valuable piece of 
23 Griffiths, "Democedes of Craton", p 45. 
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Achaimenid property which could not be parted with. In the 
event that Demokedes was allowed to leave Sousa, he was 
escorted by fifteen Persian notables as well as those who were 
on board the three Phoenician ships chartered at Sidon (Hdt. 
3.135-6). Whether or not Demokedes' escort was as grand as 
Herodotos claims, in no way should Demokedes be seen as a 
free agent during the voyage. He was given a task by, and 
operated under the authority of, the Great King. 
Although there is no explicit evidence that might outline the 
law regarding runaway slaves in late sixth century Kroton, 
there exist many later references which may help to suggest 
what this law might have involved. Certainly, neighbouring 
Sybaris was a slave-owning society and it is highly probable 
that Kroton too was at least partially a slave-based society. 
Moreover, a didactic anecdote recorded by Athenaios impli~s 
that a Sybarite citizen possessed the power of life and death 
-
over his slaves (Ath. 12.520b). Such power, or close to it, is 
also implied in the forensic speeches of fifth and fourth century 
Athenian orators, in which torture and bodily harm to a slave 
were not considered by the law to be of serious 
consequence. 24 Furthermore, an early fourth century speech 
attributed to Lysias makes it plain that a runaway slave (in 
this case from Dekeleia) could only hope to avoid capture in the 
24 See Lysias 4.15, 7.34; Demos. 30.29. 
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long term by falsifying a new identity, preferably as a citizen 
of the polis within which they found themselves (Lysias 23.7-
8). When- Pancleon, the slave in question, was located by his 
master in Athens, he was seized and carried off by force - an 
occurrence that the orator does not seem to regard as 
remarkable or unusual in itself (23.11-12). Simply put, despite 
the obvious charge of anachronism, I do not find i't likely that 
the no m o i of Kroton were any more favourable to slaves, 
runaways or otherwise, than other Greek states. 
Thus, however many Persians happened to have accompanied 
Demokedes to Kroton, it appears likely that they could have 
expected to reclaim possession of Demokedes without too much 
attention drawn to themselves - at least in a legalistic sense. 
The Persian empue, like many Greek states, was clearly a 
slave-owning system and even if the Persians in pursuit of 
Demokedes did not have a fine grasp of Krotoniate law, they 
would have had good reason to assume that runaway slaves 
constituted legally recoverable property. Indeed, fugitive 
- slaves may well only have expected to find sanctuary with an 
enemy state currently at war with their masters, as was the 
case with the Athenian slaves at Dekeleia during the 
Peloponnesian War after 413 (Thouk. 7.27.5). However, as no 
such conflict existed between Persia and Kroton it is difficult to 
believe that the Persian guardians of Demokedes would not 
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have made an attempt to reclaim the doctor. Furthermore, as 
the nostos of Demokedes pre-dates the anti-barbaros 
polarization of the early fifth century, there seems to be no 
good reason why the Persians would expect substantial 
opposition to their request. 
Regarding the matter of Milon, his daughter and the marriage 
to Demokedes it remains to be proven whefuer such an event is 
chronologically feasible. As will be argued in section (iv), the 
involvement of Milon carries with it potentially significant 
ramifications for the political situation at Kroton at that time. 
Milon must have been an adult in 532 when he won the first of 
his five senior Olympic wrestling victories (Paus. 6.14.5; Diod. 
12.9.6), and given his junior victory in 540 he is likely to have 
entered the 532 games at the minimum age of around 
eighteen. 25 Depending on whether one accepts that his first 
victory (in 540) was achieved at the age of twelve or younger, 
by the games of 532 Milon was therefore at least eighteen, if 
not as old as twenty or slightly older.26 
25 N.B. Crowther, "The Age Category of Boys at Olympia", Phoenix 42 
(1988), pp. 306-8; W.W.' Hyde, Olympic Victor Monuments and Greek 
Athletic Art (Washington, 1921), p. 106, n. 7; TWGa, pp. 360, 363; K. 
Palaeologos, "Famous Athletes in Ancient Greece", Athletics in Ancient 
Greece: Ancient Olympia and the Olympic Games, N. Yalouris (ed.) 
(Athens, 1976), p. 267; M.I. Finley & H.W. Pleket, The Olympic Games: the 
first thousand years (London, 1976), p. 38. 
26 No information exists to indicate a specific age. 
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Given that there is only a fifteen year interlude between the 
year in which Milon is known to have been of adult age (532) 
and the year in which Demokedes is alleged to have sought the 
hand of Milon' s daughter (c. 517), the Herodotean chronology 
appears at first to be suspect. As with the above case of the 
nomo i regarding slaves, we simply do not know for certain 
what the laws and conventions regarding marriageable ages for 
males and females at Kroton during the late archaic period 
were. However, classical period examples may serve to give an 
indication as to what the Krotoniates believed to be a suitable 
age to marry. 
The potential weakness m the Herodotean chronology lies not 
in. the age of Milon' s daughter as much as it does 1n the 
marrying age of Milon himself. That it was possible if not 
desirable for a woman to be married off as young as the age of 
fourteen in classical Athens is made plain in the Oikonomikos 
of Xenophon (7 5). Tlits model would therefore make it 
necessary for Milon to have married in or close to 532 in order 
for him to have fathered a child old enough to be of a 
marriageable age in c. 517. However, it is also commonly held 
that Athenian men on the other hand did not marry until their 
mid-twenties, with Hesiod having recommended as late as 
thirty years of age as the ideal (W &D 699-701).27 This 1s a 
2 7 E. Fantham et al., Women in the Classical World: Image and Text 
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model which, if applied to late sixth century Kroton, would 
make the premise of Milon having married 1n or around 532 
(i. e. when, at the oldest estimation, he was in his early 
twenties) unfeasible. 
While such age brackets may have constituted the ideal or 
perhaps even the norm 1n many Greek pole is, there 1s 
however evidence to suggest that exceptions were made and 
that cultural variations occurred. In Sparta, for instance, it 
would appear that males were encouraged to marry as early as 
age twenty (Xen. Lak.Pol. 1.6; Plu. Lyk. 15.1-2).2 8 More 
importantly, even 1n a po l is such as Athens, where a 
preference for later marriages for males is apparent, exceptions 
can be found. In another speech attributed to Lysias, an 
anonymous pleader gives an account of the first eight years of 
his adult life (i. e. ages eighteen through to twenty-six).29 At 
21.23-4 the pleader states that he is a married man and 
implies that he has at least two children. If the pleader's 
marriage has produced two children or more and his age is 
(Oxford, 1994), p. 101. 
28 See A.H.M. Jones, Sparta (Oxford, 1968), p. 35; M.M. Austin & P. 
Vidal-N aquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An 
Introduction (London, 1977), p. 83. 
2 9 Calculated from his statements at 21.1 and 21. 4 which identify the 
archonships in which he held a particular office or discusses other 
events in his life. 
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twenty-six, then it follows that his maximum age at the time of 
his marriage can only have been twenty-four, with the strong 
possibility of an even lower age. In classical Athens at least, it 
was therefore not impossible for a male to marry before his 
mid-twenties. 
Indeed, there are special circumstances in late sixth century 
Kroton which may indicate a greater propensity among 
Krotoniate men to marry earlier rather than later. The Battle 
of the Sagra River, fought around 550 between Kroton on the 
one side and a Lokrian/Rhegine coalition on the other, resulted 
in a massive defeat for the Krotoniate forces (Strabo 6.1.10).30 
Strabo goes on to note that Kroton experienced horrendous 
losses at the Sagra ( ... TO TTA.fj8os TWV TOTE TTEOOVTWV av8pwv), and it is 
probable that Kroton in effect lost the best part of an entire 
generation of young men overnight. It is evident in the 
classical period at least that the rulers of Greek poleis were 
---quite-preparecr to-a-dopt-polic1es-- which -were-designed-to either-----
boost declining citizen populations or stabilize expanding 
ones. 31 It should not therefore be viewed as mere unfounded 
3° For the date, see RCA, p. 251. 
31 Spartan efforts to address a declining population during the fifth 
and fourth centuries are well known: see S. Hodkinson, "Inheritance, 
Marriage and Demography: Perspectives upon the Success and Decline 
of Classical Sparta", Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success, A. 
Powell (ed.) (London, 1989), pp. 109-10. In contrast, Perikles' 
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speculation that Kroton may have employed policies designed 
to recoup its no doubt substantial losses namely, the 
encouragement of early marriages. 
Furthermore, In a speech by Isaios, there exists a reference to 
the betrothal of a girl in all likelihood under the age of fourteen 
(2.4-5). In this case, a certain Menekles requests the hand of a 
girl who is explicitly described as axEoo v i}f..z.Kiav ... avvoz.Kdv (2.4). 
Although close to an age deemed suitable for marriage, the girl 
in question is still considered by her g~ardians to be underage 
- an IS sue that does not prevent her betrothal to Menekles. 
This model, if adopted, would suggest that any daughter of 
Milon need not have been fourteen years old or more In c. 517 
to have been betrothed to Demokedes. Moreover, with this 
model either applied on its own, or in combination with the 
above arguments for Milon having married before his mid-
twenties, the fifteen year margin between Milon's adulthood 
and the engagement of his daughter becomes far less 
problematic. 
Thus, as a legal adult in 532, Milon could have married and 
fathered a daughter who would have been of an age considered 
suitable for marriage or at least betrothal by 517, when, 
Citizenship Law of 451/50 was a measure aimed at slowing the growth in 
citizen numbers (Arist. At h. Pol. 26. 3 ). 
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assuming Demo'kedes approached Milon shortly after his 
arrival in Kroton (as Herodotos' chronology suggests), the 
marriage was arranged. However, given the difficulties 
involved in using evidence removed by a century or more from 
the actual period under examination, it is necessary to stress 
that the events that occurred upon Demokedes' return to 
Kroton (as narrated by Herodotos) have been demonstrated to 
be within the realms of possibility rather than certainty. That 
they have been demonstrated to be at least plausible in the 
given historical and cultural context, however, should give 
caution to the view that Herodotos was merely fulfilling his 
role as a gifted embellisher and story-teller.32 In essence, 
that Demokedes a) sailed to Kroton under Persian guard, and b) 
consolidated his escape by marrying the daughter of Milon 
cannot simply be rejected on the charge of being Herodotean 
and therefore outrageous fiction. Herodotos was in all 
probability guilty of melding several quaint flourishes, such as 
the Demokedes-Atossa episode, on to the account of 
Demokedes' no s to s, but this should only warrant the 
employment of a sieve, not a sledgehammer. 
(iv) Having given the narration of Herodotos, at 3.136-7 in 
particular, an opportunity to stand as a source of s o me 
potentially reliable information, it is now important to examine 
3 2 A view well extrapolated by Griffiths, "Democedes of Craton", esp. 
pp. 45-7. 
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the Krotoniate side of the equation. Indeed, crucial to this 
equation is the question of why did Demokedes single out 
Milon when looking to consolidat~ his escape from his Persian 
minders? Herodotos of course gives us a response to this at 
3.137, arguing that Milon's was a name that was respected 
even by Dareios in distant Persia. That Dareios may have 
known who Milon was is not impossible. By c. 517 Milon had 
after all achieved four successive victories at the Olympic 
Games in the wrestling event, and would have been famous 
throughout the Greek world at least.33 However, whether 
Dareios actually knew of Milon or not, Herodotos undermines 
his own assertion with a report of an alleged conversation 
between Dareios and Atossa in which both confess to knowing 
very little about Hellas, let alone specific competitors in Greek 
games (3 .134). That Milon' s fellow Krotoniate Demokedes may 
have earlier related some news of the athlete's prowess to 
Dareios is of course possible, but the assertion that Dareios was 
sufficiently in awe of the man to surrender the possession of a 
valuable slave is dubious. In sum, I am in agreement with the 
observations of Griffiths, and the earlier commentary of How 
and Wells, that Herodotos was probably exaggerating the 
extent of the Great King's familiarity with individual Greeks not 
33 Finley & Pleket, The Olympic Games: the first thousand years, p. 38; 
"List of Ancient Olympic Victors", Athletics in Ancient Greece, N. 
Yalouris (ed.), p. 290. 
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directly m his employ. 3 4 
Having cast enough doubt on 'name-recognition' 1n distant 
Sousa as the reason for Demokedes' decision to ally himself to 
the family of Milon, we must examine those aspects of Milon 
not connected with his sporting career. Regarding the non-
Olympic part of Milon' s life, the ancient sources highlight two 
main features. The first is that Milon led the Krotoniate army 
against the Sybarites· in 510 (Diod. 12.9-5-6), and the second, 
that Milon was a follower of Pythagoras of Samos (Strabo 
6.1.12; Iamb., VP 249, 267; DL 8.39; Aristox. F18 [Wehrli]). 
Both features clearly indicate that Milon was in an interesting 
position at Kroton in terms of his influence and standing. No 
doubt much of this was originally based on his Olympic 
successes and Demokedes would thus have been wise to court 
the athlete's favour. However, Milon's involvement with the 
Pythagoreans suggests another possibility. Having arrived in 
Kroton around 531, Pythagoras appears to have inspired the_ 
formation of a society apart from the various existing political 
factions (lamb., VP 29-30, 74; DL 8.3), and which had also 
attracted a number of the leading men of the po l is - of which 
34 Griffiths, "Democedes of Croton", p. 45; How & Wells, A 
Commentary on Herodotus, p. 298. 
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Milon was one (Iamb., VP 88).35 By making a marriage 
alliance to the family of Milon, Demokedes may well have been 
making a conscious decision to seek the protection of the 
faction to which Milon belonged - the Pythagoreans. Certainly, 
more sense can be made of Demokedes' use of Milon in order to 
consolidate his escape from Persia than when relying on 
Herodotos' explanation for this event. Thus Milon is in fact 
relied upon for name-recognition, but within Kroton rather 
than without, at Sousa or elsewhere. Moreover, the appearance 
of Demokedes as a Pythagorean during the post-Sybarite war 
stasis at Kroton IS provided with a mini-history of its own 
(Iamb., VP 261). Demokedes was almost certainly drawn into 
the Pythagorean ranks by his Pythagorean benefactor and 
father-in-law, Milon. 
While the influence of this society was In all likelihood 
exaggerated by the biographers of Pythagoras, 3 6 we do 
possess one alleged example of this group having successfully 
intervened in Krotoniate politics. Diodoros (12.9.4) and 
Iamblichos (VP 133) both report that Pythagoras and his 
35 For the date see Attianese, Kroton: Ex Nummis Historia, p. 14. 
3 6 Given what we do know about the very mixed fortunes of later 
Pythagoreans at Kroton, the statement of Diogenes Laertius that the 
Pythagoreans formed the ruling elite of that po l is cannot be taken 
seriously (8.3). 
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followers intervened successfully during a debate over foreign 
policy in 510. The position taken by the Pythagoreans in effect 
constituted them as the 'war party' of Krotoniate politics, as it 
was over the issue of Sybarite exiles and subsequent threats 
from Sybaris that the Pythagoreans took their stand (Diod. 
12.9.2-4). That Milon is said to have led the Krotoniate army in 
the ensuing war should come as no surprise given his 
attachment to the Pythagorean cause. Moreover, if Demokedes 
did in fact seek to associate himself with the Pythagoreans via 
Milon in c. 517, as seems possible, then in effect we are dealing 
with an earlier instance of Pythagorean intervention in a 
potentially political matter than that of the war with Sybaris. 
That Milon' s intervention on Demokedes' behalf was indeed an 
act with political connotations is clear. The protection of 
Demokedes was in essence a slap in the face for the Persians 
who were charged with his safe-keeping. Indeed, the Persians' 
demand is not unlike the demands of Telys in 510, when other 
fugitives, on this occasion Sybarite aristoi, sought sanctuary in 
Kroton (Diod. 12.9.2-3). On both occasions it is fugitives who 
are at issue, and on both occasions it is the Pythagoreans who 
form the resistance to the demands of the 'outsiders'. 
Furthermore, on both occasions the recipients of Pythagorean 
aid are members of the wealthy and/or aristocratic class. 
While such information is clearly stated by Diodoros when 
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discussing the victims of Telys (12.9.2-3), Herodotos is not so 
forthcoming about the social situation of Demokedes, nor for 
that matter does it seem particularly relevant to the latter 
historian's purpose, which was to narrate an adventure story. 
However, despite his scepticism concernmg much of the detail 
of Demokedes' nostos, Griffiths has accepted the Suda' s 
information regarding Demokedes' family. 3 7 Demokedes was 
most probably a member of the priest class - through his 
father Kalliphon, a Knidian priest of Asklepios - and was 
therefore in many ways a spiritual cousin to those other 
influential and aristocratic priestly families of the Greek West: 
the Telinidai of Gela (Hdt. 7.153-4); and the Iamidai of Kroton 
and Syracuse (Hdt. 5.44-5; Pind. OZ. 6.43, 57-81). To underline 
the point, it is probable that Demokedes later qualified for 
membership of the Krotoniate chilion, a forum in which 
presumably only one thousand of the wealthiest and 
aristocratic Krotoniates could debate (lamb., VP 257, 260), 
again suggesting that his class background was by no means an 
unprivileged one. 
At any rate, priesthoods were regularly the preserve of the 
royal and aristocratic families of Greek poleis throughout 
archaic period Hell as, 3 8 and in the colonies priests and their 
37 Griffiths, "Democedes of Croton", pp. 48-9. 
3 8 For example: the Eurypontidai and the Agiadai of Sparta (Xen. 
Lak.Pol. 15.2-5); the Battiadai of Kyrene (Hdt. 4.161); the Teisandridai of 
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descendants also often formed part of the elite class.39 As the 
direct descendant of a priest, Demokedes would In all 
probability have found it relatively easy to assimilate himself 
into Kroton' s upper classes. Furthermore, as stated previously, 
the Pythagoreans are known to have attracted many of the 
elite to their ranks (Iamb., VP 88, 254), among them Milon, 
Kylon (briefly), Hippasos, and possibly Theages, as well as ·a 
certain Diodoros, and to have even recruited enough of them to 
play a significant role in the running of the state (Iamb., VP 
254). 4 0 Indeed, it would appear that the stasis in Kroton 
that followed the Krotoniate victory over Sybaris in 510 was In 
part provoked by the Pythagoreans' insistence on maintaining 
the ancien regime with all of its undemocratic and exclusive 
practices. 41 In sum, the Pythagoreans were evidently 
attractive to, and recruited from, the elite tier of society and 
were happy to identify themselves with traditional aristocratic 
Athens (Hdt. 5.66); and the Eumolpidai and Kerykes of Athens (Thouk. 
8.53.2). 
3 9 Gelon the Telinid established a dynastic tyranny over Gela and 
Syracuse (Hdt. 7.154-5); Kallias, an Iamid of Elis acquired gifts of land at 
Kroton (Hdt 5.45); and Hagesias, an Iamid of Stymphalos was a supporter 
and no doubt confidant of Hieron I of Syracuse (Pind. OZ. 6.92-8). 
4 ° Kylon was the exarch of the newly conquered Sybaritid and is 
mentioned specifically as a member of the richest class (Iamb., VP 74, 
258). Hippasos, Theages and Diodoros were all probably members of the 
Krotoniate chilion, (Iamb., VP 257, 260). 
41 Vatai, Intellectuals m Politics in the Greek World, pp. 53-5 
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causes such as repress10n of democracy (Iamb., VP 257) and 
the monopolization of land (Iamb. VP 255). Moreover, 
whether these elites happened to be fugitive aristoi from 
Sybaris or an escapee doctor of priestly and Knidian descent, 
the Pythagoreans appeared only too ready to offer their 
protection. 
However, the chief potential weakness in the case for a 
Pythagorean role 1n the events surrounding Demokedes' 
nostos lies in the silence of Herodotos. Herodotos' narrative 
does make it clear that some Krotoniates were in favour of 
handing over the escapee Demokedes to the Persians, whilst 
others actively resisted this course of action (3 .13 7). Milon was 
therefore not alone in his involvement in the effort to succour 
Demokedes and this may in fact be an allusion to the 
participation of the Pythagorean faction to which he belonged. 
However Herodotos, who clearly knows something about the 
historical Pythagoras and what. approximately a Pythagorean 
was, makes no mention of Milon' s affiliations or indeed that the 
Pythagoreans were even present in Kroton at that time. 
The words Pythagoras and Pythagorean occur on a total of four 
occasions in the History of Herodotos, and an examination of 
their occurrence is revealing when seeking to explain the 
absence of Pythagorean references at 3.137. All of Herodotos' 
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remarks linking Pythagoras and/or his followers to a 
geographical location relate to the eastern Mediterranean 
world. Herodotos knows Pythagoras was from Samos (4.95), a 
polis which the historian has been shown to have known much 
about, and that oral tradition had given him a geographical 
range among - the Thrakians and the Greeks of the Hellespont 
and Pontos (4.95-6). However, Herodotos demonstrates no 
knowledge of Pythagoras ever having travelled to Magna 
Graecia, despite Herodotos' later discussion of the war between 
Kroton and Sybaris (5.44-5). Indeed, Herodotos demonstrates 
that he had interviewed at least one person with knowledge 
about the war from the Krotoniate perspective (presumably a 
Krotoniate) by contrasting the oral histories of the· Syba~ites 
and Kroton (5.45). As a citizen of Thourioi during the 440' s, 
Herodotos' paradoxic display of relatively detailed and sparse 
knowledge of Kroton is puzzling. As stated earlier, many of the 
sources pertaining to Pythagoras and his sojourn in Magna 
Graecia may be considered suspect on a number of grounds, 
but surely not to the extent that Pythagoras' presence in Italy 
was a fabrication? 
A possible solution to -this problem lies _in the tim~-frame 
within which Herodotos was actually in Italy when he wrote 
those parts of his History relevant to Kroton. In his 
reassessment of the tyranny of Kleinias, as outlined by 
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Dionysios of Halikarnassos (20.7), Bicknell has persuasively 
dated the aforementioned tyranny as being effective between 
c. 453 and c. 440.4 2 This tyranny closely followed an 
outbreak of anti-Pythagorean violence which resulted in the 
expulsion of the Pythagoreans from Kroton (Aristox. F18; Iamb., 
VP 249; DL 8.39; Polyb. 2.39.1). Although this mass-expulsion 
was led at first by a certain Litates around 454 (Iamb., VP 
263 ), it would appear that Kleinias maintained Litates' anti-
Pythagorean policies, as there is no suggestion of a Pythagorean 
nostos until after the Thourian invasion of Kroton in c. 440 
(Iamb., VP 263-4).43 
Indeed Polybios, who does not suffer from the same 
hagiographical tendencies as Iamblichos 1n regard to 
Pythagoras, makes no mention at all of an amnesty extended to 
the Pythagoreans by the Krotoniates once the stasis of the 
440's had come to a close (2.39.4-6). Moreover, it is a difficult 
task to find any room for a Pythagorean role in the mainland 
Achaian League-brokered politeia of Kroton and the new 
Italiote Achaian koinon, despite the claims to the contrary by 
Iamblichos (Iamb., VP 263-4, cf. Polyb. 2.39.5-6). The 
differences between the democratic hue of the Achaian states 
42 Bicknell, "The Tyranny of Kleinias at Kroton", pp. 5-25. 
43 Ibid., p. 17. Compare with F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary 
on Polybius (Oxford, 1957), pp 225-6. 
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of the Peloponnesos at the time of their mediation efforts in 
Italy, and the autocratic tendencies of the Pythagoreans must 
have been substantial, if not irreconcilable. 4 4 That the 
Pythagoreans returned 1n any great numbers or to positions of 
respect and influence at Kroton after c. 440, should therefore 
not be assumed.45 Indeed, it would appear that many, if not 
most Pythagoreans transferred to other Italiote poleis rather 
than risk returning to Kroton. Certainly it is from Taras, 
Metapontion and Rhegion that most Pythagoreans of note 
emerge or base themselves after c. 440, including Archytas, 
Eurytos and possibly even Philolaos as well.4 6 
The problem of Herodotos' lack of knowledge concerning 
Pythagoreans in Kroton, despite his acce~s to local knowledge, 
can therefore be interpreted more favourably. Having arrived 
at Thourioi no earlier than 444/3 (the date of its foundation), 
44 For the general democratic disposition of Achaia during the second 
half of the fifth century see Thouk. 5.82.1 and comments by J.A.O. 
Larsen, Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History (Oxford, 
1968), p. 87, and Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, p. 224. 
For the autocratic and elitist tendencies amongst the Pythagoreans, see 
Iamb., VP 193, 199, 226-7, 255, 257, 260. 
45 Iamblichos himself admits that the Pythagoreans who allegedly 
returned to Kroton numbered little more than sixty (VP 264). 
46 
. C. Huffman, Philolaos of Craton: Pythagorean and Presocratic (a 
commentary on the fragments and testimonia with interpretive essays) 
(Cambridge, 1993), p. 6. See also Iamb., VP 130, 172, 197, 251, 267. 
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and residing there until his death in the 420's (Steph. Byz. s.v. 
eovpioi), Herodotos' sources for his Krotoniate history must have 
been heavily influenced by the events of recent years. Kroton, 
having first endured fourteen years of stasis and tyranny 
under Litates and Kleinias respectively, 1n which anti-
Pythagorean pogroms appear to have been a maJor feature, 
could not be expected to have been a repository of pro-
Pythagorean sources. Furthermore, as has been argued 
previously, this period of overt anti-Pythagoreanism was in all 
probability not succeeded by an era 1n which .the 
Pythagoreans could flourish. They were more likely to have 
been regarded by the new democratic and pan-Achaian regime 
as antiques, whose involvement in at least two civil wars since 
their formation around 531, cast serious doubts over their 
eligibility to remain in Kroton.4 7 Thus, if Herodotos was to 
report on Pythagorean activity in Kroton during the late sixth 
century, he required a written or oral history from which to 
draw upon - history which either no longer 'existed' or had 
been seriously edited by a generation of anti-Pythagorean 
sources. Similarly, neither would the Sybarite survivors of the 
Krotoniate/Pythagorean invasion, who were to share briefly 
the site of Thourioi with the panhellenic settlers from the 
Aegean (of whom Herodotos was one), have much to say in the 
Pythagoreans' favour (Diod. 12.10.3-11.1). 
4 7 Two Pythagorean-orientated civil wars are known to have occurred 
, in 509 (Iamb., VP 248-9, 252, 255, 258, 261-2), and 454 (see section [iv]). 
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Theoretically, the absence of any Pythagorean references 
during the nostos of Demokedes could be overlooked due to 
the relative non-importance of the event. Unless one 
interprets the participation of Phayllos of Kroton in the Battle 
of Salamis as a Krotoniate swipe at the Persians for their 
arrogance 1n c. 517 (Hdt. 8.47),. there were no serious 
repercuss10ns from the escape of Demokedes. Even those 
sources that did make it their business to discuss the lives of 
vanous Pythagoreans do not concern themselves with this 
story. Wheri Demokedes does appear in the Pythagorean 
corpus, it is at a point in his life where he has already become a 
Pythagorean, and is thus of interest to the source (Iamb., VP 
257, 261). Despite the joy which Iamblichos appears to find in 
compiling lists of Pythagoreans, he generally offers no details 
on their pre-Pythagorean lives, even when discussing the 
grand masters of the school. Moreover, it would also be of little 
value to argue that this story might be expected to appear in a 
Life of the Pythagorean Milon. The only deeds that interested 
the sources wilting to discuss Pythagoreans at length were 
those related to their Pythagoreanism - for example, Milon' s 
alleged rescue of Pythagoras and his school (Strabo 6.1.12). 
Therefore, that the nostos of Demokedes, who was not a grand 
master, does not feature in the Pythagorean corpus should not 
be seen as surpnsmg. Rather, this particular story was more 
befitting of a historian and tale-collector such as Herodotos. 
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The absence of any mention of Pythagoras or his followers in 
Herodotos' narrative at 5.44-5 (the war between Kroton and 
Sybaris) is however far more difficult to pass off as absent-
mindedness. If the Pythagoreans were as unimportant in the 
history of Kroton as Herodotos' source(s) seem to imply, then 
why did a civil war ensue between pro and anti-Pythagorean 
factions in 509 and again in 454? Clearly there were two very 
differing traditions regarding the war with Sybaris: a virtually 
Pythagorean-free one from which Herodotos appears to have 
drawn upon; the other from which an array of significantly 
later and outwardly pro-Pythagorean sources find inspiration 
(including Diodoros, Strabo, Iamblichos and Porphyrios). 
The major exception 1Il the latter category IS of course 
Aristoxenos. However, it should be noted that this particular 
Pythagoras hagiographer states that he actually managed to 
meet some Pythagoreans during the fourth century (Aristox. 1Il 
DL 8.46). However, none of these Pythagoreans were 
Krotoniates and if anything, their diverse origins indicate the 
extent to which the Pythagorean school had become a diaspora 
- a diaspora most probably with its origins In the anti-
Pythagorean stasis of 454. In sum, it is unlikely that 
Herodotos had the opportunity to meet any Pythagoreans, nor 
even any Krotoniates who were prepared to attribute much 
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that was constructive to them. This 1s of course understandable, 
in the context of the Pythagoreans being on the losing side in a 
civil war. 
Therefore, the impact of this generation of anti-Pythagorean 
sources was to ensure the absence of any references to 
Pythagoras and his school in Kroton. Moreover, if the model 
proposed in this section is adopted, it follows that Herodotos 
was only able to extract an 'edited' version of this story from 
his source(s) in Magna Graecia, obtained after the definitive 
removal of the Pythagoreans from Kroton. The story that 
Herodotos did manage to hear was of interest to him, as it was 
a piece which, as Griffiths has argued, could easily be adapted 
to a long-standing hero genre of the eastern Mediterranean. 4 8 
Furthermore, even mmus the Pythagorean connotations that 
this paper has sought to identify, the story possesses good 
propaganda value for the Krotoniates. As with the story of 
Phayllos which Herodotos no doubt has also picked up from the 
proud Krotoniates (Hdt. 8.47), Demokedes' nostos show-cases 
Krotoniate disdain for Persian power in the post-Xerxes era in 
which Herodotos wrote his History.4 9 
Thus to Herodotos the story of Demokedes' nostos was 
probably little more than a good tale. To the biographers and 
48 Griffiths, "Democedes of Craton", pp. 37-8, 45-6, 50. 
49 Ibid., p. 46. 
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historians of the Pythagoreans, the story was irrelevant. 
However, to the modern scholar, the story has considerable 
potential value. The rescue of Demokedes from the Persians by 
Milon and his associates represents the earliest known instance 
of Pythagorean involvement in the politics of Kroton. As stated 
previously, the rescue of Demokedes pre-dates the intervention 
of the Pythagoreans in the debate over Sybarite supplicants in 
510. As a result, we are offered a glimpse of this largely 
mysterious yet evidently potent faction during the hitherto 
shrouded years between Pythagoras' arrival at Kroton around 
531 and his advocation of war in 510. 
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